"An intention to assume an obligation of indefinite extension to every member of the public is seen to be the more improbable when we recall the crushing burden that the obligation would impose. * * * The consequences invited would bear no reasonable proportion to those attached by law to defaults not greatly different." 159 N.E., at 897, 898.

A diligent search has revealed no Michigan decision which considers the issues raised in this case. Until 1961 municipal corporations in Michigan were immune from tort liability. This immunity was abolished in Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961). By Act No. 170 of the Public Acts of 1964 the Michigan Legislature exempted municipal corporations from tort liability except for certain narrow specific exceptions. This Act was held unconstitutional as being broader than the title of the Act, Maki v. City of East Tawas, 385 Mich. 151, 188 N.W.2d 593 (1971). The legislature acted promptly by expanding the title of the Act rather than by limiting the immunity of municipal corporations in Michigan, Act No. 155, Public Acts of 1970, M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(107), M.C.L.A. Sec. 691.1407.2 The Michigan Supreme Court has not had occasion to discuss the tort liability of municipal corporations since the enactment of Act No. 155. The issue has been presented to the courts of other states.

Municipal corporation immunity was abolished in Florida in 1957. Certain limitations on the extent of liability are delineated in City of Tampa v. Davis, 226 So. 2d 450 (1969). In discussing the liability of the City of Tampa for negligently failing to replace a stop sign at an intersection where the plaintiff was subsequently injured in a collision, allegedly because of the sign's absence, the Florida Court of Appeals said the following:

"So what we are simply talking about is that area of municipal tort liability when the tort of the municipality's agent is committed in the performance or nonperformance of an executive (or administrative) duty in carrying out a 'governmental function."' 226 So. 2d, at 452.

"We conclude, therefore that * * * a municipality is liable in tort, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, when its agent or employee commits a tort in the performance, or by the nonperformance, of an executive (or administrative) duty within the scope of a governmental function, only when such tort is committed against one with whom the agent or employee is in privity, or with whom he is dealing or is otherwise in contact in a direct transaction or confrontation." 226 So. 2d, at 454 (Emphasis original).

"The duty owed by the city's agents or employees, as to the plaintiff, was no different at the time of the alleged negligence than that owed to every other member of the public. In short, the duty breached was a public duty, not a duty owed to the individual injured, foreseeability notwithstanding." 226 So. 2d, at 454-455.

The same standard was applied by the Florida Court of Appeals in Town of Largo v. L & S Bait Co. of Florida, Inc., 256 So. 2d 412 (1972), where the Court held that the Town of Largo could not be held liable for damages caused by negligently causing a sewer to back up on to plaintiff's property. A similar conclusion has been reached under other circumstances in Whitney v. City of New York, 27 A.D.2d 528, 275 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1st, 1966). A wife sued the City of New York for negligently failing to inspect a boiler as required by city ordinance. The boiler later exploded killing her husband. In rejecting the plaintiff's theory of liability for damages the Appellate Division said:

". . . plaintiff seeks to impose liability on the City, merely because the City failed to carry out a statutory function. Unless it can be said that the statute was enacted for the benefit of an individual, no liability may be imposed for failure to carry out the statutory function. * * * . . . mere failure to perform a statutory government function, does not alone lead to liability in tort." 275 N.Y.S.2d, 784-785.

See also Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 272 N.E.2d 871 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1971); Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969), noted in Rose v. Mackie, 22 Mich.App. 463, 177 N.W.2d 633 (1970).

The rule relating to responsibility for such alleged negligence has been summarized in 2 Cooley, Torts (4th Ed. 1932), Sec. 300, p. 385, as follows:

"The rule of official responsibility, then, appears to be this: That if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution."

Quoted in Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 116 A.2d 429, at 432 (1955); People of State of Illinois, for Use of Trust Co. of Chicago v. Maryland Casualty Co., 132 F.2d 850, 852, 853, (7th Cir. 1942), and Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376, 379 (Ariz.1969).

The Court in Leger laid down an additional test to be utilized in determining when the breach of a duty by a public officer provides a basis for a tort action.

"If the duty imposed upon the public official by the statute is of such a nature that the performance of it will affect an individual in a manner different in kind from the way it affects the public at large, the statute is one that imposes upon the official a duty to the individual, and if the official is negligent in the performance of that duty he is liable to the individual."

The only Michigan cases which discuss the issue before this Court appear to be inapplicable. Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342, 5 N.W. 403 (1880); People for use of Lapeer County Bank v. O'Connell, 214 Mich. 410, 183 N.W. 195 (1921).

It appears to this Court that the imposition of a duty to one in the position of plaintiff, Rudolf J. Gerneth, and a resulting liability for damages for breach of such duty would impose an undue burden upon municipal corporations, and might in fact substantially interfere with the licensing and investigatory functions of such municipal corporations. It appears to us that as a matter of public policy, absent a statement to the contrary by the legislature or the highest court of the jurisdiction involved, the imposition of liability for damages for breach of such a claimed duty would be inappropriate under the circumstances of a case such as this. There is no basis for a conclusion that the Detroit City Council, in enacting the ordinance in question (paraphrasing the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo), "intended to assume an obligation of indefinite extension to every member of the public . . . and the crushing burden which such obligation might impose."

Judgment affirmed.