OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Deborah Branham brought suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") after being terminated from her job as a receptionist for The Dickson Herald, a newspaper owned by Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. ("Gannett"), for excessive absenteeism. The district court granted summary judgment to Gannett. The court held that although Branham produced a medical certification of her need for leave within the fifteen-day period afforded by Department of Labor regulations, Gannett was entitled to deny her leave based on an earlier "negative certification"—a form from a physician indicating that Branham was not incapacitated. Because we conclude that Gannett never properly triggered Branham's duty to provide a medical certification, we REVERSE.

I. BACKGROUND

The district court discussed the facts material to the dispute between Branham and Gannett:

Branham v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., No. 3:08-700, 2009 WL 2588744, at *1-4 (M.D.Tenn. Aug. 19, 2009) (citations omitted).

On July 18, 2008, Branham filed a complaint in federal district court alleging that Gannett violated the FMLA by interfering with her use of FMLA leave and by terminating her in retaliation for seeking FMLA leave. Branham moved for partial summary judgment on May 4, 2009, and Gannett moved for summary judgment on July 6, 2009. On August 19, 2009, the district court denied Branham's motion and granted summary judgment in full to Gannett. The court observed that an employer may require an employee to provide a medical certification supporting her request for FMLA leave and that the employer must allow the employee fifteen days to provide such certification. Id. at *6. The court acknowledged that Gannett fired Branham before the fifteen-day period expired and that Branham provided a supporting certification on the fifteenth day, but it concluded that Gannett was entitled to terminate Branham on the eleventh day, when it received a "negative certification" from Dr. Singer and confirmed that neither Dr. Singer nor Dr. Peters would certify Branham's need for FMLA leave. Id. at *7. "Under these circumstances," the district court explained, "the Court is not persuaded that the Defendant was required to delay its termination decision until receipt of the second, unanticipated medical certification." Id. Branham then filed this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir.2004). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Our focus must be on "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

B. Summary Judgment

"The FMLA entitles an `eligible employee' to up to twelve weeks of leave per year if the employee has a `serious health condition' that prevents the employee from performing the functions of her job." Hunter v. Valley View Local Schs., 579 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D)). The FMLA provides a private right of action to employees to protect their rights to such leave under two different theories: the "interference" or "entitlement" theory, under which employers may not "interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise" FMLA rights, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); and the "retaliation" or "discrimination" theory, under which employers may not "discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful" by the FMLA, § 2615(a)(2). See Hoge v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 384 F.3d 238, 244 (6th Cir.2004). Branham filed suit under both theories, alleging that Gannett interfered with her FMLA rights by denying her leave and retaliated against her for taking leave by terminating her.

To prevail on either her interference claim or her retaliation claim, Branham must prove that she was entitled to FMLA leave. See Novak v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 503 F.3d 572, 577-78 (6th Cir.2007); Edgar v. JAC Prods., Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 508 (6th Cir.2006). The essence of Gannett's summary-judgment argument is that she cannot establish this entitlement.

Gannett advances two bases on which to affirm the district court's judgment. First, it contends that Branham cannot prove that she had a serious health condition that prevented her from performing the functions of her job—reasoning on which the district court ultimately did not rely. Second, Gannett reiterates the argument accepted by the district court, that Gannett was entitled to terminate Branham for excessive absenteeism on the basis of the negative certification received from Dr. Singer. We address each in turn.

1. Whether Branham Can Prove a "Serious Health Condition"

As noted, Branham cannot prevail on her interference or retaliation claims unless she sought leave for an FMLA-qualifying reason, namely, that she had a "serious health condition" that prevented her from doing her job. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The FMLA defines "serious health condition" as "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves (A) inpatient care ... or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). Branham does not contend that she ever required inpatient care, so her claim turns on her need for continuing treatment. Department of Labor regulations define "continuing treatment" as "[a] period of incapacity (i.e., inability to work ...) of more than three consecutive calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same condition, that also involves: (A) [t]reatment two or more times by a health care provider ... or (B) [t]reatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider." 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i) (2006) (amended 2009) (emphasis omitted).1

