Judges: Tinder
Filed: Oct. 21, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit _ No. 12-3724 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEX A. CAMPBELL, also known as DAVE, also known as DADDY, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:10-cr-00026-1 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge. _ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2014 _ Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and TINDER, Circuit Judges. TINDER, Circuit Judge. Defend
Summary: In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit _ No. 12-3724 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEX A. CAMPBELL, also known as DAVE, also known as DADDY, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:10-cr-00026-1 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge. _ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2014 _ Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and TINDER, Circuit Judges. TINDER, Circuit Judge. Defenda..
More
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 12‐3724
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
ALEX A. CAMPBELL, also known as
DAVE, also known as DADDY,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:10‐cr‐00026‐1 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2014
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
TINDER, Circuit Judge. Defendant‐Appellant Alex Camp‐
bell, also known as “Daddy”, “Dave” and “Cowboy”, re‐
cruited young women in the United States illegally to work
for him as masseuses and, ultimately, prostitutes. He re‐
ferred to these women as his “Family”. At first, Campbell
enticed the women into joining his Family by offering them
comfortable places to live, and jobs in massage parlors with
2 No. 12‐3724
no expectation that they perform sexual services. Once he
had gained their trust, Campbell required the women to
break their ties with their relatives and friends, and confis‐
cated their identification, immigration documents and mon‐
ey. Campbell renamed them, branded them with tattoos,
abused them, and forced them to engage in prostitution for
his benefit.
Eventually, one of Campbell’s victims turned to law en‐
forcement. This led to an investigation, which resulted in an
eleven‐count indictment. A jury found Campbell guilty on
all counts and the district court sentenced him to life impris‐
onment. Campbell appeals his conviction of two counts of
harboring illegal aliens, one count of extortion under the
Hobbs Act, and one count of sex trafficking under the Traf‐
ficking Victim’s Protection Act. Specifically, Campbell con‐
tends that the district court erred in failing to instruct the ju‐
ry that harboring requires proof of his intent to shield the
alien from detection by law enforcement, and the Govern‐
ment’s evidence of such intent was insufficient. Campbell
also contends that the Government’s evidence was insuffi‐
cient to establish the required interstate commerce elements
under the Hobbs Act and the Trafficking Victim’s Protection
Act.
I. Background
On January 12, 2010, the Government filed a Complaint
in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois against Campbell and Danielle John. Both Camp‐
bell and John were indicted on April 15, 2010. On November
29, 2010, John withdrew her not‐guilty plea pursuant to a
plea agreement. On December 30, 2010, a Superseding In‐
dictment was filed against Campbell alone, containing the
No. 12‐3724 3
following eleven counts: obtaining labor and services of oth‐
ers by force, serious harm and abuse, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1589 (Counts 1, 2 and 3); concealing, harboring and
shielding illegal aliens for commercial advantage, in viola‐
tion of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) &
1324(a)(1)(B)(i) (Counts 4, 5, and 6); concealing identity and
immigration documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a)
(Counts 7, 8, and 9); sex trafficking, in violation of the Traf‐
ficking Victim’s Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (Count
10); and extortion, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1951(a) (Count 11). A jury found Campbell guilty on all
counts, but the district court granted Campbell’s motion for
acquittal as to Count 5. Campbell was sentenced on all re‐
maining counts. On appeal, Campbell only challenges his
conviction of the following: Counts 4 and 6, for harboring
illegal aliens “Diamond” and “Loni”, respectively; Count 10,
for sex trafficking related to Diamond; and Count 11, for ex‐
tortion of “Masha”.1 Accordingly, we will focus on the evi‐
dence adduced at trial related to Campbell’s interactions
with Diamond, Loni and Masha. And if Tolstoy was correct
that every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way, some
1 Four victims testified at trial under their real first names. They testified
about the “Family” names Campbell gave to them, and they referred to
each other by those names. In the appellate briefing, the parties refer to
two of the testifying victims—“Diamond” and “Loni”— by the names
given to them by Campbell. The parties refer to a third victim by her first
name, “Masha”, and not her Family name given by Campbell, “Baby”.
(Reference to the fourth testifying victim has been omitted from this
opinion because the convictions being appealed do not relate to her.) In
this opinion, we refer to the victims by the same names used by the par‐
ties in the briefing.
4 No. 12‐3724
detail will be necessary to show the way in which Campbell
made his “Family” uniquely unhappy.
A. Diamond
Diamond, who was born in Ukraine, came to the United
States in 2007 to be an au pair in Ohio and Georgia. Her last
au pair assignment ended in November 2007, when she had
a month left on her visa. Seven months later, Diamond, then
20 years old, had moved to Chicago and was looking for
work. In June 2008, Diamond was hired by Bo Liu, Camp‐
bell’s business associate, to be a masseuse at a massage par‐
lor, after she responded to an internet advertisement for an
administrative assistant. Shortly after being hired, she met
Campbell, who was 43 years old, used the name “Dave”,
and was introduced to Diamond as the owner of the mas‐
sage parlor. During their first conversation, Campbell as‐
sured Diamond: “In my spas, there are no illegal activities.”
On the same day, she met John, who was known as “Prin‐
cess”, and who was also born in Ukraine. Diamond under‐
stood John to be the manager of the spa, although she took
orders from Campbell. Diamond met another female em‐
ployee of the spa, “Nadya”, who was born in Ukraine. Dia‐
mond noticed that John and Nadya had identical tattoos.
After her first day of work, Campbell drove Diamond
home in his car. At the beginning of her time at the spa,
Campbell treated Diamond nicely, gave her rides, asked her
about her life, and—in her mind—became her friend. Camp‐
bell asked Diamond about her past in Ukraine, her time in
the United States, and the roommate with whom Diamond
shared a small apartment. He asked about her legal status in
the United States, and Diamond confided in him that she
was not in the country legally. Campbell remarked to Dia‐
No. 12‐3724 5
mond that it is hard to be in the United States alone, and she
needed someone who could give her advice and help her.
On June 25, 2008, after Diamond had known Campbell
for a week, Campbell gave Diamond a ride after work. They
ate dinner and Campbell served her alcohol until she be‐
came intoxicated. Campbell described the “Family” to her.
He said the Family was an organization of friends that help
each other. He told her that he was a member of the Family,
and he gave $5,000 a month to other members of the Family.
