Appellant was arrested on November 4, 1952, by the United States Marshal at Bartow, Florida, upon a warrant issued by the District Judge for the Eastern District of Tennessee, to answer a complaint charging him with a violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 2312, in which it was set forth that on October 23, 1952, he had transported, in interstate commerce, a stolen motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen, and also with violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 1201, in which it was set forth that on the same date, he had kidnapped one George Hershel Myers, whom he had taken from Tennessee to Georgia. Subsequently, separate indictments were returned by the grand jury, charging him with the commission of the above mentioned offenses. Upon being arraigned on November 12, 1952, the District Judge refused to accept appellant's guilty plea and appointed able counsel to protect his rights. Thereafter, upon motion of his counsel, appellant was examined by a qualified psychiatrist who furnished a report of his examination to the District Judge and to appellant's counsel, in which appellant's condition was diagnosed as paranoia. In accordance with the provisions of Title 18 United States Code, Section 4244,1 a hearing was then held before the District Judge as to the mental competency of appellant to stand trial, and the physician who, as a psychiatrist, had examined appellant, testified in open court. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court found as a fact that appellant was mentally incompetent, and thereupon entered an order reciting that it appeared to the court, after receiving medical report and hearing oral testimony in open court, that appellant was so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or to properly assist in his own defense or advise his counsel. The District Court, accordingly, ordered that appellant be committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative until he should be mentally competent to stand trial or until the pending charges against him were disposed of according to law.2

In accordance with the order of the court, appellant was committed to the medical center for federal prisoners at Springfield, Missouri. Appellant thereafter filed a motion with the District Court, entitled "Motion under Rule 35 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [18 U.S.C.A.] to Correct Sentence Illegally Imposed Conformable to Title 28, Section 2255," and recited that "Comes now James Francis Hill petitioner (Title 28, Section 2255) and moves the Honorable Court to set aside and vacate judgment and illegal confinement * * * imposed upon the petitioner * * *," and petitioned the court to discharge him from further custody on the ground that the statute under which he is being held is unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion and this appeal is taken to review the denial of such motion.

Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, upon which the motion to vacate the sentence is based, provides for a correction or reduction of sentence.3 Title 28 U.S.C.A. Section 2255, provides remedies on motion attacking sentence and sets forth that a prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress may, upon various grounds, move the court which imposed sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. However, appellant was not arraigned or sentenced for the commission of any offense against the criminal laws. He is not suffering punishment for which, under the law, sentence is imposed. See Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, appellant does not come within the purview of the rule relating to correction of sentence or of Title 28 U.S.C.A., Section 2255. No question is raised as to the fact that appellant is mentally incompetent and unable to assist in any defense of the charges made against him, and, in fact, it is admitted that he is insane. However, it is claimed that he is entitled to be released to the state authorities in Florida where he was arrested, or to the state authorities in Massachusetts, his place of residence, for detention as a mentally incompetent or insane person; and interesting arguments are submitted by counsel for appellant and by the government in this regard. See Higgins v. McGrath, D.C. Mo., 98 F. Supp. 670; Dixon v. Steele, D.C. Mo., 104 F. Supp. 904; and Wells v. Attorney General of the United States, 10 Cir., 201 F.2d 556. All of these cases involved habeas corpus proceedings, and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the usual way to bring before the court unlawful detention on grounds of insanity.

In the case before us, appellant did not receive any sentence for a criminal offense and a motion to correct or vacate sentence, under these circumstances, must be dismissed.

In accordance with the foregoing, the order of the District Court is affirmed.