Petitioner appeals a final order of deportation issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "Board") on the grounds that the Board erroneously affirmed an Immigration Law Judge's decision that petitioner failed to establish that his deportation would result in "extreme hardship" to his wife and stepdaughter under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the Board.

Petitioner Yousef Hamdan is a native of Israel and a citizen of Jordan, who lawfully entered the United States as a visitor on August 27, 1991. However, petitioner remained in the United States in excess of the lawful time period and was therefore found deportable at a January 13, 1993 hearing before an Immigration Law Judge ("ILJ"). The ILJ ordered that petitioner voluntarily depart the United States on or before July 13, 1993, or be deported to Jordan.

Petitioner instead filed a motion to reopen the proceedings because a visa petition filed by his wife had been approved. Because petitioner had been convicted in Ohio for trafficking in food stamps,1 which the INS maintained was a crime involving moral turpitude thus rendering him ineligible for an adjustment of status, petitioner applied for a waiver of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).2

The motion to reopen was granted and the ILJ held a hearing to afford petitioner the opportunity to establish the requisite "extreme hardship" to his wife and stepdaughter. At the hearing, petitioner presented testimony from his wife and various family members who all testified to the effect that petitioner and his wife had a happy, loving relationship and that petitioner's stepdaughter identified with petitioner as her father.3

The ILJ denied the waiver and ordered petitioner deported from the United States to Jordan. While the ILJ did find that the testimony presented by petitioner impacted favorably on the exercise of discretion, it failed in the end to demonstrate that petitioner's "forced departure would cause a level of emotional hardship that would rise beyond that normally incidental to deportation." (JA at 16-17). Petitioner appealed this decision to the Board, which affirmed the decision of the ILJ based upon the reasons stated in his opinion. This appeal followed.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the Board erred in affirming the ILJ's decision that petitioner failed to establish that his deportation would result in "extreme hardship" to his wife and stepdaughter.4 Petitioner argues that the testimony he presented established extreme hardship, while the government argues that the Board acted within its discretion in concluding that it did not. We agree with the government.

We review Board determinations of extreme hardship under the abuse of discretion standard. Babai v. I.N.S., 985 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir.1993). "In determining whether the Board abused its discretion, this court must decide whether the Board's decision was made 'without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination.' " Hazime v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 136, 140 (6th Cir.) (quoting Balani v. I.N.S., 669 F.2d 1157, 1161 (6th Cir.1982)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 331 (1994).

We note at the outset that great deference is ordinarily extended to the determination of the Attorney General and her delegates as to what constitutes extreme hardship. I.N.S. v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144-45 (1981) (per curiam). We further note that they "have the authority to construe 'extreme hardship' narrowly should they deem it wise to do so," and that "[s]uch a narrow interpretation is consistent with ... the exceptional nature of the suspension remedy." Id. at 145.

Petitioner bears the burden of establishing extreme hardship and must do so through a "showing of significant actual or potential injury." Hassan v. I.N.S., 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir.1991). Accordingly, the common results of deportation, such as separation from family and financial difficulties, are insufficient to establish extreme hardship. Palmer v. I.N.S., 4F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir.1993); Osuchukwu v. I.N.S., 744 F.2d 1136, 1142 (5th Cir.1984). Rather, to establish extreme hardship, petitioner must make a showing of "at least hardship substantially different from and more severe than that suffered by the ordinary alien who is deported." Sanchez v. I.N.S., 755 F.2d 1158, 1161 (5th Cir.1985).

Petitioner has made no such showing. Both the ILJ and the Board recognized that the evidence submitted by petitioner impacted favorably upon the exercise of discretion but failed, in the end, to establish the requisite extreme hardship. The Board cited the following deficiencies: the lack of any documentary evidence to support petitioner's assertion of financial hardship to his wife; the fact that petitioner's testimonial evidence was merely of a general nature; the fact that petitioner's wife and stepdaughter had an extensive local family network that could provide them with support in his absence; and the fact that petitioner and his wife were married after deportation proceedings had been initiated, putting petitioner's wife on notice that he was subject to deportation and diminishing the importance of their marriage in the equitable determination of whether their separation constitutes extreme hardship. In sum, the Board decided that petitioner's forced departure would not cause a level of hardship above that normally associated with deportation. On the record before us, we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in this decision.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.