He asked her if she would like to join the Family. She asked
if she would need to pay money to join. He said that she
would not need to pay money, but he told her that every
member of the Family had a horseshoe tattoo. He said that
the tattoo allows members of the Family to identify each
other and, “if you need help, and they see this tattoo, they
will help you.” At the end of the conversation, while Dia‐
mond was still intoxicated, Campbell took Diamond to a tat‐
too shop and Diamond received her first tattoo, a horseshoe
on her neck.
Within a week of receiving the tattoo, Campbell and Di‐
amond began a sexual relationship. Campbell had Diamond
refer to him as “Daddy”. Campbell told Diamond that she
needed a pseudonym to give to massage clients. At first, he
let her choose the name, but later, Campbell gave her a new
name: “Diamond”. He told her that she was like “a diamond
in the rough,” but it takes “a lot of pressure to actually make
it a real diamond.” Shortly after their sexual relationship be‐
gan, Campbell had Diamond receive a second tattoo, this
time on her chest. The tattoo depicted a horseshoe, with
“Cowboy”—Campbell’s self‐appointed moniker—written at
6 No. 12‐3724
the top, and “Diamond” written inside the horseshoe, along
with “AAC” and “917”, Campbell’s initials and his birthday.
For two weeks after being tattooed, Diamond was paid
for her work at the spa. Then, Campbell told her that he
would keep all the money she earned in an envelope with
her name on it. He told her that he would keep it safe, and if
she needed it, she could have it at any time. Diamond felt
that Campbell treated her well during this time, and she
thought she was falling in love with him.
Campbell told Diamond that she would have to undergo
an orientation for joining the Family. This orientation in‐
cluded training on the Family rules, such as the requirement
to keep in constant contact with Campbell via phone calls
and text messages, and to have no contact with “society”
(Campbell’s word for non‐Family members). During orienta‐
tion, Campbell took Diamond’s passport, and told her he
was giving it to Danielle John so it would be kept safe.
Campbell told Diamond that her roommate was jealous
of her, and would report her to immigration authorities
which would result in Diamond being deported. Campbell
demanded that Diamond immediately move out of her
shared apartment and into an apartment he provided. At
first, Diamond moved into John’s apartment, which was in
the building that housed “Elle Spa,” a massage parlor under
Campbell’s control. In late‐July 2008, Campbell rented a stu‐
dio apartment for Diamond in the same building. Campbell
furnished the apartment and paid the bills.
At the end of July 2008, Campbell learned that Diamond
had smoked a cigarette after he had previously forbade her
from smoking for the day. Campbell told Diamond that she
No. 12‐3724 7
had cheated on the Family, and he ordered her to take off
her clothes, and he beat her with a belt. The same night, John
took all of Diamond’s identification documents and bank
cards. While Campbell told Diamond she could not talk to
anyone other than Campbell and John, John erased all of the
phone numbers in Diamond’s phone except Campbell’s and
John’s numbers. While Campbell told Diamond she was not
allowed to keep track of money, John erased a record of
earnings Diamond had been keeping on her phone.
After that incident, Campbell began inflicting what he re‐
ferred to as “punishments” on Diamond. He forbade her
from speaking to her parents, and from smoking, drinking
and eating sweets. Campbell repeatedly beat her with his
belt or hand, and he forced her to extinguish a lit cigarette
using her naked buttocks. Campbell told Diamond that he
had video surveillance cameras throughout the spas where
Campbell forced Diamond to work without pay seven days
a week. Campbell told her that if she tried to run from him
he would find her. He emphasized that she was in the coun‐
try illegally, had no passport, no identification, no money
and no friends in the United States. Campbell claimed he
was a professional assassin, who was good at tracking and
killing people. He told Diamond repeatedly that if anyone in
the Family went to the authorities, he would kill that person
or he would “just come to the courtroom and shoot every‐
body.” Campbell told her that she should say nothing if she
were ever questioned by law enforcement, and that the po‐
lice often beat and raped women. Campbell ordered Dia‐
mond to spy on other spa employees and report to Campbell
what they did and said.
8 No. 12‐3724
In September 2008, Campbell told Diamond he was a
“pimp” and she would engage in prostitution for his benefit.
He said that all of the members of the Family engaged in
prostitution for him, and he ordered John to teach Diamond
the mechanics of how prostitution worked, such as how to
negotiate with customers, screen customers to ensure they
were not law enforcement agents, and which sex acts were
expected. In October 2008, Campbell ordered Diamond to
have sex with his business partner Bo Liu, get pregnant from
him, and give him the baby. Diamond agreed to the request,
fearing for her life. Bo Liu made monthly payments to
Campbell for this.
In November 2008, Diamond was late in texting Camp‐
bell that she had finished a massage. Campbell responded
by beating Diamond with his belt and forcing her to live in
Elle Spa. The conditions in the spa were unsanitary, and she
was given little food to eat, going for stretches of up to 48
hours without food. Campbell also began requiring Dia‐
mond to perform sex acts for money at Elle Spa. On Christ‐
mas day 2008, Diamond made $800 performing sex acts in
the spa. When she gave the money to Campbell, as she was
always required to do, he rewarded her by allowing her to
spend the night on a couch in John’s apartment. At the be‐
ginning of January, Campbell forced Diamond to live in a
different spa under his control. She spent between four and
five months living in this spa, which did not have a shower
or a bathtub. She washed in a sink, and was forced to use
semen‐stained towels to wash and dry.
In January 2009, when Diamond asked for a thousand
dollars to send to a sick relative in Ukraine, Campbell told
her that she was out of the Family, and would have the
No. 12‐3724 9
choice of going through a “reorientation” or having Camp‐
bell “cut [her] tattoos off and put heroin in [her] veins and
drop [her] off in some crack [house].” During the reorienta‐
tion in 2009, Diamond was permitted to speak only English,
and she was not permitted to talk with anyone outside of
work, including Campbell, without permission.
In January 2009, Campbell had an appearance in court.
Afterward, he told Diamond that a former Family member
named Amy had complained to him about the police, but
she did not appear in court and so he was no longer in trou‐
ble. Campbell opened champagne in celebration, and told
Diamond “his people took care of [Amy],” which Diamond
understood to mean that Campbell’s associates killed her.