Gannett argues that Branham cannot prove that her condition involved "continuing treatment" because she cannot establish that she was incapacitated for a period of more than three days. This argument is unavailing. To be sure, Branham admitted in her deposition that she was not sick on Tuesday, November 7, or Wednesday, November 8, days on which she missed work in order to care for her son. She further admitted that she either performed some work or did not work but was "not incapacitated" on every day on which her office was open between Tuesday, November 14, and Tuesday, November 28. Dist. Ct. Document ("Doc.") 35-1 (Branham Dep. at 148-51). This testimony cannot be construed as a legal admission, however. Branham agreed that she was "not incapacitated" only after the following exchange with defense counsel:

Doc. 35-1 (Branham Dep. at 149) (emphases added). Plainly, Branham understood defense counsel's use of the word "incapacitated" to refer to the inability to do any work.2 In fact, "incapacity" refers to the inability to "perform the functions of the position of such employee," 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D), which in turn is defined as being "unable to work at all or ... unable to perform any one of the essential functions of the employee's position," 29 C.F.R. § 825.115 (2006) (amended 2009). That is, a person can be incapacitated despite being able to do some of her regular work. Here, the very basis of Branham's suit is that she was not able to perform the essential functions of her job throughout the period of her absences in November 2006. She submits her testimony, her medical records, and Nurse Practitioner Seefeldt's certification as evidence of that incapacity.3

Even if Branham's deposition testimony were viewed as preventing her from arguing incapacity from November 14 through 28—which, to reiterate, it does not—Branham consistently has maintained that she was incapacitated between Thursday, November 9, and Monday, November 13. That Thursday, she left Buhler a voicemail message indicating that she was sick; that Friday, she left Buhler another voicemail message indicating that her migraines were keeping her home; then, her "migraine was so bad [that she] had been in bed for the entire weekend and could not tolerate any light or sound," Doc. 35-1 (Branham Dep. at 79); and the following Monday, Branham's husband informed Gannett that he was taking her to the doctor. These facts indicate that Branham was incapacitated for five consecutive calendar days. Gannett points to different evidence: a document from Branham's medical records in which Dr. Singer listed the duration of Branham's illness as "2 days." Doc. 35-6 at 78 (Medical Records). But Branham does not accept Dr. Singer's evaluation and provides her own testimony and a conflicting medical opinion in support of her position. This is the essence of a factual dispute that precludes summary judgment.

In short, Branham has advanced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on the incapacity element of the "continuing treatment" requirement.

Gannett next argues that Branham cannot establish "continuing treatment" because she cannot show that she was treated by a health care provider twice within her period of incapacity or that a regimen of continuing treatment resulted from the single doctor's visit she did have. Again, Gannett is wrong on both counts.

First, there is evidence that Branham was treated by two health care providers during her period of incapacity: Dr. Singer on November 13, and Nurse Practitioner Seefeldt on November 28. The issue is whether the Seefeldt visit qualifies as a "treatment ... by a health care provider" under 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i) (2006). The regulations' definition of "treatment" states that the term "includes (but is not limited to) examinations to determine if a serious health condition exists and evaluations of the condition." 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b) (2006). Seefeldt's certification includes several diagnoses, reflecting that some sort of examination took place, and Gannett appears to acknowledge as much. See Appellee's Br. at 14 n. 6 (stating that Branham was "seen by" Seefeldt). The regulations also define a "health care provider" to include nurse practitioners such as Seefeldt. 29 C.F.R. § 825.118(b)(2) (2006).

