The plaintiffs, Larry and wife Deborah Lund, two licensed bail bond underwriters from Florida, sued the Ohio law enforcement officers listed in the caption above, claiming constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and numerous common law torts under Ohio law. The action arises from the arrest and prosecution of plaintiff Larry Lund by defendants for his behavior while arresting Michael Gish, an alleged fugitive bail jumper from Florida for whom the Lunds had written a bail bond. Lund entered the home of a third party in Ohio where Gish was alone with two small children. He did so without a warrant. According to the law enforcement officer defendants from Seneca County, Ohio, he arrested and removed Gish without making provision for the care and safety of the two children in the home. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all of the federal and state claims. It held that the Seneca Countylaw enforcement officers were protected by qualified immunity and that there was probable cause for the arrest of Larry Lund.

Plaintiffs' main argument on appeal is that language found in Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872), at page 371, set out in the footnote below,1 provides them with a "clearly established" federal constitutional right under the Extradition Clause, Article IV, § 2, to enter the home of another and arrest a bail jumper without a warrant or other process. Based upon this quoted language from Taylor v. Taintor, the essence of Lund's constitutional argument on appeal, as found on page 18 of his appellate brief, is as follows:

[A] bondsman can go anywhere in the United States and arrest his fugitive at any time. It matters not if he leaves kids unattended, or if he forces his way into a third party's home or if he forcefully seizes his fugitive. The bondsman is basically permitted to break the law to re-arrest his fugitive.

Lund asserts that the defendant law enforcement officers "transgressed a clearly established right" under the Extradition Clause, as enunciated in Taylor v. Taintor, when they effected Lund's arrest for forcefully entering the house of a third party and taking Gish away while leaving the children unattended.

Taylor v. Taintor does not support plaintiffs' federal claim. In that 1872 case, sureties made an $8000 cash bond for McGuire in Connecticut in September 1866 after he was charged with a felony. While awaiting trial in Connecticut, McGuire returned to his home in New York. Unknown to the bondsmen in Connecticut, McGuire was wanted in Maine for another felony. Upon request from the Governor of Maine later in 1866, the Governor of New York extradited him to Maine where he was convicted a year later and imprisoned for fifteen years. When McGuire failed to appear for trial in Connecticut in October 1866, the cash bond was forfeited. The Connecticut bondsmen sought relief from the forfeiture on grounds that they were not at fault in failing to secure McGuire's appearance but rather that his nonappearance was the result of his extradition to Maine -- an intervening "act of law" under the Extradition Clause2. The SupremeCourt, by a vote of 4 to 3 (2 Justices recused themselves) held that the sureties were at fault and were not protected by the Extradition Clause. The sureties' "supineness and neglect" in failing to keep up with McGuire and to inform the New York authorities of the pending Connecticut case caused McGuire's nonappearance. Id. at 373. Justice Field in dissent, writing for himself and Justices Clifford and Miller, argued that Extradition Clause of Article IV, Section 2, was complied with by the States of New York and Maine. Since McGuire's failure to appear in Connecticut was the result of the enforcement of the Extradition Clause, the bail money should be returned to the sureties in their view. Id. at 3763.

When one reads Taylor v. Taintor in full, it is clear upon reflection that nothing the majority or minority said was intended to mean that the Extradition Clause or any other provision of the Constitution authorizes bondsmen to violate the law of a state or provisions of the federal Constitution in an effort to apprehend a bail jumper. The language from the majority opinion, quoted in footnote 1 above, and relied upon by Lund, is not meant as an interpretation of federal constitutional law. It does not create for bondsmen "a clearly established right" under the Extradition Clause and hence does not shield a bondsman under federal law from arrest and prosecution for violation of the law of Ohio in apprehending bail jumpers. The quoted language from Taylor v. Taintor appears to be simply an effort to state the common law powers of bondsmen, as found in Blackstone, Chapter 8, and several other sources. We find nothing in Taylor, or in Chapter 8 of Blackstone, that would authorize the broad power of a bondsman at common law to "break the law," as claimed by Lund. Lund's entire federal claim is based on a misunderstanding of the Supreme Court's opinion in Taylor v. Taintor. The bondsman may be authorized under the law of the state where a bond is made to retrieve bail jumpers, but he must abide by he law of the state he enters to pursue his fugitive. Federal constitutional law does not preempt state law or immunize bondsmen from violations of local law. Plaintiffs' argument that "the bondsman is basically permitted to break the [local] law to rearrest his fugitive" is simply wrong.

Because Lund has failed to state a federal claim under the Extradition Clause or any other provision of the federal Constitution, his action under § 1983 must be dismissed. In addition, we find no error in the District Court's summary disposition of plaintiff's numerous, repetitive state law claims of false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.