In January and February of 2009, Diamond continued
performing sex acts for money at the spas when instructed
by Campbell. Sometimes during that period, Campbell was
worried about undercover law enforcement agents, and he
instructed Diamond to only perform massages. During this
time, the spas where she worked advertised in a magazine
called, “Chicago After Dark,” and on the classified adver‐
tisement website, “Craigslist”. During late 2008, all of 2009
and early 2010, Diamond placed advertisements for the spas
on Craigslist.
When Diamond met Masha, or “Baby”, at a spa in Janu‐
ary 2009, Diamond was angry because she assumed Masha
was living in the studio apartment Campbell had initially
rented for Diamond. Diamond asked Campbell why Masha
lived in the apartment and Diamond was forced to live in
the spa. Campbell took her to a massage room, beat her, and
then told her to clean up and not reveal to Masha that he had
beaten her. In February 2009, Campbell ordered Diamond
10 No. 12‐3724
and Masha to perform sex acts on each other while Camp‐
bell filmed them with his phone. In March or April 2009,
Campbell directed Diamond to call Masha’s parents in Bela‐
rus and obtain from them Masha’s phone number in the
United States. Around the same time, Campbell instructed
Diamond to meet Masha in a spa parking lot and receive a
package from her. Diamond received the package and put it
in the spa safe as instructed.
In June 2009, Campbell moved Diamond into a house
with John, and John and Campbell’s child, known as “Eu‐
rope”. During the six months that Diamond lived in this
house, other members of Campbell’s Family lived there from
time to time, including Loni. Campbell asked Diamond to
tell Loni about the rules of the Family (e.g., not to talk to an‐
yone outside the Family, to give all money to Campbell, to
text Campbell about customers and whereabouts, etc.), but
he told Diamond not to tell Loni her real name or that the
Family members were required to engage in prostitution. In
August or September 2009, Loni hit a fence while driving a
car. Campbell instructed John to give Diamond her identifi‐
cation and driving permit. Campbell instructed Diamond to
tell the police that she was driving and John was in the pas‐
senger seat. When the police arrived, Diamond complied
and the car was towed.
Throughout 2009, Campbell continued inflicting an array
of “punishments” on Diamond. Campbell beat Diamond
with his fists, his belt, a pool cue and a two‐by‐four board.
Campbell extinguished a lit cigarette on Diamond’s bare
foot. After a repeat customer brought her flowers on Valen‐
tine’s Day, Campbell accused Diamond of asking the cus‐
tomer for help getting out of the Family, and he beat her
No. 12‐3724 11
with a large umbrella. When Diamond only made $20 in gra‐
tuities after a day’s work, Campbell forced her to eat a $20
bill. When Campbell decided Diamond did not smile
enough in the presence of a new Family recruit, he beat her.
When Campbell caught Diamond and Loni speaking to each
other in Russian, he beat them both. At times, Campbell beat
Diamond until she begged him to kill her.
In September 2009, Campbell ordered Diamond to call
Masha’s parents in Belarus a second time to obtain Masha’s
new phone number in the United States. Soon afterwards,
Campbell instructed Diamond to receive a package from
Masha outside the Day and Night Spa. Diamond did as in‐
structed. As Diamond stood alone with Masha in the park‐
ing lot, Masha gave Diamond the package. Then Masha
hugged her and said: “Everything [is] gonna be okay.” Un‐
beknownst to Diamond, the exchange in the parking lot was
being monitored by law enforcement agents.
B. Loni
Loni was born and raised in Ukraine, and came to the
United States on a four‐month visa in May 2007 when she
was 20 years old. She came to the United States “to see a
new country and meet new friends.” In September 2008, Lo‐
ni was working as a waitress in Chicago when she met
Campbell, who went by the name “Dave”. Campbell began
referring to her by the name “Loni”, which he made up for
her, on the day they met. In November 2008, when she was
21 years old, Loni began working for Campbell as a mas‐
seuse in three of his spas, including the Elle Spa and the Day
and Night Spa. During the first month of her employment,
Campbell paid Loni in cash 35 percent of the money the spa
12 No. 12‐3724
received for each massage she performed. During the second
month, Campbell paid her 50 percent.
When she began working for Campbell, he asked Loni
about her legal status in the United States. When Loni told
him that she was in the United States illegally, Campbell re‐
sponded that he could help change her status. Loni was in‐
terested in his offer because she felt that if she were in the
country legally, she could go to school in the United States
and find a better job. In December 2008 or January 2009, at
his request, Loni gave Campbell copies of her passport,
driver’s license, social security card, birth certificate and oth‐
er identification documents so he could help her obtain legal
status.
In February 2009, Campbell gave Loni a car as a birthday
gift. In a similar manner to what he had done with Diamond,
Campbell began telling Loni about the Family. He told her
that he helped members of the Family. He also told her
about a woman who had been working for him who com‐
plained about him to the police. He said the police could not
prove a case against him because the woman disappeared.
On another occasion, Loni overheard Campbell ordering
John to tape plastic to the floors and walls of the house
basement, because he was planning to dismember a dead
body. Campbell told Loni multiple times that he had the
ability to call the authorities and have people deported, and
he had caused a woman to be deported because she had
wronged him.
In May 2009, Campbell moved Loni out of the apartment
she had been sharing with a friend, and moved her into the
house occupied by John, Diamond and others. Campbell
convinced Loni to give him her money and cell phone,
No. 12‐3724 13
which he promised to “keep safe” for her. Shortly after Loni
moved into the house, John took Loni’s passport and credit
cards. Campbell and John said that she did not need money
because they would pay all of her bills. Later, Loni asked
Campbell and John to return her passport, but they refused.
On May 27, 2009, Campbell told Loni she was joining the
Family and getting a tattoo, and Loni said that she did not
want a tattoo or to be part of the Family. Campbell said the
decision was already made, and John drove Loni and Dia‐
mond to a tattoo shop and Loni received a tattoo on her neck
modelled after the tattoo on Diamond’s neck. During the
summer of 2009, Campbell required Loni, Diamond and
John to receive tattoos on their backs and wrists. Each wom‐
an received a tattoo covering 70 percent of her back which
depicted a scroll containing a manifesto drafted by Campbell
asserting that each woman “live[s] for” Campbell “till
death.”