It is irrelevant that Branham saw Seefeldt after Gannett received Dr. Singer's negative certification and after Gannett terminated her. At this stage of the analysis, the question is not whether Gannett was entitled to terminate Branham when it did based on the FMLA's certification requirements—an issue we discuss below—but rather whether Branham can prove that she suffered from a "serious health condition." That is, the question is whether Branham can prove to a jury that she received "continuing treatment" by showing that she received "[t]reatment two or more times by a health care provider." 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i)(A) (2006). The only timing requirement relevant to this inquiry is that the second treatment must occur during the same period of incapacity as the first, defined to include the original period of more than three consecutive calendar days of incapacity and any subsequent period of incapacity relating to the same condition. See id.; Jones v. Denver Pub. Schs., 427 F.3d 1315, 1321-23 (10th Cir.2005). Branham saw Nurse Practitioner Seefeldt about the same medical issues for which she saw Dr. Singer: migraines, anxiety, depression, and insomnia. Thus, taken in the light most favorable to Branham, the evidence indicates that she was treated by Dr. Singer and Nurse Practitioner Seefeldt, both qualified health care providers, during the same period of incapacity, which exceeded three days. This is enough to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Branham suffered from a "serious health condition involving continuing treatment," 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2) (2006), rendering summary judgment inappropriate.

Second, Branham may also be able to use her examination by Seefeldt to show a "serious health condition" based on "[t]reatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which result[ed] in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider." 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i)(B) (2006). Seefeldt's certification indicates under the heading "Regimen of Treatment" that Branham required "greater than 5" physician visits, including "several appointments with orthopedist, ob/gyn, and [primary care physician] over the next month and a half for surgery, medication adjustments, injections." Doc. 28-2 at 3 (Seefeldt Cert.). Seefeldt also wrote that she anticipated referring Branham to additional health care providers, that Branham would need to work less than her normal schedule, and that she could return to full duty on January 1, 2007. Branham testified in her deposition that she did see other physicians after this visit, including an obstetrician/gynecologist to investigate whether her migraines were hormonal and to treat fibroids, an orthopedist for a cyst on her wrist and her trigger-finger condition, and her primary-care physician, Dr. Peters, for her migraines and insomnia. Thus, this evidence of a regimen of continuing treatment following the Seefeldt visit also precludes summary judgment.

2. Whether Gannett Could Terminate Branham on November 24, 2008, Based on Dr. Singer's Certification

Gannett's second argument for summary judgment is its theory that the FMLA permitted it to terminate Branham based on her failure to present a medical certification of her incapacity. To assess this argument, we review the regulatory framework in which the certification requirement exists.

To claim FMLA leave when the circumstances giving rise to the need for such leave are not foreseeable, an employee must give notice to her employer "as soon as practicable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case." 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (2006). "The employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA." Id. § 825.303(b) (2006). She "gives sufficient notice when [she] provides enough information for the employer to reasonably conclude" that leave is needed for a serious health condition. Perry v. Jaguar of Troy, 353 F.3d 510, 513 (6th Cir.2003). After an employee gives notice, "[a]n employer may require that a request for leave ... be supported by a certification issued by the health care provider of the eligible employee." 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a). Such a request for medical certification must be in writing and must detail the employee's specific obligation to provide certification and the consequences of failing to do so. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.301(b)(1)(ii), 825.305(d) (2006) (amended 2009); Perry, 353 F.3d at 514. The request may be oral only if (1) the employee handbook or other written policy documents (if they exist) clearly provided that medical certification would be required, and (2) the employee sought FMLA leave some time in the previous six months and received written notice of the medical-certification requirement at that time. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(c)(2)(ii) (2006); Frazier v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 431 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir.2005).

The FMLA requires an employee to deliver the certification "in a timely manner." 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a). The regulations specify that when leave is unforeseeable, the employer must give the employee at least fifteen calendar days to provide the requested certification, and more time if it is not practicable under the circumstances to do so within fifteen days. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b). "If an employee fails to provide a medical certification within" the period of fifteen days (or longer, depending on the circumstances), "the employer may delay the employee's continuation of FMLA leave." 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2006) (amended 2009). "If the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave." Id. If, on the other hand, the employer terminates the employee before giving her the full fifteen-day period to provide a certification, the employer has violated the FMLA. Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 555 (6th Cir.2006).

