OPINION

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge.

This appeal concerns the contractual right to continued healthcare benefits for members of a certified class of retirees, their spouses, surviving spouses, and eligible dependents under § 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Defendants Newell Operating Company, Inc. (Newell), its subsidiary Newell Window Furnishings, Inc., Kirsch Division (Newell Window), and the Newell Rubbermaid Health and Welfare Program 560 (Newell Plan), appeal from the judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs, which included monetary damages for the individual plaintiffs and declaratory and injunctive relief requiring that defendants provide vested lifetime healthcare benefits to the class members depending on the relevant date of retirement.

Appealing the order granting summary judgment to plaintiffs, defendants challenge the district court's determinations: (1) that Newell Window is bound as a successor liable under earlier collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) to which it was not a party; (2) that members of the plaintiff class had vested rights to company-paid health insurance and/or Medicare Part B premium reimbursements; and (3) that the plaintiffs' claims were not barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations. For the reasons that follow, the district court's judgment is affirmed.1

I.

The retirees were all bargaining-unit employees of a plant located in Sturgis, Michigan, that manufactured window furnishings such as drapery hardware and window blinds. The bargaining-unit employees were represented by former UAW Local 797 (Union), although their employer changed several times during the relevant period. The Sturgis plant was owned by and was the headquarters for Kirsch Company, a Michigan corporation, until it was acquired as a division of Cooper Industries, Inc., in 1981. In 1997, Cooper Industries transferred the Kirsch assets to a newly formed subsidiary named Kirsch, Inc., and then sold that subsidiary to the Newell Company. Newell changed the name back to Kirsch Company, and, in 1998, merged Kirsch with another Newell subsidiary to form what is now Newell Window. Newell Window closed the Sturgis plant pursuant to a Shutdown Agreement negotiated with the Union in 2000. This litigation arose out of Newell's announcement in November 2005 that it would consolidate all retiree healthcare plans for administration by CIGNA Healthcare, and that a premium of $40 per month would be charged to all retirees across the board effective January 1, 2006.

This case was not the first to be filed. Rather, anticipating litigation and seeking to control the forum, Newell, Newell Window, and the Newell Plan quickly filed suit in federal court in the Northern District of Illinois against the Union and nearly 500 retirees seeking declaration that the changes were lawful. One month later, the Union and four retiree plaintiffs filed this action, individually and on behalf of a purported class, in the Western District of Michigan alleging that the benefit changes violated ERISA and breached the CBAs in violation of the LMRA. The Illinois suit was ultimately dismissed on jurisdictional grounds in favor of this action, and that decision was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. See Newell Operating Co. v. UAW, 532 F.3d 583 (7th Cir.2008) (overruled on other grounds by Envision Healthcare, Inc. v. PreferredOne Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 983 (7th Cir.2010)). The forum dispute is not before us, but, as will be discussed later, the district court considered allegations made in the Illinois case in deciding the question of successor liability.

Once the forum dispute was resolved, and after a tentative settlement fell apart, the retiree plaintiffs filed a third amended class action complaint that dropped the Union as a plaintiff, added two more retirees as named plaintiffs, and brought new claims for full reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums.2 The district court granted, in part, the plaintiffs' motion for class certification—declining to establish the three subclasses proposed by plaintiffs but certifying a single class of all former Newell Window, Kirsch Company, or Cooper Industries bargaining-unit employees at the Sturgis facility who retired on or before July 31, 1998, and their spouses, surviving spouses, and eligible dependents. Although probably known to the parties, there are no representations on appeal as to the number or identity of the class members.

Defendants filed a flurry of motions for summary judgment in December 2009, including separate motions by Newell, the Newell Plan, and Newell Window. Plaintiffs filed responses, as well as their own joint motion for summary judgment. After review of the voluminous record and full briefing, the district court denied the defendants' motions and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment for the reasons articulated in its opinion and order entered July 6, 2010. See Bender v. Newell Window Furnishings, Inc., 725 F.Supp.2d 642 (W.D.Mich.2010). Defendants' timely motion for reconsideration was denied, and judgment was finally entered in February 2011.

The corrected judgment awarded damages, plus interest, to the individual plaintiffs for medical insurance and/or Medicare Part B premiums, the amounts of which are not in dispute on appeal.3 With respect to the class claims, the district court declared that some of the class members were entitled to vested lifetime healthcare benefits "at the levels in place for their respective retirement groups (pre-1986 retirees and 1986—1993 retirees) prior to the changes imposed by Defendants beginning January 1, 2006." Further, the district court declared that, with the exception of certain retirees age 62 to 65, the benefits must be provided at no cost to the class; decided that pre-1986 retirees were entitled to coordination (rather than integration) of Medicare Part B benefits; and determined that all retirees and spouses (but not dependents) were entitled to vested lifetime reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums from Newell to the full extent that the premiums exceeded a "capped" monthly contribution from the Pension Plan of $11.70. Defendants were also enjoined from amending the plans or providing benefits inconsistent with the judgment. Finally, while recognizing that there were no class claims for money damages, the district court retained jurisdiction to implement and enforce the judgment including "to conduct all appropriate proceedings to address the appropriate remedy for Class Members for past conduct by Defendants that has been inconsistent with the terms of this Judgment." Defendants' timely appeal followed. To date, the only further proceedings conducted in the district court were related to plaintiffs' pending motion for attorney fees and costs.