Campbell and John told Loni the rules of being part of
the Family, just as they had done earlier with Diamond.
Campbell told her repeatedly that he had friends in law en‐
forcement, and if she went to the police, he would find out.
He said the police would deport her. Loni, like Diamond,
was required to work in the spas every day and give Camp‐
bell all of the money she earned. Campbell beat Loni repeat‐
edly and forced her to have sex with him. On one occasion,
Campbell beat Loni and Diamond with his belt, and then re‐
quired Loni and Diamond to strike another female spa em‐
ployee. Campbell required Loni to watch as he beat Dia‐
mond with a pool cue. During the beating, when Diamond
shouted in Ukrainian, Campbell asked another Family
member for a translation. Upon learning that Diamond had
14 No. 12‐3724
exclaimed, “Oh my God,” Campbell told her: “Yes, I am
your God.”
In early October 2009, Loni asked Campbell to allow her
to travel to Ukraine. She lied to him, saying that her mother
was sick and she would return to the United States in a cou‐
ple of months to rejoin the Family. On October 5, 2009,
Campbell told her that she would be permitted to go to
Ukraine, and John booked Loni a plane ticket for the next
day. On October 6, 2009, John drove Loni to the airport, and
only then did John give Loni her passport and the plane
ticket. Loni boarded the plane with no intention of returning
to the United States.
C. Masha
Masha was born and raised in Belarus, and came to the
United States in June 2007 with a four‐month visa. When her
visa expired, Masha stayed in the country because she liked
the United States and wanted to attend nursing school in the
country. In 2008, when she was 20 years old, Masha met
Campbell while she was attending a massage therapy school
in Chicago. Campbell asked Masha questions about her life
and background, including her immigration status in the
United States. Campbell told Masha that he worked for im‐
migration services, and he could help her obtain a green
card. He told her that he had obtained green cards for many
people, and it would not be a problem obtaining one for
someone in her situation. Campbell said that a green card
would cost her $13,000, plus an additional “upfront pay‐
ment” of $1,500. In September 2008, Masha began making
weekly $1,000 payments to Campbell for a green card. Pur‐
suant to Campbell’s request, Masha gave Campbell copies of
her passport and all other identifying information, including
No. 12‐3724 15
the names and telephone number of Masha’s parents in Bel‐
arus. Campbell obtained Masha’s credit report without her
knowledge, and required Masha to undergo a medical exam‐
ination at her own expense, purportedly because it was a
step in the immigration process.
Masha obtained the money for her weekly payments by
working in Campbell’s spas (the Day and Night Spa, Elle
Spa and Club Tan) as a masseuse, as well as from friends
and her parents in Belarus. Campbell prohibited Masha from
talking with her co‐workers, and in particular, he prohibited
discussion of Masha’s life, history, address or real name
(Campbell’s name for Masha was “Baby”). Campbell sug‐
gested Masha move into one of his apartments, which he of‐
fered at a discount price. Shortly after she moved in the
apartment, Campbell evicted her for employing the chain
lock on the apartment door. Campbell broke the chain lock
and told Masha to share John’s apartment, but Masha re‐
fused and instead moved into a friend’s house. Campbell
told Masha about the Family, in similar terms to what he
used with Diamond and Loni. Campbell told Masha that she
was required to get a tattoo, but she said she needed addi‐
tional time before getting the tattoo. Campbell told Masha
that she was already in the Family, even without the tattoo.
Campbell asked Masha to engage in prostitution with the
customers at the spas, but she refused. In November of 2008,
Masha was late making her $1,000 weekly payment. Camp‐
bell told her that as punishment, she would be required to
have sexual intercourse with him and his business partner,
Bo Liu, at Elle Spa. She complied, and Campbell charged Bo
Liu $300. Campbell warned Masha that he was “working on
[her] immigration status. And [she] better do whatever he
16 No. 12‐3724
says.” Afterwards, Campbell required Masha to have sex
with him weekly. He would tell her that her body belongs to
him, and if she refused, he would have her deported with a
single phone call. One day, while Masha was working at
Club Tan, Campbell had sex with Masha, and then ordered
Masha and Diamond to have sex with each other. Masha ini‐
tially refused, but eventually complied. Campbell recorded
this encounter using his mobile phone.
In March 2009, when Masha finished paying $14,500 to
Campbell, he told her that everything was going well, and
her green card would be issued soon. Campbell told Masha
to return to Belarus, where he would send her the green card
and other documents she would need to enter the United
States. At first Masha planned to return to Belarus as in‐
structed by Campbell, but then she consulted a lawyer with‐
out Campbell’s knowledge. The lawyer advised Masha not
to leave the United States, stating that she would not be al‐
lowed to return.
Masha told Campbell that she refused to leave the United
States. Campbell responded that, in order to “punish” her
for refusing to go to Belarus, Masha would be required to
pay him $10,000, either in cash or by working for him for six
months, seven days a week, without pay. Masha opted to
pay the $10,000 in weekly installments of $1,000 because she
feared if she continued working for Campbell, he would
continue forcing her to have sex with him. When Masha
made the final payment of the $10,000 “punishment”,
Campbell told Masha that her refusal to go to Belarus caused
Campbell “a lot of problems with getting [legal] status for
somebody else,” and therefore Masha would be required to
pay an additional $6,000 “fine”. Campbell told Masha that
No. 12‐3724 17
he had the address of her parents in Belarus, and if Masha
did not pay the money, he would send the video of Masha
and Diamond having sex to Masha’s parents, as well as put
the video on the internet, and have Masha deported. Masha
paid Campbell the $6,000 in weekly installments of $1,000 a
week. After Masha paid the $6,000 “fine”, Campbell claimed
that she had only paid $5,000, and would be required to pay
an additional $1,000, which she could satisfy by paying $500
and having sex with him. After Masha paid $500 and had
sex with Campbell, he told Masha that she could get out of
the Family only if she paid him an additional $5,000. Camp‐
bell told Masha that, otherwise, “the only way out of the
Family is death.”
After Campbell demanded $5,000 for leaving the Family,
Masha changed her phone number in order to evade Camp‐
bell. Campbell directed Diamond to call Masha’s parents in
Belarus to obtain Masha’s new number. Diamond complied,
and in August 2009, Campbell called Masha at her new
number. Masha then began recording her calls with Camp‐
bell. During one of these calls, Masha told Campbell that she
only had $1,500 of the $5,000 Campbell was demanding.
