ZATKOFF, District Judge.
Plaintiff James D. Szekeres appeals the district court's grant of Defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA") and the Locomotive Inspection Act ("LIA"). The district court's ruling stemmed from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, ___ U.S.___, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011), wherein the Supreme Court endorsed the dismissal of a FELA action in Nicholson v. Erie R.R. Co., 253 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.1958). The district court concluded that the facts of Nicholson were not meaningfully distinguishable from the facts of this case and vacated the jury's verdict in favor of Plaintiff on both the FELA and LIA claims. The district court did not address Defendant's motion for a new trial before dismissing Plaintiff's cause of action. Plaintiff contends that the district court erred when it concluded that Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient proof of causation between the jury-determined violations under FELA and LIA and Plaintiff's injuries. For the reasons that follow, we
Plaintiff began working for Defendant in 1967. On January 4, 2006, he was working
Plaintiff had to urinate while operating the Valley City switch. Plaintiff testified that he planned to urinate outside — rather than in the toilet compartment of the locomotive assigned to their job — because he had looked at the toilet compartment earlier that day and found it to be "dirty," "smelly," "filthy," and "unusable." Plaintiff testified that, had the toilet compartment not been dirty and unusable, he would have used it. Instead, once Plaintiff completed his tasks at the Valley City switch, he began to walk from the Valley City switch to a more private outdoor location in the field behind the tracks. The path Plaintiff chose led him up a slight incline. Within steps of the Valley City switch, Plaintiff slipped and twisted his right knee. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a torn right meniscus and underwent surgery to repair the cartilage in his knee.
Plaintiff filed this cause of action in the Northern District of Ohio on May 8, 2008. On July 2, 2009, the district court (Aldrich, J.) granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims. On August 16, 2010, this court reversed the district court's summary judgment order after finding that genuine disputes of material fact existed with respect to both the FELA and LIA claims and remanded the case back to district court for a trial by jury. Szekeres v. CSX Transp., Inc., 617 F.3d 424 (6th Cir.2010). On August 27, 2010, the case was reassigned from Judge Ann Aldrich to Judge John R. Adams. After being adjourned pending the Supreme Court's decision in McBride, a jury trial was held in August 2011. At the close of Plaintiff's case-in-chief, Defendant filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to both the FELA and LIA claims, relying primarily on Nicholson. The district court denied that motion and permitted the trial to continue. A unanimous jury found: (a) Defendant had violated the LIA and that the LIA violation caused Plaintiff's injuries,
Defendant then filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) with respect to both the FELA and LIA claims or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a). On June 5, 2012, relying on McBride and Nicholson, the district court entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendant with respect to both claims. After finding "no meaningful distinction between the facts at issue in Nicholson and the facts presented by" Plaintiff, the district court held that there was not sufficient causation to assess liability against Defendant on the LIA claim. For the same reasons, the district court held that Plaintiff failed to present adequate proof of causation to support the jury's verdict with respect to the FELA claim. The district court then vacated the jury's verdict and dismissed Plaintiff's cause of action. The district court expressly noted it was not making a conditional ruling on Defendant's Rule 59(a) motion for new trial.
We review de novo the district court's grant of a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law. "In a federal question case, the standard of review for a Rule 50 motion based on sufficiency of the evidence is identical to that used by the district court. The evidence should not be weighed, and the credibility of the witnesses should not be questioned. The judgment of this court should not be substituted for that of the jury; instead, the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, and that party given the benefit of all reasonable inferences." Tisdale v. Fed. Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 531 (6th Cir.2005). The Rule 50(b) motion should be granted only if "reasonable minds could not come to a conclusion other than one favoring the movant." Id.
In McBride, the Supreme Court set forth several clearly established principles of FELA law. First,
McBride, 131 S.Ct. at 2636 (emphasis added).
Second, in order to prove causation under FELA, an employee must prove only that the railroad's negligence played a part in producing the injury for which the employee seeks damages:
Id. (internal citations omitted). Significantly, Congress has not taken action to change the FELA causation standard the Supreme Court announced over a half-century ago:
Id. at 2641 (internal citations omitted).
Third, even though the relaxed proximate causation standard set forth in Rogers — and not the common law proximate cause standard — governs FELA cases, a defendant railroad will not be liable for every possible link of causation. Rather, though "FELA's language is straightforward: railroads are made answerable in damages for an employee's `injury or death resulting in whole or in part from [the railroad's] negligence[,]" id. at 2643 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 51), the harm caused by the negligence of the railroad must be reasonably foreseeable:
McBride, 131 S.Ct. at 2642-43 (footnotes omitted).
