Filed: Oct. 09, 2020
Latest Update: Oct. 10, 2020
Summary: Case: 20-60491 Document: 00515596806 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/09/2020 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED October 9, 2020 No. 20-60491 Lyle W. Cayce Summary Calendar Clerk Nelson Frederick Jones, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant—Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi USDC No. 4:19-CV-28 Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Cir
Summary: Case: 20-60491 Document: 00515596806 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/09/2020 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED October 9, 2020 No. 20-60491 Lyle W. Cayce Summary Calendar Clerk Nelson Frederick Jones, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant—Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi USDC No. 4:19-CV-28 Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Circ..
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Case: 20-60491 Document: 00515596806 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/09/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 9, 2020
No. 20-60491
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Nelson Frederick Jones,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 4:19-CV-28
Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff-appellant, Nelson Frederick Jones, applied for and was
denied social security disability benefits by the Commissioner of Social
Security. The district court affirmed. For the reasons set forth herein, we
AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-60491 Document: 00515596806 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/09/2020
No. 20-60491
I.
Jones applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income benefits, alleging that he had been disabled since June 1,
2016, due to left leg problems and spinal problems as well as an enlarged heart
and high blood pressure. The Commissioner denied relief.
At Jones’s request, a hearing was then held before an administrative
law judge (“ALJ”), at which Jones was represented by counsel and both
Jones and a vocational expert testified. After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ
determined that although Jones’s “impairments do result in some functional
limitations,” Jones was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act (the “Act”). Following the ALJ’s decision, Jones requested review by
the Appeals Council, which denied the request. Accordingly, the ALJ’s
decision became the Commissioner’s final decision under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
Jones then appealed to the district court, where a magistrate judge,
sitting by consent of the parties, affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Jones
subsequently filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, which was denied,
though the magistrate judge nevertheless issued an Amended Final
Judgment, again affirming the Commissioner’s decision. Jones timely filed a
notice of appeal.
II.
Our review of a final decision denying social security benefits is
limited by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Specifically, we review a denial of social
security benefits only to determine “whether (1) the decision is supported by
substantial evidence and (2) proper legal standards were used to evaluate the
evidence.” Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995). “If the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, then the
findings are conclusive and the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed.”
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Id. Substantial evidence is a deferential standard and requires more than a
scintilla of evidence but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.
Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). In determining whether substantial evidence supports
the Commissioner’s decision, “[w]e may not . . . reweigh the evidence or try
the issues de novo.”
Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174. Indeed, it is for the
Commissioner—not the courts—to “resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
Id.
Finally, the harmless error doctrine applies to social security cases, see Morris
v. Bowen,
864 F.2d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1998), and we will not vacate the
Commissioner’s decision unless the claimant’s rights are substantially
affected, see Shineski v. Sanders,
556 U.S. 396, 407–08 (2009); Jones v. Astrue,
691 F.3d 730, 733–34 (5th Cir. 2012).
To be entitled to disability benefits, a claimant must show that he is
“disabled” within the meaning of the Act. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 563–
64 (5th Cir. 1995). “Disability is defined as an ‘inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment’ lasting at least twelve months.” Kneeland v. Berryhill,
850 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). To
determine disability, the Commissioner engages in a five-step analysis: (1) Is
the claimant currently working? (2) Does the claimant have a severe
impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or equal a listed impairment? (4)
Does the impairment prevent the claimant from performing past relevant
work? (5) Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing other work?
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); see also
Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173–
74.
Before reaching step four in the five-step analysis, the Commissioner
makes a determination about the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), which is a “determination of the most the claimant can still do
despite his [or her] physical and mental limitations and is based on all relevant
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evidence in the claimant’s record.” Kneeland, 850 F.3d at 754 (quoting Perez
v. Barnhart,
415 F.3d 457, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2005)) (alteration in original). The
RFC determination then guides the next steps of the five-step analysis:
whether the claimant can perform his past work or other available work.
Id.
Despite Jones’s argument to the contrary, a review of the record
reveals both that the Commissioner’s determination that Jones is not
disabled under the Act is supported by substantial evidence and that the
Commissioner properly considered the evidence. In contesting this
determination, Jones brings two challenges. First, he challenges the ALJ’s
determination that he has a medium RFC, meaning he could “perform[]
medium work with some exertional limitation.” Second, he challenges the
ALJ’s determination of his past relevant work. Each argument is discussed in
turn.
A.
Jones argues that the law requires the ALJ to consider carefully all
medical opinions, whether from treating, examining, or non-examining
physicians, and that, in making the RFC determination, the ALJ failed to
consider the opinion of a non-examining physician as required by 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527.1 Specifically, he argues that the ALJ “improperly found that [he]
was capable of performing a range of work at the medium exertional level
despite the fact that [a] non-examining physician . . . limited [him] to a light
residual functional capacity.”