II.

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, as well as decisions on questions of contract interpretation. Noe v. PolyOne Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir.2008); Maurer v. Joy Techs., Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 914 (6th Cir.2000).

A. Successor Liability4

Defendants take issue with the determination that Newell Window is liable as a successor for whatever retiree healthcare benefits vested under the pre-1998 CBAs entered into between its predecessors and the Union. It is true that "a successor corporation generally is not liable for its predecessors liabilities unless expressly assumed." Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir.2006) (citing NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 279, 286-88, 92 S.Ct. 1571, 32 L.Ed.2d 61 (1972)). Here, the district court found an assumption of liability (although there seems to be no question that there was also a substantial continuation of operations at the plant by Newell Window and its predecessors). See Wood v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 807 F.2d 493, 498-99 (6th Cir.1986).

Defendants argue that the district court improperly applied judicial estoppel based on statements made in the Illinois complaint alleging that Newell Window was a successor to Cooper and Kirsch Company with respect to healthcare benefits. Bender, 725 F.Supp.2d at 654. That is, defendants argue, judicial estoppel applies only "to a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in a prior proceeding." Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir.1982) (emphasis added). However, while it is true that the Illinois complaint was dismissed, it is clear that the district court did not rely on judicial estoppel but properly recognized the Illinois complaint as containing a "party admission" that could be considered with the other evidence in the record. See Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 829 (6th Cir.2000); Dixie Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Holland, 255 F.2d 304, 310 (6th Cir.1958). The admission that Newell Window was a successor in interest was confirmed by other documentary evidence (including the transfer agreements and a partially disclosed "due diligence" memorandum), and the defendants' course of conduct. For example, a letter from June 1997 addressed to Kirsch retirees stated: "Because Newell has assumed Kirsch's ongoing commitments to its retirees for medical coverage, your benefits will not be changed."

Defendants also renew the argument that retiree healthcare benefit liabilities were "cut off" either because they were not transferred by Cooper to its subsidiary, or because of a reservation-of-rights provision in the transfer agreement between Cooper and Newell. These arguments are no more persuasive on appeal. First, defendants argue that the 1997 Amended and Restated Asset Transfer Agreement between Cooper Industries and Kirsch, Inc. (Cooper-Kirsch Agreement), transferred only liabilities for CBAs in effect at the time (or, in other words, only liability for unexpired CBAs). However, the provision relied upon, § 7.3, does not represent the retention of such liabilities by Cooper and reflects Kirsch's express assumption of "all collective bargaining agreements and all Liabilities associated therewith, that are in effect between any Cooper Company and a union or other collective bargaining representative covering Employees or Former Employees." Also, as the district court found, § 4.1.11 expressly provides for the assumption of liabilities associated with "Employee Benefit Plans in which Employees or Former Employees participate or have participated." The definition of "Employee Benefit Plans" includes plans that provided "post-retirement or post-employment benefits." Further, § 8.6 acknowledged that "Certain Employees and Former Employees are covered by welfare benefit programs maintained by [Cooper]" and provided that "Kirsch shall become a participating employer in the Cooper Welfare Plans." The district court did not err in rejecting this claim.

Alternatively, defendants rely on the reservation-of-rights clause in § 6.4(f) of the 1997 Purchase and Sale Agreement between Cooper and Newell (Cooper-Newell Agreement), under which Newell agreed to provide "Former employees," i.e., retirees, with "medical and life insurance coverage identical to that provided to them ... under the Cooper Welfare Benefit Plans." Also found in § 6(f) is the following clause:

Elsewhere, Newell expressly assumed Cooper's liabilities under prior CBAs in § 5.12, which defined Cooper's obligations as including "any obligation, commitment, liability or responsibility of Seller, its Affiliates or its or their Predecessors ... existing as of Closing under ... (iii) any labor or collective bargaining agreements relating to the Kirsch Companies" and provided that "Buyer expressly agrees that it shall assume Seller's Company Obligations to the extent related to the Kirsch Companies, effective on the Closing Date, and shall thereafter discharge the same in accordance with their terms." (Emphasis added.)5 Finally, the reservation of the right to amend or terminate the Newell Plan could not alter the retiree healthcare benefits to the extent that they had already vested. Bender, 725 F.Supp.2d at 655 ("Indeed, no subsequent agreement between the companies or between the company and the Union could lawfully do so.") (citing Wood v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 607 F.3d 427, 434-35 (6th Cir.2010); Prater v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n, 505 F.3d 437, 444 (6th Cir.2007)).

