June G. Moore (plaintiff-appellee) brought this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to recover survivor's disability benefits from the Reynolds Metals Company Retirement Program (defendant-appellant) (Retirement Program). Moore alleged that a provision in a defined benefit pension plan requiring a five month waiting period before a participant could be declared totally and permanently disabled and, thus, eligible for disability benefits, was arbitrary and capricious.1 The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Moore. 563 F. Supp. 1372. Because federal courts do not have authority to review the provisions of such a plan, we reverse.

The facts are uncontested. Moore's husband, Mr. Donald Moore, was a salaried employee of the Reynolds Aluminum Company for twenty-eight years and was a participant in the Retirement Program, a plan subject to ERISA. The Retirement Program, a plan which called for no employee contribution, was established unilaterally by Reynolds Aluminum Company. The Retirement Program's provisions specify the circumstances under which death benefits to the surviving spouse of a "totally and permanently disabled" individual may be awarded. Article VI, Section 6.3 of the Retirement Program provided in pertinent part at the time of Mr. Moore's death:

If a disabled participant to whom Section 5.2 applies dies after completing at least ten (10) years of service but before electing to receive a retirement benefit pursuant to Section 5.2, his Surviving Spouse, if any, shall be entitled to receive a benefit hereunder. (emphasis added).

Section 5.2 applies only to a participant who is "totally and permanently disabled" as defined in Section 2.4 of the Retirement Program. Section 2.4 provides:

Total and Permanent Disability. For the purposes of the Program, an Employee shall be deemed to be totally and permanently disabled as of the date he is considered eligible for, and in receipt of, benefits under the Disability Insurance provisions of the Social Security Act. (emphasis added).

In order to be eligible for benefits under the disability insurance provisions of the Social Security Act, the potential recipient must meet all of the requirements specified in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423, which includes completion of a five-month waiting period. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(c)(2). Accordingly, a beneficiary of the Retirement Program becomes eligible for disability benefits only upon completing a five-month waiting period following commencement of the disability.

Mr. Moore became afflicted with cancer and was placed on sick leave status on May 15, 1981; he died on September 27, 1981. After her husband's death, Moore applied for benefits as a surviving spouse of a totally and permanently disabled participant of the Retirement Program who had completed at least ten years of service with Reynolds Aluminum Company.2 Because he did not complete the five-month waiting period, Mr. Moore was not "totally and permanently disabled" as defined by the Retirement Program and, therefore, his wife's application for survivor's disability benefits was denied.

June Moore was successful in persuading the district court to declare the five month waiting period arbitrary and capricious. The sole issue on appeal is whether a federal court may review for reasonableness the provisions of a retirement program established pursuant to the requirements of ERISA, even though the program was not established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.

We note initially that an employer has no affirmative duty to provide employees with a pension plan. H.Rep. No. 93-807, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News, 4670, 4677. In enacting ERISA, Congress continued its reliance on voluntary action by employers by granting substantial tax advantages for the creation of qualified retirement programs. Id. Neither Congress nor the courts are involved in either the decision to establish a plan or in the decision concerning which benefits a plan should provide. In particular, courts have no authority to decide which benefits employers must confer upon their employees; these are decisions which are more appropriately influenced by forces in the marketplace and, when appropriate, by federal legislation. Absent a violation of federal or state law, a federal court may not modify a substantive provision of a pension plan.3 United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 102 S. Ct. 1226, 71 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1982).

Moore argues that Robinson does not apply because the plan in that case was established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement whereas the plan involved in this case was created unilaterally by the employer.4 We find the logic of Robinson persuasive in either context:"[B]ecause finite contributions must be allocated among potential beneficiaries, inevitably financial and actuarial considerations sometimes will provide the only justification for an eligibility condition that discriminates between different classes of potential applicants for benefits."

United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 575, 102 S. Ct. 1226, 1234, 71 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1982). Accordingly, an employer is free to choose which benefits to include in a retirement program so long as the stringent requirements of ERISA are met and no other law or policy is violated.

In contrast, once a plan is established and is governed by the requirements of ERISA, courts may review a decision by trustees to deny benefits. Rhoton v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 717 F.2d 988 (6th Cir.1983); Van Gunten v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 672 F.2d 586 (6th Cir.1982). Such review, however, is limited to a determination of whether the trustees' actions in administering or interpreting a plan's provisions are arbitrary and capricious. Courts may review the trustees' administration of a pension plan because Congress has imposed a fiduciary duty upon trustees to administer such plans for the sole and exclusive benefit of the beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104. See H.Rep. No. 93-533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News, 4639, 4649. Courts, however, have not been authorized by Congress to impose upon employers the court's subjective beliefs concerning the relative value of benefits which employers have chosen voluntarily to confer upon employees.

In summary, judicial interference into the establishment of pension plan provisions is unwarranted.5 Such interference would serve only to discourage employers from creating voluntarily pension plans. Although Congress sought to establish minimum standards for pension plans to assure that employees would not be denied benefits arbitrarily, it recognized that if standards were too stringent, the creation of new pension plans would be discouraged. See Holliday v. Xerox Corporation, 732 F.2d 548 (6th Cir.1984). Thus, Congress struck a balance by providing for judicial review of trustees' administrative decisions while declining to dictate to employers the type of benefits which must be included in voluntarily established retirement plans. The district court modified impermissibly the plain language of the pension plan. Accordingly, the district court's judgment is reversed.