The Supreme Court also clarified that certain "far out `but for' scenarios" will not, as a matter of law, support viable FELA claims. The Supreme Court cited Nicholson as an example of such a case:
McBride, 131 S.Ct. at 2643-44 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
Under LIA, 49 U.S.C. § 20701, et seq., and 49 C.F.R. §§ 229.137 and 229.139, a railroad must provide a sanitary toilet on its locomotive for use by employees while on duty. The jury determined that Defendant violated LIA by providing Plaintiff with an unsanitary bathroom. Defendant does not challenge that finding in this appeal. Rather, Defendant argues that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to find that the LIA violation caused Plaintiff's injury. A LIA violation constitutes negligence per se under FELA only if Plaintiff can establish that the violation was a cause of the injury. See Szekeres, 617 F.3d at 427. Thus, we must look to the causation standard under FELA to determine whether the jury could find for Plaintiff with regard to his LIA claim.
Under FELA, a "railroad `caused or contributed to' a railroad worker's injury `if [the railroad's] negligence played a part — no matter how small — in bringing about the injury.' That, indeed, is the test Congress prescribed for proximate causation in FELA cases." McBride, 131 S.Ct. at 2644.
The district court found "that the express approval of Nicholson by the United States Supreme Court after remand in this matter compels a conclusion that judgment as a matter of law in favor of [Defendant] is appropriate." In ruling on Defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court oversimplified the facts of both Nicholson and this case as
This court rejects: (a) the district court's oversimplification of the facts of Nicholson and this case, and (b) its conclusion that the Supreme Court's endorsement of Nicholson dictates judgment as a matter of law for Defendant on Plaintiff's FELA claim. It is true that three important facts were present in both Nicholson and this case: (1) both Plaintiff and the Nicholson plaintiff were railroad employees, (2) there was not a usable lavatory available to either of them, and (3) both plaintiffs ultimately were injured as the result of seeking to relieve themselves. The district court relied on only the very limited facts of Nicholson set forth in McBride. In doing so, however, the district court ignored several key facts of Nicholson that were materially different than the key facts in this case.
First, in Nicholson, the plaintiff was off-duty when the incident occurred. In this case, Plaintiff was on the job when the incident occurred. Second, in Nicholson, the plaintiff was on defendant railroad property but was not working at her workplace when she was injured; rather, she was on a passenger locomotive for the purpose of using the women's lavatory.
For the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that the facts of this case: (a) are distinguishable from the facts of Nicholson,
The district court also concluded that Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the FELA claim because Plaintiff relied solely upon speculation to establish causation between the muddy area behind the switch and plaintiff's injury. When granting Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court held that causation was not established because Plaintiff did not testify that he saw mud on his shoes after being in the area behind the Valley City switch. The district court, however, did not give appropriate consideration to: (1) certain testimony of Plaintiff, (2) the testimony of others, (3) the photographs of the incident scene, and (4) the ability of a person to realize he or she had mud on his or her boots, even without looking at the boots.
Specifically, the district court did not credit Plaintiff's testimony that the ground conditions where he stood behind the Valley City switch were muddy and not covered with ballast. Plaintiff's testimony regarding the muddy conditions behind the Valley City switch not only was unchallenged, but it was corroborated by Larry Ashby, the conductor of the three-man crew on which Plaintiff worked when he was injured on January 4, 2006. Larry Ashby stated that the area was "wet, damp and muddy." Their testimony was supported by photographs of the Valley City switch area taken hours after the incident. In addition to their testimony and those photographs, John Whittenberger, a supervisor for Defendant who visited the site hours after the incident occurred, testified that the area behind the Valley City switch consisted of dirt mixed with stone and that dirt becomes muddy when wet.
This court holds that the foregoing evidence, taken in the aggregate, constituted sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that: (a) the area behind the Valley City switch was muddy, (b) mud had accumulated on Plaintiff's boots as a result of standing where required while operating the Valley City switch, and (c) such mud was a cause of Plaintiff's fall.
This court also finds that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the mud in the area behind the Valley City switch was the due to Defendant's negligence and that such negligence played a part in causing Plaintiff's injury. First, Larry Ashby testified that, prior to January 4, 2006, he had reported to railroad management at a safety meeting that ballast was needed behind the Valley City switch to improve unsafe ground conditions. Second, Whittenberger testified that mud was a recognized slipping hazard in the railroad industry. As we have previously stated, "if as a result of a defective appliance a plaintiff is required to take certain actions and he or she is injured while taking those actions, the issue of causation generally should be submitted to the jury." Richards v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 330 F.3d 428, 437 (6th Cir.2003). Based on the evidence admitted at trial, this court holds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff's injury "was within the risk created by" the unusable toilet and the muddy conditions; therefore Plaintiff's right to
This court also finds erroneous the district court's conclusion that it was mere speculation that Plaintiff had mud on the bottom of his boots after being in the Valley City switch area simply because Plaintiff did not testify that he "saw" mud on his boots. Rather, a reasonable jury could conclude that a person is aware that he or she has mud on the bottom of his or her boots simply by walking in the boots-especially when such person observed that the area in which he or she walked was muddy. In fact, Plaintiff, Larry Ashby, and Whittenberger all acknowledged as much at trial. Plaintiff stated that he did not look at and see mud on the bottom of his boots, but he also stated: (1) "[Mud] was on the bottom of my shoe," (2) "[t]he mud was on my shoes because there was mud everywhere," and (3) "You're walking on your boot. You know when there is mud on the bottom of your boot." Larry Ashby also stated that he never looked at the bottom of his boots, but he could feel the mud on them after walking in the area behind the Valley City switch. ("Q. When you walked in this area [behind the Valley City switch], did you get mud on your work boots? A. Yes.") ("Q. Did you actually see the mud on the bottom of your boots? Did you look at it? A. Well, you just feel it. It's there. No, I didn't [see mud on my boots]."). Finally, Whittenberger testified that although he did not look directly at his shoes, he believed he accumulated mud on his shoes walking in the area behind the Valley City switch. Therefore, a reasonable jury could find that each of three witnesses testified he accumulated (or, in the case of Whittenberger, believed he accumulated) mud on his shoes as a result of walking in the area behind the Valley City switch on January 4, 2006.