The district court did not err in finding that Newell Window is the successor in interest to the pre-1998 CBAs. Whether and to what extent retiree health insurance and/or Medicare Part B premium reimbursements were vested is a separate question from whether Newell Window is a successor to the earlier obligations.

B. Vesting of Bargained-for Welfare Benefits—Legal Framework

Retiree healthcare benefit plans are welfare benefit plans under ERISA, but, unlike pension plans, are not subject to mandatory vesting requirements. Maurer, 212 F.3d at 914. As a result, vesting of retiree welfare benefits is a matter of contractual agreement. Id. If the parties intend for welfare benefits to vest and the agreement to that effect is breached, there is an ERISA violation as well as an LMRA violation. Id. Vesting occurs upon retirement, not eligibility for retirement, see Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc. (Winnett I), 553 F.3d 1000, 1011 (6th Cir. 2009), while "an employer is free to terminate any unvested welfare benefits upon the expiration of the relevant CBA," Noe, 520 F.3d at 552 (emphasis added). Significantly, in this circuit, a court may find vested welfare benefits "under a CBA even if the intent to vest has not been explicitly set out in the agreement." Maurer, 212 F.3d at 915; see also Noe, 520 F.3d at 552.6

Although governed by substantive federal law, we apply traditional rules of contract interpretation "as long as their application is consistent with federal labor policies." UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir.1983). Under Yard-Man, the seminal case governing whether parties to a CBA intended welfare benefits to vest,

Noe, 520 F.3d at 552. If the issue cannot be resolved by summary judgment, it is now settled that there would be no right to a jury trial of these claims. Reese v. CNH Am., LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 327-28 (6th Cir. 2009).

Although no legal presumption arises and plaintiffs continue to bear the burden of proving that vesting has occurred, this court will apply the Yard-Man inference "so long as we can find either explicit contractual language or extrinsic evidence indicating an intent to vest." Reese, 574 F.3d at 321 (citing Yolton, 435 F.3d at 580) (internal quotation marks omitted). While application of Yard-Man has led to differing results, this court has described the inference as acting like a "thumb on the scales" or "nudge" in favor of vesting. Id.7

As the district court explained, although many CBAs were entered into during the period from 1971 to 1998, the plaintiff class can be divided into three subgroups who claim benefits based on an employee's retirement: (1) before 1986; (2) from 1986 through the end of 1993; and (3) after 1993 (or more precisely, on or after January 1, 1994, but on or before July 31, 1998). The first two groups were found to have vested (although somewhat different) rights to lifetime health insurance benefits, and all three groups were found to have vested rights to full reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums for retirees and spouses (but not dependents). Although both health insurance and Medicare Part B reimbursements are contractually based welfare benefits, they are discussed separately because the provisions and arguments are distinct.

C. Vesting of Medical Insurance Benefits

Pre-1986. Five CBAs used the same language to establish medical insurance programs for employees, including "`group insurance benefits, paid by the Company and underwritten by Aetna Life Insurance Company.'" Bender, 725 F.Supp.2d at 646 (citations omitted). Each CBA provided that "`[t]he benefits of the program are set forth in a booklet and policy, a copy of each to be available to every employee.'" Id. The CBAs also expressly extended "`[t]he same benefits [to retirees] as for the employees and their dependents'" and specifically stated that "`[t]he Company agree[d] to pay the cost of such insurance for the retiree and his dependents.'" Id. As defendants point out, the 1982 CBA negotiated by Cooper provided that retiree medical insurance would be the same as for employees and dependents "as of July 1, 1980." Also, spouses and eligible dependents of deceased retirees could remain under "Kirsch Group Medical Coverage at Company expense" provided that spouses did not remarry or become eligible for insurance through another employer.8

1986 to 1993. Three CBAs between 1985 and 1993 provided retirees with the "same benefits as for the employees and their dependents as of January 1, 1986," namely "group insurance paid by the Company." This granted the same health insurance benefits as above, except that the CBAs required retirees aged 62 to 65 to pay $20 per month toward the cost of such insurance (as would spouses and dependents of deceased retirees who were eligible to remain under the Cooper Comprehensive Health Care Plan). Also, as above, the CBAs each referred to a "booklet and policy" as setting forth the benefits of the program.