Campbell responded that he was going to give Masha her
“birthday present,” which was that if she gave Campbell the
$1,500 and “spend two hours with your Daddy today,” she
would owe him no more money, and “[i]t’s over with.” Ma‐
sha met Campbell at the Day and Night Spa and had sex
with him and Bo Liu.
Masha again changed her phone number. At Campbell’s
direction, Diamond again called Masha’s parents in Belarus
and obtained Masha’s new number. On September 1, 2009,
Campbell called Masha and told her she owed him an addi‐
18 No. 12‐3724
tional $5,000 for changing her telephone number. Masha said
she had no more money to pay Campbell. Campbell re‐
sponded with a tirade about “the problem [Masha] created,”
which concluded with the threat that if Masha did not pay,
“we will go to f—ing war.”
Masha responded by contacting U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. Under the direction of ICE agents,
Masha engaged in a series of monitored and recorded phone
calls with Campbell; and, under the direction of, and surveil‐
lance by, ICE agents, she made a series of payments to
Campbell using funds provided by ICE. Specifically, on Sep‐
tember 11, 2009, Masha made a payment of $1,200 with
funds provided by ICE. Masha told Campbell that the mon‐
ey had come from her parents in Belarus.
On September 25, 2009, Masha told Campbell that she
did not have any more money to pay him. Campbell threat‐
ened that unless she paid him more money, he would post
photos on the internet of her having sex with him, Diamond,
and Bo Liu, and would send the same materials on a DVD to
her parents in Belarus. Masha then made a $500 payment to
Campbell, using funds supplied by ICE agents. In early Oc‐
tober, Campbell continued to demand more money, and
again threatened to post the sex tape on the internet for
viewing “all over the f—ing world.” Masha made another
payment to Campbell using funds supplied by ICE agents.
In December 2009, Loni was contacted by U.S. law en‐
forcement agents and spoke with them about Campbell at
the U.S. embassy in Ukraine. On January 13, 2010, ICE
agents took Diamond from the Day and Night Spa, where
Diamond had been living and working.
No. 12‐3724 19
In January 2012, Diamond, Loni, Masha, John, and an‐
other former Family member testified against Campbell at
his jury trial. After the jury rendered its verdict, the district
court sentenced Campbell, who had a prior conviction for
attempted murder, to a total sentence of life imprisonment.
II. Harboring
Campbell challenges his convictions for harboring illegal
aliens Diamond and Loni. Specifically, Campbell contends
that (1) the district court erred in instructing the jury on the
intent element the Government must prove in order to con‐
vict him of harboring, and (2) the evidence at trial was insuf‐
ficient for the jury to find that the intent element was prov‐
en. Before discussing the merits of these issues, we first dis‐
cuss the magnitude of the burden Campbell faces in chal‐
lenging the harboring convictions.
When a party disagrees with a jury instruction it “must
inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for
the objection before the jury retires to deliberate.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 30(d). Failure to object in accordance with Rule
30(d) precludes appellate review, except as permitted under
plain error review. See id. It is undisputed that Campbell did
not comply with Rule 30(d); accordingly, we review Camp‐
bell’s jury instruction challenge for plain error only.2 See
2 The Government contends that even plain error review is foreclosed
because Campbell’s prior counsel “provisionally accepted” the chal‐
lenged jury instructions prior to Campbell’s first trial in August 2011.
The first trial (in August 2011) ended in a mistrial; Campbell’s convic‐
tions were the result of his second trial (in January 2012), and that is the
only trial at issue here. After the mistrial, the district court did not indi‐
cate to the parties that any waivers from the first trial would carry over
20 No. 12‐3724
United States v. Ye, 588 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2009). With re‐
spect to Campbell’s sufficiency‐of‐evidence challenge, in the
ordinary case, “[w]e will overturn a jury verdict for insuffi‐
ciency of the evidence only if, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government, the record is de‐
void of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Aslan, 644
F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2011). However, as with Campbell’s
jury instruction challenge, Campbell concedes that he raised
his sufficiency‐of‐evidence challenge for the first time on ap‐
peal, so we review that challenge for plain error only. See id.
“In order to reverse for plain error, we must find (1) error
(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects the defendant’s substan‐
tial rights.” Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732
(1993)). “An error ‘affects the defendant’s substantial rights’
when it is prejudicial, that is, when it has affected the out‐
come of the district court proceedings.” Id. at 540–41 (quot‐
ing Olano, 507 U.S. at 734); see also United States v. Ramirez‐
Fuentes, 703 F.3d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that the
error must “represent[] a miscarriage of justice such that the
defendant probably would have been acquitted but for the”
error) (quotation omitted). Finally, the decision to correct a
plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights is left within
the discretion of the court of appeals, and we “should not
exercise that discretion unless the error seriously affects the
to the second trial, and it is unnecessary for us to decide whether such an
indication would have been effective. Under the facts of this case, we
decline to find that Campbell waived (rather than forfeited) his right to
challenge the harboring instructions. See generally United States v. Pappas,
409 F.3d 828, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing forfeiture and waiver).
No. 12‐3724 21
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceed‐
ings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (quotation omitted).
Campbell was convicted of harboring illegal aliens Dia‐
mond and Loni for the purpose of private financial gain in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(1)(A)(v)(II), and
(a)(1)(B)(i). The harboring statute imposes criminal liability
on one who “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact
that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United
States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from
detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from de‐
tection, such alien in any place, including any building or
any means of transportation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) (imposing liability for one
who “aids or abets the commission of any of the preceding
acts”), (a)(1)(B)(i) (stating that one who violates subpara‐
graph (a)(1)(A)(iii) “in which the offense was done for the
purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain,
[shall] be fined under Title 18, imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both”).
The terms “‘conceal,’ ‘harbor,’ and ‘shield from detection’
have independent meanings, and thus a conviction can re‐
sult from committing (or attempting to commit) any one of
the three acts.” United States v. Ye, 588 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir.
2009). These terms are not defined in the statute, and courts
have devoted substantial effort to pinning down their pre‐
cise meanings in the context of the harboring statute.3 See,
3 We refer to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) as the “harboring statute” as a
shorthand only, since the statute prohibits concealing and shielding from
detection in addition to harboring.