For the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury reasonably could have found that Plaintiff satisfied his burden of proving causation to the extent required by FELA and McBride. Therefore, this court holds that the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's FELA claim.
At trial, the district court allowed the testimony of James Arton ("Arton") as an expert for Plaintiff.
Contrary to Defendant's argument and as this court has recognized, expert testimony is not necessary to support allegations of negligence. See, e.g., Richards, 330 F.3d at 433 (plaintiff's testimony alone was sufficient to show that an appliance failed to function properly). See also Ulfik v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 77 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir.1996) (it was within the common knowledge of the jury to determine whether there was a link between exposure to paint fumes and claimed headaches); Lynch v. METRA, 700 F.3d 906, 915 (7th Cir.2012) (no expert testimony needed on "easily understood" concept of improper installation of equipment). For the reasons discussed above, including the testimony of Whittenberger that mud is a recognized hazard in the railroad industry, this court finds that, even without the testimony of Arton, there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the muddy conditions and/or lack of ballast in the area behind the Valley City switch was a cause of Plaintiff's injury under FELA and LIA. Thus, this court need not decide whether Arton's testimony should have been considered in deciding the Rule 50(b) motion.
The district court expressly stated that it was not addressing Defendant's Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial because it would do so in the event this court remanded the case. As the parties agree, the district court erred when it failed to make a conditional ruling on the Rule 59(a) motion, as required by Rule 50(c)(1), which provides:
Neither party, however, moved the district court to rule on the Rule 59(a) motion; instead, Plaintiff filed his appeal the same day as the district court issued its opinion. Plaintiff asks this court to rule on the Rule 59(a) motion now, in the interest of judicial economy and to prevent another trial and potential appeal. Defendant asks this court to remand the case to the district court so that it can make the initial ruling on the Rule 59(a) motion.
This court has recognized that "if the judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed on appeal, it is within the appellate court's discretion to determine whether the case should be sent back for a new trial" when the district court also conditionally granted the motion for new trial but did not specify the grounds for the conditional grant. See Portage II v. Bryant Petro. Corp., 899 F.2d 1514, 1524 (6th Cir.1990) (citing Ross v. Chesapeake & Ohio Rlwy. Co., 421 F.2d 328, 330 (6th Cir.1970)). In such circumstances, we also have the authority to reinstate the verdict of the jury. Id. at 1525.
This court has not expressly decided whether it can consider the motion for a new trial if the district court failed to address the motion for a new trial, but other circuits have and some have determined that an appellate court can rule on such a motion if the district court fails to
This court likewise concludes that it can rule on a Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial if a district court fails to consider such a motion after ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The rationale expressed by the Fourth Circuit is particularly instructive and persuasive:
Mays, 502 F.2d at 110 (emphasis added).
The court now turns to whether it should remand this case or address the motion for a new trial at this time. Defendant's Rule 59(a) motion was based on two issues: (a) that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and/or (b) the verdict was improperly influenced by
A review of the trial transcript also reveals that Arton's testimony added little, if anything, to the evidence presented to the jury that the jury did not hear from other witnesses. Specifically, like Arton, Larry Ashby testified that ballast was needed at the Valley City switch; in fact, Larry Ashby had complained to Defendant's management about this safety concern prior to January 4, 2006. In addition, like Arton, Whittenberger testified that the presence of mud is a recognized hazard in the railroad industry. Therefore, even if it was error to admit Arton's testimony at trial, it was harmless error as Arton's testimony could not have improperly influenced the jury. Rather, as we have concluded, "there is evidence in the record from which the jury could find that the injuries complained of resulted at least in part from [Defendant's] negligence," Ross, 421 F.2d at 330, and Defendant's violation of the LIA.
Accordingly, this court concludes that there is no basis for granting Defendant's alternative motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) and denies the same.
For the reasons set forth above, this court