However, the 1993 CBA also included a negotiated end to health insurance benefits for future retirees. Specifically, effective with retirements on or after January 1, 1994, the CBA provided for a maximum of five years of post-retirement medical coverage, no coverage for the retiree or spouse past the age of 65, and monthly contributions toward the cost of the plan in an amount to be set when the employee retired. In fact, as noted above, no claim for medical insurance benefits is made on behalf of class members in the third group (post-1993 retirements). This change is nonetheless relevant because these negotiated changes contrast with the simultaneous continuation of health insurance benefits for employees retiring prior to the change.

That is, the 1993 CBA expressly provided that "Employees retiring prior to January 1, 1994, (Deletion) will be covered under the Cooper Industries Comprehensive Retiree Medical Plan (1/93 GWI), but, will have the same cost effective health benefits as those being granted active employees as of January 1, 1986." (Emphasis added.) Again, retirees aged 62 to 65 would pay $20 per month toward the cost of such insurance for the retiree and his dependents (as would spouses and dependents of deceased retirees who were eligible to remain under the Cooper Comprehensive Health Care Plan). Further, the CBA provided that employees who retire before January 1, 1994, "will retain retirement medical coverage under the Cooper Comprehensive Retiree Medical Plan" and "will receive a lump sum wage payment of $300 upon retirement." The district court found, and the extrinsic evidence established, that the prospective reduction of post-retirement healthcare benefits offered an obvious incentive for employees to retire before January 1, 1994 (and resulted in a greater than usual number of retirements at the end of 1993). Bender, 725 F.Supp.2d at 647.

Intent and Durational Clauses. The district court found that the provisions granting retiree health insurance benefits suggested that, once retired, those benefits would continue indefinitely and without cost; except for those who retired under the CBAs that expressly limited the duration or required specific contributions toward the cost. Defendants argued in the district court that there was no vesting because each of the CBAs provided that "[t]he insurance program as set forth in Exhibit A is agreed to for the duration of this contract." (Emphasis added.)

However, "[a]bsent specific durational language referring to retiree benefits themselves, courts have held that the general durational language says nothing about those retiree benefits." Noe, 520 F.3d at 554. Unlike the specific limitation on the duration of health insurance for those retiring on or after January 1, 1994, this language was general in nature and did not create ambiguity regarding the intention that medical insurance benefits continue for those who had already retired. See Maurer, 212 F.3d at 917-18. Rather, the district court concluded that plaintiffs had met their burden of demonstrating that the CBAs unambiguously gave bargaining-unit employees who retired prior to January 1, 1994, a vested right to health insurance benefits. In addition, as discussed below, the district court also found that even if ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence was overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of lifetime vesting of medical insurance benefits for those claiming benefits based on retirements prior to January 1, 1994 (pre-1986 and 1/1/86-12/31/93). We turn to the defendants' principal arguments.

1. Incorporation by Reference

First, defendants contend that the CBAs do not reflect an intention to vest because reservation-of-rights language in three summary plan descriptions (SPDs) were incorporated into the CBAs such that it would stand on "equal footing" with the provisions from which vesting might be inferred. The incorporation language defendants rely upon, which is the same in each CBA, stated that the "benefits of the program are set forth in a booklet and policy, a copy of each to be available to every employee." The district court did not address defendants' argument, which is based on dicta from Schreiber v. Philips Display Components Co., 580 F.3d 355, 365 n. 12 (6th Cir.2009).

In Schreiber, the district court found the durational language to have unambiguously precluded vesting. Reversing, this court found there was ambiguity that should have led the district court to consider the SPDs regardless of whether the subsequently issued SPDs may be properly regarded as extrinsic evidence of the parties' original intent. Id. In dicta that followed, the court suggested that repeated references to the SPDs in the CBA at issue in Schreiber

Id. Lastly, this court added that "the district court would have been on solid ground had it interpreted the SPDs alongside the CBA before reaching the ambiguity issue." Id.

Here, the CBAs refer to a "booklet and policy," but do not include any explicit language of incorporation. Nor does the dicta in Schreiber compel a finding of reversible error based on this reference. In fact, in another case upon which the defendants rely, the district court acknowledged the Schreiber decision but concluded that simply referring to an SPD that was to be distributed to qualifying employees was not sufficient to constitute incorporation by reference. See Moore v. Menasha Corp., 724 F.Supp.2d 795, 804 n.3 (W.D.Mich.2010) (appeal pending No. 10-2171). Finally, defendants' reliance on United Steelworkers of America v. Commonwealth Aluminum, 162 F.3d 447, 449 (6th Cir.1998), is misplaced. Although the question in that case had to do with the arbitrability of grievances related to the denial of group benefits, the CBA in that case expressly stated that the group insurance booklets "are incorporated herein and made a part of this Labor Agreement by such reference." Id. (emphasis added). No similar explicit incorporation language has been identified in this case. The district court did not err in rejecting the defendants' incorporation-by-reference argument. Nonetheless, both Schreiber and Moore indicate that when no incorporation is found, the SPDs may be considered as extrinsic evidence in evaluating the intent to vest retiree welfare benefits.

