Rule 46(e)(1), Fed.R.Crim.P., requires that the district court declare a forfeiture "[i]f there is a breach of condition of a bond." When Gutierrez failed to appear as ordered on August 15, the bond agreement was breached,2 and the district court had no discretion in determining whether the bond should be forfeited. See Appearance Bond Surety v. United States, 622 F.2d 334, 336 (8th Cir.1980) (per curiam). See also 3A Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal 2d Sec. 776 (1982). Indeed, Cornell acknowledges the mandatory nature of Rule 46(e)(1). Prior to the entry of a judgment of default, however, "[t]he court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture." Fed.R.Crim.P. 46(e)(2). And unless the forfeiture is set aside, the court is further required to enter a judgment of default on motion of the government, after which execution may issue. Fed.R.Crim.P. 46(e)(3). Once judgment is entered, "the court may remit it in whole or in part under the conditions applying to the setting aside of forfeiture...." Fed.R.Crim.P. 46(e)(4).

On the day Gutierrez failed to appear as ordered, the court entered judgment on the government's motion. No further hearings were held. Cornell argues that the court "was not sufficiently informed" to permit an assessment of the relevant factors bearing on the court's exercise of its discretion under Rule 46(e)(2) and (4), and thereby asserts that the court erred in failing to hold a hearing3 on his motion.

The decision whether to set aside or remit a forfeiture rests within the sound discretion of the district court and will be reversed only if the court acted arbitrarily or capriciously. United States v. Foster, 417 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir.1969). Similarly, we hold that a district court's decision on a surety's request for a hearing on the motion is discretionary. See United States v. Roher, 706 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir.1983) (denial of hearing not an abuse of discretion where surety requested "an opportunity to present evidence with reference to the setting aside of the bond forfeitures or to develop further evidence with reference to what damages, if any, were suffered by the Government as a result of Defendant's nonappearance"). In the usual case, the factors that the district court should consider in making its determination regarding whether a forfeiture should be set aside or remitted include: "(1) the willfulness of the defendant's breach of conditions; (2) the participation of the surities in apprehending the defendant; (3) the cost, inconvenience and prejudice suffered by the government as a result of the defendant's breach; and (4) any explanation or mitigating factors presented by the defendant." United States v. Castaldo, 667 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 978, 102 S. Ct. 2245, 72 L. Ed. 2d 853 (1982). It is not necessary that each of these factors be resolved in the government's favor for the district court to enforce full forfeiture. United States v. Abernathy, 757 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam). Additionally, if the movant is a surety, the court may consider whether the surety is a professional bondsman or one of defendant's friends or family members, and the appropriateness of the amount of the bond. United States v. Frias-Ramirez, 670 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 842, 103 S. Ct. 94, 74 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1982). The court, however, may not consider the financial plight or interests of the movant. United States v. Ciotti, 579 F. Supp. 276, 278 (W.D.Pa.1984). See also United States v. Skipper, 633 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir.1981) (denial of request to set aside forfeiture or remit affirmed although enforcement would cause financial hardship to sureties who were family members of defendant). However, none of these factors are applicable in the case before the court for Gutierrez has failed to appear. See United States v. Velez, 693 F.2d 1081, 1083 (11th Cir.1982).

In most cases, the setting aside of a forfeiture or its remission while the defendant is still at large would undermine the purpose of bail bonds, i.e., to insure the presence of the accused. United States v. Velez, 693 F.2d at 1084 n. 7; United States v. Skipper, 633 F.2d at 1180; United States v. Ciotti, 579 F. Supp. at 278. In Velez, however, remission of $30,000 of a $60,000 surety bond was allowed due to "the unusual circumstances" of the case. There, the Eleventh Circuit found that a bondsman justifiably believed that he had obtained a valid reduction of his obligation on a bail bond prior to the defendant's breach and, accordingly, concluded that the district court had abused its discretion in failing to remit a portion of the bond forfeiture. United States v. Velez, 693 F.2d at 1084. The instant case presents no such unique or special circumstances. The district court explained to Cornell in detail the risks of executing a bond, and we are convinced Cornell was well aware of his obligations thereunder. More importantly, since Gutierrez has failed to appear for trial and his whereabouts remain unknown, it cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion by its failure to conduct a hearing on Cornell's motion.

Moreover, it is apparent that the district court based its decision on the affidavits submitted by both Cornell and the government. Where, as here, the affidavits of the parties adequately set forth the relevant facts, a full-scale evidentiary hearing is not required. See United States v. Castaldo, 667 F.2d at 22 (court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing not an abuse of discretion where parties' affidavits are sufficient and the sureties failed to request a hearing).

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying, without a hearing, petitioner's motion to set aside or remit the bond forfeiture.

AFFIRMED.