Gannett contends (1) that Branham was required to provide a medical certification supporting her need for FMLA leave; (2) that before the fifteen-day period expired, Branham's doctor provided a certification indicating that Branham did not require leave; and (3) that Gannett was entitled to rely on that negative certification and was not required to allow Branham the remainder of the fifteen-day period to secure a second certification supporting her claim for leave. Branham responds that she disputed Dr. Singer's assessment and that the FMLA guaranteed her fifteen days to secure a second opinion. The parties thus focus our attention on an issue of first impression in this circuit: when an employee provides a negative certification— that is, a certification indicating that she does not have a serious health condition that prevents her from performing her job—must the employer wait the full fifteen days prescribed by regulation before denying leave on the basis of that negative certification?

The district court answered this question "no." It relied primarily on Nawrocki v. United Methodist Retirement Communities, Inc., 174 Fed.Appx. 334 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion), which upheld summary judgment for an employer that terminated an employee for absenteeism after the employee's doctor submitted a certification form listing various medical conditions but indicating that the employee would not need to miss work. Nawrocki, however, does not resolve the question presented in the case at bar. First, Nawrocki was an unpublished and nonprecedential opinion. Second, the opinion held only that "an employer is entitled to rely on a `negative certification' in denying FMLA leave," id. at 338; the employee there did not claim that the employer had violated the fifteen-day requirement, and the opinion made no mention of the requirement at all. Third, Nawrocki's holding relied entirely on Stoops v. One Call Communications, Inc., 141 F.3d 309 (7th Cir.1998), which likewise did not involve the fifteen-day requirement and which included language in tension with the conclusion of the district court in the instant case. See Stoops, 141 F.3d at 313 (observing that "nothing in the [FMLA] or regulations limits the employee's ability to produce a medical opinion that contradicts a prior negative certification originally provided by the employee"). Thus, the issue presented by the parties remains unresolved in this circuit.

We need not decide the issue today, however, because there is an independent fatal flaw in Gannett's argument for summary judgment. Branham satisfied her notification requirement on November 13, 2006, when she asked Buhler "about taking leave, because [she] still wasn't feeling well and had numerous doctors' appointments scheduled for November and December." Doc. 35-1 (Branham Dep. at 88) (internal quotation marks omitted). But Gannett never properly triggered the additional duty to provide a medical certification supporting her claim. The district court found that Gannett requested certification on November 13, the day on which Buhler told Branham over the phone to come to the office and sign a short-term-disability form to "see if she qualified for anything." Doc 28-3 (Buhler Dep. at 51). In her deposition, however, Buhler testified that "Michele and I never at any time discussed FMLA leave." Doc 28-3 (Buhler Dep. at 54). It is true that Gannett's short-term-disability form doubled as its FMLA leave form, but it is clear that Buhler communicated to Branham no information about the FMLA certification requirement, the fact that such certification was due within fifteen days, or the consequences of failing to return an adequate certification. Doc. 28-3 (Buhler Dep. at 58) (stating that she did not provide Branham a deadline); Doc. 28-4 (Kling Dep. at 40-41) (stating that Buhler should have provided this information). Even if Buhler had conveyed all the appropriate information, her oral request would have been insufficient to activate Branham's certification duty because there is no evidence that Branham requested leave and received written notification of the requirement in the previous six months,4 or that the requirement appeared in the employee handbook that Branham should have received when she first joined Gannett in November 2003. See Doc. 28-4 (Kling Dep. at 13-21) (reading sections of handbook about FMLA but not mentioning certification requirement).

We therefore must conclude that Gannett was not entitled to delay or deny leave to Branham on the basis of the certification requirement. "Because there is no evidence that defendant requested medical certification pursuant to the requirements of the FMLA,"—and, in fact, all the evidence confirms that Gannett did not make a proper request—"[Branham's] failure to provide medical certification does not support summary judgment for defendant." Perry, 353 F.3d at 514. Because Branham's own testimony constitutes sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue whether she suffered from a serious health condition that prevented her from doing her job, this case must be remanded for a jury to decide whether she was entitled to leave under the FMLA.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we hold that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to Gannett based on the submission of a negative medical certification indicating that she could return to work. Branham has produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact about her entitlement to FMLA leave, and Gannett was not permitted to deny her leave based on the certification requirement when it never properly requested certification or informed her of the consequences of failing to provide the same, as required by Department of Labor regulations. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment to Gannett and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.