2. Unilateral Modification

Defendants argue, in the alternative, that the district court erred in concluding that reservation-of-rights language found in the three SPDs themselves did not preclude the vesting of retiree health insurance benefits. See Reese, 574 F.3d at 323-24; Prater, 505 F.3d at 444-45; McCoy v. Meridian Auto. Sys., Inc., 390 F.3d 417, 424-25 (6th Cir.2004). This line of cases recognizes an exception to the general rule—applicable to collective bargaining agreements—that "`an existing contract cannot be unilaterally modified.'" Prater, 505 F.3d at 443 ("Were it otherwise, the option of either party to modify a contract unilaterally would defeat the essential purpose of reaching an agreement in the first place—to bind the parties prospectively.").

The exception arose out of the holding in Maurer that a widely distributed SPD, issued after the CBA had been signed, prevented retiree health benefits from vesting because the union had failed to contest the SPD's express reservation of the right to "curtail or eliminate coverage for any treatment, procedure, or service regardless of whether [the employee is currently] receiving treatment." Maurer, 212 F.3d at 913 (emphasis added). That is, once the unqualified unilateral right was asserted in the SPD, "`the Union was obligated to grieve or enter suit' if it disagreed with the employer's assertion of authority—even if that assumption of authority came after the effective date of the relevant collective bargaining agreement." Prater, 505 F.3d at 444 (quoting Maurer, 212 F.3d at 919).

However, as explained in Prater, to read Maurer broadly would "run headlong into the rule that a plan summary `cannot vitiate contractually vested or bargained-for-rights.'" Prater, 505 F.3d at 444 (citation omitted). As a result, the Maurer exception for unilateral modification has been expressly limited to "`unqualified reservation-of-rights language,' that claims a `unilateral right by the employer to terminate coverage without regard to existing or future collective bargaining agreements.'" Id. (citations omitted). Although this standard is necessarily case specific, McCoy, Prater, and Reese each found the reservation of rights were not sufficiently unqualified so as to fairly be expected to prompt an immediate protest by the union.9

The reasons given in those cases included: (1) that the SPD acknowledged that termination or modification would be subject to the provisions of any applicable CBA (McCoy and Prater), or that any conflict would be governed by the official plan documents or labor agreements (Reese); (2) that, unlike in Maurer, the reservation of rights did not assert an explicit right to terminate coverage for even current treatment (Prater); and (3), "[p]erhaps most importantly," the CBA expressly provided that it could not be amended without mutual signed consent of the parties (Prater). Elaborating on the last of these, we explained that the prohibition on unilateral modification in the CBA meant that the union could not be required to protest the SPD as long as "the summary does not explicitly renounce the [CBA]." Prater, 505 F.3d at 445.10

Aetna Summary. Defendants rely specifically on a provision from the first "booklet," a 1978 Aetna Group Plan (Aetna Summary) covering various group insurance benefits, including medical insurance, which stated among its "general provisions":

Also, after specifying the benefits for the various group plans, a separate "summary" stated: "Your contributions toward the cost of the contributory coverages provided by this Plan will be deducted from your pay and they are subject to change." Despite defendants' comparison to Maurer, the Aetna reservation of rights did not specifically claim a unilateral right to terminate coverage without regard for existing or future CBAs.

Cooper SPDs. Defendants also rely on a Cooper Industries Health Care Plan—Retired Employees marked with "10/89-STD" on the back (1989 Cooper SPD) and a Cooper Industries Comprehensive Retiree Medical Plan marked "1/93 GWI" (1993 Cooper SPD). Defendants contend, in particular, that the 1989 Cooper SPD mandates reversal of the judgment with respect to all post-1985 retirees (i.e., the 1986 to 1993 group). Under the heading "background information," the 1989 Cooper SPD states:

The exact same language was used in the 1993 Cooper SPD.

The district court found that this reservation was not sufficiently unqualified because the SPDs otherwise reaffirmed that the CBAs would control any conflict. Bender, 725 F.Supp.2d at 659 (relying on Prater and Reese). Specifically, both Cooper SPDs included the same introductory provisions explaining, in part, that: "This booklet is a `plain language' summary of your retiree health care benefits.... The highlights of the plan in easy to understand language appear in this space at the beginning of each section." This introduction concluded with the following explanation:

(Emphasis added.) Attempting to distinguish Prater and Reese, defendants argue that the deference given to "a legal document" in this provision must mean deference to the "formal plan" rather than to the CBA. It is true that the SPDs in Prater and Reese specifically acknowledged that the CBAs would control. But, the record in this case does not appear to contain any "formal plan" associated with the Cooper SPDs, and the CBAs provided health insurance benefits "as set forth in a booklet and policy." The district court did not err in finding that the Cooper SPDs did not include an unqualified assertion of a unilateral right to end retiree medical insurance benefits without regard for existing or future CBAs.11

However, even when the Maurer exception does not apply, the summaries nonetheless "serve as extrinsic evidence regarding the extent of the employer's promise of future healthcare benefits and whether the parties intended the benefits to vest." Prater, 505 F.3d at 445.

