Filed: Apr. 29, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 April 29, 2013 Before MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge JOHN D. TINDER, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge No. 12-2037 NORTHEASTERN RURAL ELECTRIC Appeal from the United States District Court MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION, for the Southern District of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellant, Indianapolis Division. v. No. 1:11-cv-00144-SEB-DML WABASH VALLEY POWER Sarah Evans Barker, ASSOCIATION, Judge. Defendant-Appellee. ORDE
Summary: United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 April 29, 2013 Before MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge JOHN D. TINDER, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge No. 12-2037 NORTHEASTERN RURAL ELECTRIC Appeal from the United States District Court MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION, for the Southern District of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellant, Indianapolis Division. v. No. 1:11-cv-00144-SEB-DML WABASH VALLEY POWER Sarah Evans Barker, ASSOCIATION, Judge. Defendant-Appellee. ORDER..
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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 April 29, 2013 Before MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge JOHN D. TINDER, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge No. 12-2037 NORTHEASTERN RURAL ELECTRIC Appeal from the United States District Court MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION, for the Southern District of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellant, Indianapolis Division. v. No. 1:11-cv-00144-SEB-DML WABASH VALLEY POWER Sarah Evans Barker, ASSOCIATION, Judge. Defendant-Appellee. ORDER On consideration of the petition for rehearing en banc, filed on March 8, 2013 , all judges on the original panel have voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing, and no judge in active service has requested a vote for rehearing en banc. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. On page three of the slip opinion issued February 22, 2013, the third sentence of the new, full paragraph is hereby AMENDED as follows: The denial of a motion to remand ordinarily cannot be appealed provide a basis for appellate jurisdiction before a final judgment, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)1292, but here we have jurisdiction over the denial of the motion to remand because it is “inextricably intertwined” with the appealable preliminary injunction. As amended, the sentence shall now read: The denial of a motion to remand ordinarily cannot provide a basis for appellate jurisdiction before a final judgment, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292, but here we have jurisdiction over the denial of the motion to remand because it is “inextricably intertwined” with the appealable preliminary injunction.