22 No. 12‐3724
e.g., United States v. Vargas‐Cordon, 733 F.3d 366, 379–83 (2d
Cir. 2013); United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1042–50
(7th Cir. 2012). In Costello, which was decided after the trial
in this case, we stated:
The string of prohibitions in section
1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) is most naturally understood
as the following series of loophole‐stopping
near synonyms: ‘concealing’ is concealing;
‘shielding from detection’ usually is concealing
but could involve bribing law enforcement au‐
thorities—in other words paying someone else
to conceal (yet the shade of difference is tiny—
no surprise in a string of near synonyms); and
the office left to ‘harboring’ is, then, materially
to assist an alien to remain illegally in the
United States without publicly advertising his
presence but without needing or bothering to
conceal it … .
Id. at 1046–47. In Costello, we cautioned that “harboring”
should not be defined in such a manner as to sweep far be‐
yond “concealing” or “shielding from detection.” Id. at 1047.
In the end, we settled on the following “harboring” defini‐
tion: “providing (or offering … ) a known illegal alien a se‐
cure haven, a refuge, a place to stay in which authorities are
unlikely to be seeking him.” Id. at 1050.
In this case, the parties agree that we should look to Cos‐
tello, but the parties see different things in Costello. The Gov‐
ernment says that “Costello creates an effect‐based, rather
than purpose or intent based test,” and “harboring is under‐
stood properly as requiring that a defendant, regardless of
his specific intent or purpose for doing so, provide shelter or
No. 12‐3724 23
other assistance (such as employment or transport) to an il‐
legal alien in a place where authorities are unlikely to seek
him.” Appellee Br. at 33, 34. Campbell says that, in Costello,
“this Court established that the individual’s alien status
must be the driving purpose for the provision of shelter such
that there also exists the intent by the defendant to help the
alien avoid detection by the authorities.” Appellant Reply
Br. at 6; see also Appellant Br. at 14 (“[T]he Government must
establish … that the defendant provided an alien shelter for
the purposes of evading detection by law enforcement or
immigration authorities.”). Campbell contends that the dis‐
trict court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding this
intent element.4
4 The district court gave the following jury instruction:
To sustain a concealing or harboring charge, the government
must prove each of the following propositions:
First, that Diamond (Count Four) … [and/or] Loni (Count
Six) was an alien and remained in the United States in violation
of law;
Second, that the defendant concealed or harbored or shel‐
tered from detection Diamond (Count Four) … [and/or] Loni
(Count Six) within the United States, or attempted to do so; and
Third, that the defendant either knew or recklessly disre‐
garded the fact that Diamond (Count Four) … [and/or] Loni
(Count Six) was an alien who remained in the United States in
violation of law.
App. 31; see also id. 33 (“If you find that the government proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the offense charged in Counts Four … and/or Six of the
indictment, then you must also determine whether the government
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that those offenses were committed
for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.”).
24 No. 12‐3724
Based upon the evidence adduced at trial, we need not
resolve this dispute or decide whether the jury instructions
accurately stated the law. Even if Campbell is correct that the
Government must establish that he provided Diamond and
Loni shelter for the purpose of evading detection by law en‐
forcement or immigration authorities, we find that any in‐
structional error in this regard did not affect Campbell’s
substantial rights. Although preventing detection by law en‐
forcement was not Campbell’s sole purpose for providing
Diamond and Loni with housing and employment, and for
concealing their identities and whereabouts,5 the evidence
amply showed such prevention was an integral part of
Campbell’s overall “Family” plan. Cf. Vargas‐Cordon, 733
F.3d at 383 (holding that there was sufficient evidence of an
intent to prevent detection by authorities where defendant’s
“motivations were both to continue their relationship and to
prevent authorities from returning [the alien] to govern‐
ment‐arranged foster care”).
Campbell’s efforts to profit from Diamond’s and Loni’s
labor could be successful only if he were able to prevent law
enforcement from detecting their illegal status and deporting
them. Campbell moved both women into housing he pro‐
vided, confiscated all of their identifying documents, forced
them to live and work under assumed names in an envi‐
ronment he controlled completely, and prohibited them
from communicating with anyone outside his control, in‐
cluding all friends and family who knew their real names.
5 As the jury reasonably found, one purpose was for Campbell’s com‐
mercial advantage or private financial gain.
No. 12‐3724 25
Campbell instilled in both women a fear of dire consequenc‐
es if they were to come to the attention of law enforcement,
including immigration authorities. Campbell convinced
them that if they went to law enforcement, Campbell would
kill them, or they would be beaten, raped and/or deported
by the authorities themselves. It is clear that, in Campbell’s
mind, the ties that bound Diamond and Loni to his Family
included their illegal status and the efforts Campbell took to
prevent their detection by authorities. In short, the evidence
demonstrates that Campbell provided Diamond and Loni
shelter for, inter alia, the purpose of evading detection by law
enforcement, including immigration authorities.6
On appeal, Campbell contends he acted in ways which
heightened Diamond’s and Loni’s risk of detection by immi‐
gration authorities. Campbell points out that he rented an
apartment in Diamond’s real name, and gave Loni a car with
a temporary registration in her real name. However, the evi‐
dence showed that Campbell took these actions during his
courtship phase, prior to Diamond and Loni joining his Fam‐
ily. Once Diamond joined the Family, and Campbell had se‐
cured all of Diamond’s identification documents, Campbell
moved Diamond out of the apartment rented in her real
name, and she never returned. The address Campbell gave
for Loni’s temporary registration was an address at which
Loni lived prior to joining the Family. Once Loni joined the
Family, and Campbell had secured all of Loni’s identifica‐
tion documents, Campbell moved Loni into housing he con‐
6 Although the word “harbor” conjures images of placid water and safe
vessels, there is nothing in the harboring statute that requires a defend‐
ant’s motives or methods to be benevolent.
26 No. 12‐3724
trolled, and she never returned to the address listed on the
registration.