3. Extrinsic Evidence

The district court found that the parties unambiguously intended that retiree health insurance benefits would vest for bargaining-unit retirees (and their eligible spouses and dependents) who retired prior to January 1, 1994, but that, even if the CBAs were deemed to be ambiguous, "the entire record of extrinsic evidence demonstrates, without a single contradictory voice, that the parties intended to vest lifetime retiree healthcare benefits." Bender, 725 F.Supp.2d at 661. We agree.

The district court's statement of facts outlined the extensive extrinsic evidence with respect to both medical insurance benefits, id. at 649-51, and Medicare Part B reimbursements, id. at 651-52. Later, the district court succinctly summarized the extrinsic evidence regarding vesting of medical insurance benefits as follows:

Id. at 661. Defendants protest the district court's characterization of the due diligence memo prepared in connection with Newell's purchase of Kirsch from Cooper as being directly adverse to their position. As the district court explained, only two pages of that memo have been disclosed because they were provided to Great West Life in connection with the transfer of insurance coverage from Aetna. However, defendants' argument—that this memo described the benefits as "lifetime benefits" but never said they were "vested, inalterable or immutable"—is not persuasive and does not undermine its value as extrinsic evidence that the parties had intended retiree health insurance benefits to vest. Nor does the reservation-of-rights language in the 1997 letter sent to Kirsch retirees, or in the SPDs discussed above, overcome the heavily one-sided evidence that the parties intended health insurance benefits would vest for those who retired prior to January 1, 1994.

D. Vesting of Medicare Part B Premium Reimbursement

Retirees were required to enroll in Medicare Part B and, until 1980, retirees were reimbursed for the entire cost of the Medicare Part B premium from the Pension Plan. Indeed, the CBAs prior to 1980 called for amendment of the Pension Plan to pay a benefit equal to the amount of the Medicare Part B premium (i.e., 1971 CBA calls for Pension Plan to pay Medicare benefit of $5.60 per month for retirees and spouses). Pension benefits are subject to mandatory vesting under ERISA, and no right to modify or terminate the pension benefit is asserted by defendants in this case.

The last increase in this benefit was adopted by way of an Amendment to the Kirsch-UAW Retirement Income Plan. Adopting a "cap" on this benefit, the pension plan provided that: "Effective July 1, 1980, and adjusted on each July 1 thereafter, the monthly amount payable [for this benefit], shall be the rate then in effect for Medicare Cost ... but not to exceed in any event the amount of $11.70." (Emphasis added.) At that time, the rate was $9.60. As a practical matter, however, once the Medicare Part B premium exceeded $11.70 (when that occurred exactly is not clear), retirees continued to be reimbursed in full for the premiums with the difference being contributed by the employer. The question is whether the parties' intended that the portion reimbursed by the employer would vest at the time of retirement.

Defendants main argument is that there was no contractual right to receive reimbursement for Medicare Part B premiums in excess of the pension benefit. The district court found that the right had its origin in the 1980 Addendum to the 1977 CBA, which made changes to benefits for active employees out of concerns related to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Specifically, this Addendum eliminated mandatory retirement at age 65, and provided that:

(Emphasis added.) The district court reasoned that this right was then extended to retirees "by provisions that gave the retirees all the health benefits given to active employees as of June 1, 1980." Bender, 725 F.Supp.2d at 648. However, as defendants point out, the CBA actually gave retirees "the same benefits as for the employees and their dependents as of July 1, 1980." (Emphasis added.) Because the Addendum expired before July 1, 1980, and this language was omitted from subsequent CBAs, plaintiffs concede that the reimbursement benefit was not directly extended to retirees. While this error admittedly undermines part of the district court's reasoning on this issue, it is not clear that it requires a different result.

Plaintiffs argue that it does not matter because the employees' right to full reimbursement continued under the "evergreen" clause in the absence of an express agreement to end it. That benefit, then, existed as of July 1, 1980, and was extended to retirees until it was modified by the 1998 Settlement Agreement discussed below. In fact, when the Addendum agreed to pay Medicare Part B premiums in full for active employees age 65 or older, the same Medicare Part B premiums for retirees were already being paid in full by the pension plan.

