Filed: Aug. 24, 2021
Latest Update: Aug. 25, 2021
Case: 21-60400 Document: 00515993294 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/24/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 24, 2021
No. 21-60400
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Eugene H. Irving,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Wilco Life Insurance Company,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 4:20-CV-80
Before King, Costa, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
The district court in this case granted a motion for summary judgment
in favor of defendant-appellee Wilco Life Insurance Company. For the
reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-60400 Document: 00515993294 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/24/2021
No. 21-60400
I.
This matter arises from a dispute between plaintiff-appellant Eugene
H. Irving and defendant-appellee Wilco Life Insurance Company (“Wilco”)
regarding a life insurance policy. In February 1995, Wilco’s predecessor-in-
interest, Lamar Life Insurance Company, issued to Irving a flexible premium
adjustable life policy, which enables the insured to determine how much of a
premium he will pay and accumulates value based on the premiums paid.
Irving paid monthly premiums of $343 from then until October 3, 2018. In
September 2018, Wilco sent a grace-period notice to Irving and informed
Irving that to cover the policy’s monthly deductions, Wilco would be
required to increase premiums to at least $470 monthly from October 2018
through February 2019, and again on February 3, 2019, to again increase his
premium to at least $514 monthly. Irving, through his representative, called
Wilco and authorized that his premium payment be increased to $470, at
which time the sales agent informed Irving that he would need to call again
to adjust the payment for the new February minimum. Irving called Wilco
again in November, after receiving another grace-period notice, and a sales
agent informed Irving that another call would be required in January 2019 to
increase the premium payment. Wilco sent additional grace-period notices in
February, March, April, May, June, and July of 2019. Because Irving failed
to make the minimum payment required by the policy, Wilco terminated it
on September 3, 2019.
Irving brought this breach-of-contract suit in the Circuit Court of
Attala County, Mississippi, alleging that Wilco wrongfully terminated the
policy. Wilco removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The
district court then granted summary judgment in favor of Wilco and
dismissed Irving’s claims, finding that Wilco properly canceled the policy
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after Irving failed to pay the required minimum premiums. A final judgment
was entered in this case on April 6, 2021. Irving timely appeals.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Fort
Worth 4th St. Partners, L.P. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 882 F.3d 574, 577 (5th
Cir. 2018). In so doing, we “must resolve all reasonable doubts and draw all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Sanchez
v. Young Cnty.,
956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is
required “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Acker
v. Gen. Motors, L.L.C.,
853 F.3d 784, 788 (5th Cir. 2017). “A genuine issue
of material fact exists if the record, taken as a whole, could lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Harris v. Serpas,
745 F.3d 767, 771
(5th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment cannot be defeated through
“[c]onclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences,
unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation.” Acker, 853 F.3d at
788.
III.
The district court found, and no one has disputed, that the policy
allowed Wilco to terminate it should Irving fail to make the required
minimum premium payments. The issue, according to Irving, is that the
district court failed to recognize that the policy enabled Wilco to adjust
Irving’s payment amount unilaterally and Wilco failed to do so.
The parties agree that Mississippi law governs the contract. Under
Mississippi law, a breach-of-contract case consists of two elements: “‘(1) the
existence of a valid and binding contract,’ and (2) a showing ‘that the
defendant has broken, or breached it.’” Maness v. K & A Enters. of Miss.,
LLC, 250 So. 3d 402, 414 (Miss. 2018) (quoting Bus. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Banks,
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90 So. 3d 1221, 1224 (Miss. 2012)). The parties do not contest the validity of
the contract. “Questions of contract construction and ambiguity are
‘questions of law that are committed to the court.’” Epperson v.
SOUTHBank,
93 So. 3d 10, 17 (Miss. 2012) (quoting Royer Homes of Miss.,
Inc. v. Chandeleur Homes, Inc.,
857 So. 2d 748, 752 (Miss. 2003)). When
interpreting a contract, an appeals court “reads the contract as a whole, gives
contract terms their plain meaning, and construes any ambiguities against the
drafter.” Biel Reo, LLC v. Lee Freer Kennedy Crestview, LLC,
242 So. 3d 833,
844 (Miss. 2018) (quoting Cain v. Cain,
967 So. 2d 654, 662-63 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2007)). Here, the district court correctly concluded that the policy did
not authorize Wilco to increase the amount of Irving’s premium payments
without prior authorization from Irving.
Irving argues that the district court improperly interpreted the
“Authorization Agreement for Preauthorized Payments in favor of Lamar
Life Insurance Company, Jackson, Mississippi,” which provided:
You[, Wilco,] are hereby authorized as a convenience to me[,
Irving,] to initiate debit entries to my (our) account by and
payable to the order of Lamar Life Insurance Company of
Jackson, Mississippi, provided there are sufficient collected
funds in said account to pay the same upon presentation. I
agree that your rights in respect to each such entry shall be the
same as if it were a check drawn on you signed personally by
me.
Irving contends that this provision gave Wilco the authority to determine
what amount it could withdraw from Irving’s account to pay premiums under
the policy, but giving this language its plain and ordinary meaning and
considering the policy as a whole, that is a meaning this language cannot bear.
The policy’s provision on premiums provided: “The initial premium is the
amount paid on or before delivery of this policy. You[, Irving,] may make
other premium payments: (a) at any time; and (b) for any amount of $25 or
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No. 21-60400
more, and less than any maximum amount we may set.” No similar ability is
granted to Wilco. This language establishes that it is Irving who must
determine when premiums would be paid and how much he would pay. The
Authorization Agreement then enabled Wilco to initiate debit entries from
Irving’s account for the amounts of Irving’s preauthorized payments, but it
cannot be read to have granted Wilco the right to change the payments that
Irving authorized. Properly read, the agreement between Irving and Wilco
enabled Wilco to withdraw premium payments from Irving’s bank account,
but Irving, and not Wilco, had the ability to set the amount of those payments.
Therefore, the district court properly interpreted the provisions of this
contract.
Irving further argued that the district court erred by making a factual
determination that Irving did not authorize increasing his premium payments
to $514 per month. This determination, Irving suggests, should have been
left to the jury. To survive a motion for summary judgment, Irving must
demonstrate a genuine factual dispute that is material. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). None exists here. Irving has produced no evidence of a statement from
him or his representatives that authorized increasing his premium payment
to $514, and therefore, there is no genuine factual dispute. Acker, 853 F.3d at
788 (explaining that summary judgment cannot be defeated by an
“unsubstantiated assertion[]”). Irving similarly has not produced evidence
that suggests he requested that Wilco draw from his account whatever
minimum payment was necessary to maintain his policy regardless of cost.
Finally, Irving argues that the district court erred in denying his claim
for punitive damages. These damages would be contingent on there being a
breach of contract. Because we affirm the district court’s holding that Wilco
did not breach the insurance policy, Irving’s claim for punitive damages must
also fail.
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No. 21-60400
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
Wilco’s motion for summary judgment.
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