Campbell also notes that he gave Diamond her identifica‐
tion documents twice: once to seek treatment in a hospital,
and once when he required her to falsely tell the police that
she, rather than Loni, was driving the wrecked car. The evi‐
dence showed that, on both occasions, Campbell reasonably
believed Diamond would not alert the authorities regarding
her illegal status or Campbell’s abuse, based on Campbell’s
prior threats and his accompanying her to the hospital and
the police station. None of the incidents highlighted by
Campbell seriously undermines the ample evidence that
Campbell provided Diamond and Loni with shelter for the
purpose of, inter alia, evading detection by law enforcement,
including immigration authorities.
We find that any instructional error did not affect Camp‐
bell’s substantial rights because, even under Campbell’s pre‐
ferred intent standard, the outcome of the proceedings
would not have been different. See Vargas‐Cordon, 733 F.3d at
383; cf. United States v. Courtright, 632 F.3d 363, 372 (7th Cir.
2011) (“We need not determine whether these instructions
were erroneous for the simple reason that any error flowing
from them had no effect on the outcome of the trial … . Ac‐
cordingly, we find that Courtright has failed to establish that
the instructions were plainly erroneous.”). Finally, even if
we were to find (which we do not) that the district court
committed plain error which affected Campbell’s substantial
rights, we would decline to reverse the harboring convic‐
tions because, viewing the record as a whole, we do not find
that any error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
No. 12‐3724 27
public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Olano, 507 U.S.
at 732.
III. Extortion
Campbell also challenges his conviction for extortion of
Masha in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. ' 1951(a).
Campbell’s sole contention related to his Hobbs Act convic‐
tion is that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish
the required nexus between the extortion and interstate
commerce. Because Campbell properly preserved this issue
for appeal, “[w]e will overturn [the] jury verdict for insuffi‐
ciency of the evidence only if, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government, the record is de‐
void of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Aslan, 644 F.3d at 540.
Although this standard is not as difficult to meet as the plain
error standard discussed above, it is nonetheless “highly
deferential towards the decision reached at trial.” United
States v. Mitov, 460 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2006).
The Hobbs Act imposes criminal liability on “[w]hoever
in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce
or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce,
by … extortion or attempts or conspires so to do.” 18 U.S.C.
' 1951(a). The Government had the burden of proving not
only extortion (the evidence of which Campbell does not
dispute), but “the extortion must be shown to affect inter‐
state commerce.” Mitov, 460 F.3d at 907. Because “the Hobbs
Act is imbued with the full reach of Congress’s Commerce
Clause power,” the Government “need only demonstrate a
de minimis affect on commerce.” Id. at 908 (citing United
States v. Re, 401 F.3d 828, 834–35 (7th Cir. 2005)). “Moreover,
the impact on commerce need not be actual; given that the
28 No. 12‐3724
Hobbs Act criminalizes attempts as well as completed
crimes, it is enough that the conduct (here, the conspiracy to
extort) had the potential to impact commerce.” Re, 401 F.3d
at 835. The Hobbs Act proscribes “threatened or potential
effects [on interstate commerce] which never materialize be‐
cause extortionate demands are met.” United States v.
Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 1982).
The jury heard the following evidence in this case.
Campbell extorted money from Masha by threatening to
mail an embarrassing video to Masha’s parents in Belarus,
upload the same video to the internet, and have Masha de‐
ported. Campbell believed at least some of the money Masha
used to pay his extortionate demands was sent to Masha
from her parents in Belarus.7 Campbell twice directed Dia‐
mond to call Masha’s parents in Belarus to obtain Masha’s
new phone numbers, enabling Campbell to continue perpe‐
trating his extortionate scheme. Finally, Campbell attempted
to extort free labor from Masha in the Day and Night Spa, a
business engaged in interstate commerce.8
7 Campbell contends that his beliefs should be irrelevant in the inter‐
state‐commerce analysis. However, we have held that a defendant’s “be‐
lief provides the requisite interstate effect” under the Hobbs Act when
the defendant’s belief regarding “the interstate dealings of his specific
target” impacted the defendant’s overall plan. United States v. Muratovic,
719 F.3d 809, 814–15 (7th Cir. 2013); cf. United States v. Bailey, 227 F.3d
792, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that an attempt to rob FBI agents of
money that the defendant erroneously believed came from a drug organ‐
ization in interstate commerce satisfied the Hobbs Act interstate‐
commerce element).
8 The Government presented evidence that the Day and Night Spa ad‐
vertised online, purchased supplies and promotional materials from out‐
No. 12‐3724 29
We need not decide whether any one piece of evidence
summarized above is alone sufficient to establish the re‐
quired nexus between the extortion and interstate com‐
merce. It is enough for us to hold—as we do—that the above
evidence is, in combination and viewed in the light most fa‐
vorable to the Government, sufficient for a reasonable jury to
find that the interstate commerce element was satisfied by
showing a direct connection between the extortion and inter‐
state commerce and/or a “threatened … effect[] which never
materialize[d] because [the] extortionate demands [were]
met.” Mattson, 671 F.2d at 1024; see Mitov, 460 F.3d at 909
(“The payment from Steven … was to be wired to Mitov’s
cousin in Luxembourg … . An international transfer of assets
such as … this is sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce
requirement of § 1951.”) (citing United States v. Kaplan, 171
F.3d 1351, 1355 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also United States v.
Horne, 474 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act was satisfied
by a defendant’s use of an internet auction website to lure
his victims to him, and “the government thus had no need to
argue that the … victims … traveled from other states, and
that they carried their money across state lines,” because
“the online auction site … is an avenue of interstate com‐
merce, like an interstate highway or long‐distance telephone
of‐state, ordered satellite television, internet and telephone service from
out‐of‐state companies, and employed workers from out‐of‐state. See
United States v. Clausen, 328 F.3d 708, 712 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that
“good example[s] of a commercial establishment ‘in’ interstate com‐
merce” for the purposes of the Hobbs Act are spas which, inter alia, ad‐
vertised in newspapers and on the internet, had employees from out‐of‐
state, and purchased supplies and equipment from out‐of‐state).
30 No. 12‐3724
service”); United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th
Cir. 1996) (“McGrath and Atcheson’s placement of out‐of‐
state phone calls to determine the victims’ account balances
and credit card limits created a … connection with interstate
commerce [pursuant to the Hobbs Act].”) (citing United
States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 302, 305–06 (4th Cir. 1987)).