The parties' understanding is more clearly reflected in a written Settlement Agreement entitled "Medicare Part `B' Coverage," which provided in full:

Defendants argue that the agreement in paragraph 1 to continue to reimburse retirees of record as of July 31, 1998, for Medicare Part B coverage referred only to the pension benefit payment of $11.70 per month. Although not a model of clarity, it does say the Medicare Part B coverage "reimbursed to retirees, from assets of the company, shall be continued for retirees of record as of July 31, 1998." This not only seems to refer to the reimbursements being made by the employer in excess of the pension benefit, but also would mean Newell was ending the reimbursement for existing retirees while merely phasing out the same reimbursement for future retirees. In fact, there is no dispute that the Settlement expressly created a "cap" on the employer reimbursement for those entering retirement on or after August 1, 1998, but before July 31, 2002; ended spousal reimbursement for those retiring on or after August 1, 1998; and ended the employer reimbursement completely for those retiring on or after August 1, 2002. The district court did not err in finding that this Settlement confirmed the arrangement in place since the 1980s—that the company would reimburse retirees for any cost of the Medicare Part B premium in excess of the pension plan benefit. Bender, 725 F.Supp.2d at 648. It was not error to conclude that the CBAs were ambiguous with respect to whether the right to full reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums was vested for "retirees of record as of July 31, 1998."

The district court outlined the extrinsic evidence supporting the conclusion that the parties intended the Medicare Part B premium reimbursement benefit to vest for retirees of record as of July 31, 1998, id., at 651-52, and then summarized that evidence as follows:

Id. at 661. Mr. Oetman, stated that in the 1985 negotiations, "`the Company agreed to pay the Medicare Part B reimbursement so long as the retiree was receiving Medicare. This meant for life.'" Id. at 651-52 (citation omitted). Mr. Webster explained that he was contacted several times after the plant closed by pre-August 1, 1998 retirees who were not getting completely reimbursed. He testified, however, that once he contacted Newell the reimbursements were increased to cover the full amount of the new Medicare Part B premium.

Defendants argue that the district court mischaracterized Mr. Webster's affidavit, which did not explicitly state that the Settlement Agreement intended to vest the right to full reimbursement. It may be inferred from what he did say, however:

Defendants also claim the district court erred by ignoring the deposition testimony of Webster's counterpart, Joe Marotti, who negotiated the 1998 Settlement Agreement for Newell, because Marotti testified that he understood the first paragraph to represent a maximum premium reimbursement of $11.70. In fact, Marotti explained that he assumed that it did because the Pension Plan provided a benefit "not to exceed $11.70," but acknowledged that he actually did not know. Marotti added that he intended that the Settlement Agreement would preserve the "status quo" with respect to past retirees and "freeze" the reimbursement at $43.80 for those future retirees who would retire between July 31, 1998, and June 31, 2002. Nor is it persuasive that McCurry, who had some human resources responsibilities at the Sturgis plant prior to its closing, questioned whether Newell was obligated to reimburse retirees for the increases in Medicare Part B premiums. McCurry made clear that she communicated this to someone at Newell, but was advised that she was wrong and instructed to pay the full amount of Medicare Part B reimbursements for anyone who retired as of July 31, 1998.

Despite the misreading of the relevant date in the CBA, the evidence supports the district court's conclusion that the parties intended that full reimbursement of the Medicare Part B premiums in excess of the pension benefit would vest for those who retired on or before July 31, 1998.

E. Benefit Levels

Corrected Judgment. Defendants challenge several aspects of the district court's corrected judgment. First, defendants claim it was error to declare that vested healthcare benefits would be at levels in place as of December 31, 2005, rather than as of the respective dates of retirement. However, the district court's declaration actually referred to the "levels in place for their respective retirement groups (pre-1986 retirees and 1986-1993 retirees) prior to the changes imposed by Defendants beginning January 1, 2006."

Second, as noted earlier, defendants argued that the judgment improperly included spouses of retirees who retired prior to the 1980 CBA, since coverage for spouses of employees (and therefore retirees) was not added until the 1980 CBA. Plaintiffs do not seem to disagree, responding that the judgment was consistent with this because it declares a right to medical insurance coverage based on the provisions in place for the respective retirement groups. If defendants require clarification, it should be directed to the district court.

Third, defendants claim it was error to declare that benefits for 1986-1993 retirees shall include 100% of "out-patient expenses," thereby eliminating the 20% copay for all outpatient treatments, when the district court's opinion only eliminated copays for "outpatient and diagnostic services." However, because the judgment declares the benefit for "out-patient expenses as specified in the Court's Opinion," there is no obvious error and the district court should be able to clarify if necessary.12

Coordination with Medicare (Pre-1986 Retirees). Lastly, defendants contend that the district court erred in finding that the parties intended to provide pre-1986 retirees with coordinated (rather than integrated) health insurance benefits. Coordinated benefits would mean 100% coverage between Medicare and health insurance, while integration would result in payment of no more than what the health insurance would pay in the absence of Medicare. Defendants rely on the statement in the Aetna SPD that, "when Medicare benefits are available, the benefits of this plan will be reduced. Medicare and the plan together will now provide a level of benefits at least as high as that previously provided by the plan alone." (Emphasis added.) However, this neither precludes coordination nor specifies integration of Medicare benefits. Nor do defendants deny that the pre-1986 CBAs provided "the same coordination of benefits as the General Motors-UAW," or that the extrinsic evidence showed that the parties intended coordination of benefits prior to 1986 and changed to an integrated program beginning in 1986. Bender, 725 F.Supp.2d at 663-64.