Jones’s argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, as required
by the federal regulations, “the ALJ articulate[d] the weight” given to the
non-examining and examining physicians’ opinions in that she gave the non-
1
That regulation provides, inter alia, that, regardless of its source, every medical
opinion is evaluated. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
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examining physicians’ opinions “some weight,” and the examining
physician’s opinion “great weight,” Hammond v. Barnhart, 124 F. App’x
847, 851 (5th Cir. 2005). The ALJ further explained that in light of “the other
clinical findings, [Jones’s] testimony, and the medical evidence” as well as
the opinion of an examining physician, a medium RFC was “more
consistent” with the evidence.
Second, to the extent the ALJ’s limited explanation was an error, we
consider the error harmless. See id. (applying the harmless error doctrine to
a social security case); see also
Morris, 864 F.2d at 335 (observing that
“procedural improprieties . . . will . . . constitute a basis for remand only if
such improprieties would cast into doubt the existence of substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s decision”); Alejandro v. Barnhart, 291 F.
Supp. 2d 497, 515 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (explaining that, in the context of how
the ALJ treats the opinions of state agency medical consultants, “courts have
. . . declined to reverse and remand on procedural grounds when it is clear
that the procedural error did not compromise the decision-making process”
and the ALJ’s decision is otherwise supported by substantial evidence).
To be sure, it is true that the record includes an opinion from a non-
examining physician that would limit Jones to a light RFC and thus conflicts
with the other non-examining physician’s opinion. But this inconsistency is
insufficient to overturn the ALJ’s determination on substantial evidence
review where, as here, there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting
the ALJ’s decision. See Hammond, 124 F. App’x at 851–52. For example, the
record shows that, among other things, although Jones has reported
increased pain with lateral rotation of the cervical spine, he also has a
balanced gait, strong grip, normal internal and external rotation of the right
and left hips, and a normal range of motion of his lumbar spine. Additionally,
the examining physician’s opinion observes that “there should be any
number of things [Jones] could do.” Similarly, one of the non-examining
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physician’s opinions is consistent with the ALJ’s finding that Jones is neither
limited to a light RFC nor disabled under the Act. Specifically, that opinion
states that Jones has no severe impairments.
Therefore, even if the ALJ erred in her consideration of the
physicians’ opinions, her decision remains supported by substantial
evidence.
B.
Jones also asserts that the ALJ’s decision is erroneous because the
vocational expert misclassified his past relevant work. He argues that his past
relevant work should have been classified as an immersion metal-cleaner
rather than as a general inspector. This argument is unavailing. As it is
Jones’s burden to prove his disability, it was his obligation to raise this
objection to the vocational expert’s classification of his past relevant work at
the administrative hearing. See Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir.
1990); see also
Leggett, 67 F.3d at 566 (“The ALJ’s duty to investigate . . . does
not extend to possible disabilities that are not alleged by the claimant or to
those disabilities that are not clearly indicated on the record.”). But Jones did
not do so.
To that end, Jones’s argument that his past relevant work was actually
as an immersion metal-cleaner is essentially a request for us to reweigh the
evidence, which we will not do. Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174.
Nor can Jones rely on the record to prevail on this issue given that the
vocational expert’s testimony was not challenged, is not inherently
unreliable, and is not in conflict with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(“DOT”). As we have previously held, an ALJ may rely on a vocational
expert’s knowledge of job requirements as her basis for determining a
claimant’s past work. See Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 146 (5th Cir. 2000);
Leggett, 67 F.3d at 565; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(e), 416.966(e). In this
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case, the vocational expert classified Jones’s past work as the job of “General
Inspector” under DOT, number 609.684-014, which is performed at the light
exertional level. Further, Jones’s own testimony supported this
classification, testifying that his past work was as “an inspector,” which
involved putting “small engine parts . . . in [a] machine [that] washes them”
before giving the parts to other people for processing. As Jones explained, his
job was to “ma[k]e sure [the parts] were clean.” Additionally, the vocational
expert classified Jones’s past relevant work as a general inspector as
described in the DOT without any modifications, and the DOT classifies the
work of a general inspector as a light RFC, which Jones could perform.
Accordingly, there is no conflict between the DOT and the vocational
expert’s testimony. See Carey, 230 F.3d at 144 n.2. Similarly, the vocational
expert’s testimony does not create a conflict between the medium RFC
determination and the DOT job description. See
id.
Therefore, the ALJ did not err in relying on the vocational expert, and
the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
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