Campbell contends that the interstate commerce element
of the Hobbs Act may only be proven by evidence that the
extortion affected the victim’s interstate actions. Although
such proof has been held to be sufficient, we have never held
that it is the exclusive method by which the interstate com‐
merce element may be proven. Our cases discuss two meth‐
ods by which the interstate commerce element may be prov‐
en in Hobbs Act prosecutions: (1) “a direct connection be‐
tween extortion and interstate commerce,” and (2) a “deple‐
tion‐of‐assets indirect effect on interstate commerce.”
Mattson, 671 F.2d at 1023, 1024. Under a depletion‐of‐assets
indirect effect theory, the focus typically is on whether the
extortion affected the victim’s interstate activities. See id. at
1024 (“Under the depletion of assets theory, commerce is af‐
fected when an enterprise, which either is actively engaged
in interstate commerce or customarily purchases items in in‐
terstate commerce, has its assets depleted through extortion,
thereby curtailing the victim’s potential as a purchaser of
such goods.”) (quotation and emphasis omitted). However,
the Government in this case did not rely on a depletion of
assets theory. Instead, the Government sought only to prove
a direct connection between the extortion and interstate
commerce, and in such cases, “jurisdiction … is satisfied by
showing a realistic probability that an extortionate transac‐
tion will have some effect on interstate commerce.” United
States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 60 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc)
No. 12‐3724 31
(emphasis added). As discussed above, the Government
produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find
that Campbell’s extortion of Masha had a direct effect on in‐
terstate commerce and/or a threatened effect which never
materialized because Masha met Campbell’s extortionate
demands.
IV. Sex Trafficking
Lastly, Campbell challenges his conviction for sex traf‐
ficking in violation of the Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act
(“TVPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Campbell contends that the
Government’s evidence was insufficient to establish the re‐
quired nexus between Campbell’s activities in interstate
commerce and the commercial sex acts related to Diamond.
Campbell argues that the Government showed only a link
between interstate commerce and Campbell’s lawful activi‐
ties at the Day the Night Spa—which the parties agree was
operated as a “clean” spa, that is, with no prostitution. In re‐
viewing Campbell’s challenge, we will overturn the jury
verdict for insufficiency of the evidence only if, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
the record is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Aslan, 644
F.3d at 540.
The TVPA, which was enacted in 2000, imposes criminal
liability on “[w]hoever knowingly … in or affecting inter‐
state or foreign commerce, … recruits, entices, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a
person” (or benefits financially from participation in a ven‐
ture which has engaged in such acts), “knowing, or in reck‐
less disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of
force, coercion …, or any combination of such means will be
32 No. 12‐3724
used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act.”
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). We have considered the TVPA only
twice previously. See United States v. Sawyer, 733 F.3d 228
(7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703 (7th Cir.
2012). In the only occasion we have had to consider the in‐
terstate commerce element of the TVPA, we held that the in‐
terstate commerce element has no mens rea requirement. See
Sawyer, 733 F.3d at 229. In so holding, we stated: “[W]e can
think of no reason Congress would have gutted the law by
limiting prosecutions to the surely trifling number of sex
traffickers who know, for example, that using a hotel room
or out‐of‐state condoms affects interstate commerce as that
term is understood in constitutional law.” Id. at 230. Other
circuits have interpreted the interstate commerce element of
the TVPA expansively. See United States v. Phea, 755 F.3d 255,
263 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding interstate commerce element sat‐
isfied by evidence of the use of a mobile phone, advertise‐
ment for prostitution services on the internet, and a custom‐
er from out‐of‐state); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 331,
333 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding interstate commerce element sat‐
isfied by evidence of advertisements in Craigslist and Seattle
Weekly); United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179–80 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“Evans’s enticement of Jane Doe to commit pros‐
titution, even though his actions occurred solely in Florida,
had the capacity when considered in the aggregate with sim‐
ilar conduct by others, to frustrate Congress’s broader regu‐
lation of interstate and foreign economic activity … . Evans’s
use of hotels that served interstate travelers and distribution
of condoms that traveled in interstate commerce are further
evidence that Evans’s conduct substantially affected inter‐
state commerce.”).
No. 12‐3724 33
The Government presented evidence that Diamond
placed advertisements for Elle Spa and Club Tan—where
Diamond was forced to live and perform prostitution—on
the internet website, Craigslist,9 and the publication, Chica‐
go After Dark, at Campbell’s direction and for Campbell’s
financial benefit. The Government also presented evidence
that Campbell and Diamond used mobile phones extensive‐
ly in conducting the prostitution activities. It is not necessary
for us to decide whether this evidence of internet and mobile
phone usage is alone sufficient to satisfy the interstate com‐
merce element of the TVPA, although at least one court has
held that such evidence is. See Todd, 627 F.3d at 331, 333; cf.
Phea, 755 F.3d at 263 (holding interstate commerce element
of the TVPA was satisfied by evidence of the use of a mobile
phone, internet advertisements, and an out‐of‐state custom‐
er); Horne, 474 F.3d at 1006 (holding interstate commerce el‐
ement of Hobbs Act was satisfied by defendant’s use of an
internet auction website).
As noted above, the Government presented evidence that
the Day and Night Spa advertised online, purchased sup‐
plies and promotional materials from out‐of‐state, ordered
satellite television, internet and telephone service from out‐
of‐state companies, and employed workers from out‐of‐
state. Cf. Clausen, 328 F.3d at 712 (stating that a similar spa is
a “good example of a commercial establishment ‘in’ inter‐
state commerce” for the purposes of the Hobbs Act). Alt‐
hough Campbell operated the Day and Night Spa as a
9 The Government presented evidence that Craigslist is headquartered in
California.
34 No. 12‐3724
“clean” spa where prostitution did not occur, the jury could
reasonably find that the Day and Night Spa was an integral
part of Campbell’s overall massage and prostitution busi‐
ness, which encompassed several related spas. The jury
could reasonably find that the Day and Night Spa provided
a cover for the money Campbell received illicitly through
prostitution, and a source of legitimate masseuses Campbell
could use when he feared law enforcement was investigat‐
ing the other spas. The jury also could reasonably find that
Campbell used the Day and Night Spa as a recruitment tool
for convincing prospective Family members that they would
not be required to perform “extras”, and instead would per‐
form massages in a prostitution‐free workplace. We find
that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, all of the above evidence, in combination, is
sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element of the
TVPA.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of
the district court.