Finally, continued reliance on evidence that medical insurance was integrated with Medicare when coverage was transferred to Great West is misplaced. Although the application for insurance with Great West did not reflect coordination of benefits, the evidence established that (1) Great West was expected to duplicate the coverage provided by Aetna; and (2) Great West corrected the error at Newell's direction several months later to provide pre-1986 retirees, only, with coordination of benefits with Medicare. If anything, this evidence supports the plaintiffs' contention that the parties intended that there be a vested right to coordination of benefits for pre-1986 retirees.

F. Statute of Limitations

The district court rejected defendants' argument that both medical insurance and Medicare Part B reimbursement claims were time barred. This court addressed the accrual of similar ERISA and LMRA claims for vested lifetime healthcare benefits in Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc. (Winnett II), 609 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2010). Because Congress did not provide a statute of limitations for these claims, courts must borrow from the forum state's most analogous cause of action. Id. at 408. Here, as the district court concluded, the plaintiffs' ERISA and LMRA claims are governed by Michigan's six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. Bender, 725 F.Supp.2d at 664 (citing Santino v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2001) (ERISA); Biros v. Spalding-Evenflo Co., No. 88-712, 1989 WL 201625, at *3 (W.D.Mich. Aug. 1, 1989)). "Although state law sets the length of the statute of limitations, `federal law' establishes when the `statute of limitations begins to run.'" Winnett II, 609 F.3d at 408 (citation omitted). On the question of when the plaintiffs' claims accrued, we explained that:

609 F.3d at 408-09 (emphasis added). Although the same factors at play in Winnett II are at issue here, the district court did not err in rejecting the defendants' statute-of-limitations defense in this case.

First, with respect to plaintiffs' claims that defendants breached the vested right to medical insurance benefits by requiring retirees to pay a portion of the premium, it is defendants' contention that the claims accrued for all plaintiffs no later than June 1997 when Newell sent retirees a letter asserting a "right to modify the coverage and benefits provided, as may be amended from time to time." In support, defendants rely on the fact that Bender was concerned that this letter was asserting a right that defendants did not have under the CBAs. Despite assurances that followed, defendants argue that this letter notified plaintiffs that Newell "no longer was willing to provide free, unalterable, lifetime healthcare benefits." Id. at 409. Indeed, defendants argue that these claims accrued even earlier with the reservation language in the 1978, 1989 and 1993 SPDs.

Unlike this case, however, Winnett II involved a "clear repudiation" of the promise of vested health insurance benefits where the SPDs spelled out that specific benefit changes would apply to existing retirees and would result in a cap on the employer's contributions; there were immediate benefit changes; it was expected that the VEBA trust funds would be exhausted; and the reservation-of-rights language was sufficiently unqualified so as to trigger an obligation by the union to object. See id. Here, the reservation-of-rights provisions were not unqualified, did not reflect "clear repudiation" of vested health insurance benefits for retirees, and did not result in any immediate changes in benefits. The district court did not err in finding that the health insurance claims accrued with the letter sent in November 2005 notifying retirees (including pre-1986 and 1986-1993 groups) of the intention to charge premiums effective January 1, 2006. Since the complaint was filed well within six years of the accrual, these claims were timely.

Second, defendants argue that the claims of plaintiffs Connor and Smoker for full reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums accrued when those premiums exceeded the amount of their monthly reimbursement. Defendants maintain that starting sometime in 2000 or 2001, the Medicare Part B premiums first exceeded the reimbursements they were receiving of $50.00 and $43.80, respectively. As the district court found, however, defendants may have "inadvertently mishandled the claims of a handful of retirees, but the undisputed evidence shows that Defendants' promptly and fully corrected the mistakes." Bender, 725 F.Supp.2d at 665. Also, as this court emphasized in Winnett II, such claims should accrue at the same time for each subclass of retirees. Id. at 664-65. Because the retiree claims for full reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums did not accrue until defendants announced their intention to discontinue making full reimbursement in 2006, these claims are timely even if the claims added in March 2009 do not relate back to the filing of the original complaint. The district court did not err in finding the Medicare Part B premium reimbursement claims of Connor and Smoker were timely.

III.

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.