RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Laderian McGhee filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, challenging his 2004 convictions in Wisconsin state court. In the petition, he asserted, among other claims, that the state court had deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The district court denied the petition. We granted a certificate of appealability limited to his self-representation claim. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

In the early morning hours of April 9, 2004, two women were mugged on the street in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and their purses taken. A vehicle was also taken from the street and driven to another location. Police arrested Mr. McGhee in connection with the offenses.

Mr. McGhee was later charged in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court with armed robbery, theft of movable property from a person, and operating a vehicle without the owner's consent. The public defender's office appointed attorney Richard E. Thomey II as his counsel.

Mr. McGhee was tried by a jury in August 2004. On the first day of trial, defense counsel notified the court that Mr. McGhee wished to raise an alibi defense and requested that he be allowed to call two unlisted witnesses. Counsel acknowledged that he had not provided proper notice of this defense, but explained that Mr. McGhee had not mentioned it to him until two days before trial. Defense counsel also moved to withdraw as Mr. McGhee's attorney. He submitted that withdrawal was warranted because (1) Mr. McGhee wished to discharge him; and (2) based on his knowledge of the case, he believed that putting on Mr. McGhee's alibi defense raised "certain ethical problems."1 After hearing arguments from both sides, the court denied the motions.

Following the court's rulings, Mr. McGhee asked to speak, at which point the following exchange occurred:

The court later allowed Mr. McGhee to return to the courtroom. Despite the court's warnings, however, Mr. McGhee did not stay silent for long. Shortly after the start of voir dire, defense counsel, while introducing himself, told prospective jurors that Mr. McGhee would be the only defense witness. Mr. McGhee immediately objected to this remark, stating, "Wait a minute. Wait a minute. What happened to my witnesses?"3 It appears from the transcript that the court initially tried to ignore Mr. McGhee's interjection. Mr. McGhee, however, continued to press the issue, at which point the following colloquy took place:

Following this exchange, the court took a short recess, during which time Mr. McGhee was equipped with a stun belt to prevent further disruptions. Upon reconvening, defense counsel renewed his motion to withdraw, stating, "I think the only way that [Mr. McGhee] can really get a fair trial now is with a new attorney whom he has confidence in and who, from the outset, can explore this alibi defense that he has."5 The court denied the motion.

Before bringing the jury back in, the court gave Mr. McGhee the option of being handcuffed to his chair rather than wearing the stun belt:

The court eventually decided to leave Mr. McGhee in the stun belt, but to seat him in a regular chair with a belly chain.

After ensuring that Mr. McGhee's chains were not visible to the jury, the court gave Mr. McGhee a final warning about being disruptive, triggering the following exchange:

In the proceedings that followed, Mr. McGhee did not again speak out of turn in front of the jury.

The jury found Mr. McGhee guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to seventeen years' imprisonment followed by ten years of extended supervision.

B.

On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed Mr. McGhee's conviction. Mr. McGhee then filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin; the court denied his petition as untimely.

In response, Mr. McGhee returned to the court of appeals, where he filed a motion seeking to reinstate his right to a direct appeal, claiming that his trial and appellate counsel had been ineffective. The court of appeals denied his motion, reasoning that Mr. McGhee could pursue his ineffective assistance claim in collateral proceedings under State v. Knight, 168 Wis.2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992). Knight sets out the appropriate procedure for pursuing an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in Wisconsin courts. In particular, Knight requires that such a claim be pursued via a habeas petition filed in the court that considered the direct appeal. "Such proceedings have come to be known in Wisconsin as `Knight petitions.'" McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 561 n. 2 (7th Cir.2010).

C.

In November 2007, Mr. McGhee filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. In the petition, he asserted, among other claims, that the trial court had erred by not allowing his "request for substitution of counsel."8

The court denied the petition. With respect to the substitution issue, the court concluded that "[t]he defendant's failure to pursue this issue on [direct] appeal preclude[d] him from raising [the] issue in the circuit court" on collateral review.9 As for whether his counsel had been "ineffective for failing to pursue this issue on appeal," the court concluded that that claim was one which would have to "be addressed to the appellate court under Knight."10

Mr. McGhee did not pursue his substitution-of-counsel argument on appeal. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of his other claims, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied discretionary review.

In October 2009, Mr. McGhee filed a federal habeas petition in the district court, alleging, among other claims, that the state trial court had "erred in denying [his request for] substitution of trial counsel."11 In July 2010, he filed a letter seeking to withdraw voluntarily his petition in order to pursue reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. The district court granted the motion.

Returning to the state supreme court, Mr. McGhee filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to have his appellate rights reinstated. The court granted the writ, reinstated and deemed timely filed the petition for review in his direct appeal, and denied the petition.

Mr. McGhee then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court of appeals under Knight. He asserted that his appellate counsel had been ineffective by failing to appeal the trial court's denial of his "request to dispense with his court appointed attorney and represent himself."12 The court of appeals denied the petition. It concluded that Mr. McGhee never had "clearly and unequivocally declare[d] [a] desire to represent himself" and thus that his "appellate counsel [could not] be faulted for not arguing [the] issue."13 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review.

D.

In April 2012, Mr. McGhee filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. In his petition, he asserted, among other claims, that the state trial court had violated his "right to discharge counsel and `SPEAK FOR HIMSELF' (by appearing pro se)."14

In its answer, the State contended that Mr. McGhee had not exhausted his self-representation claim. Specifically, it submitted that he had failed to raise the claim on direct appeal and that, when he later did so during his state habeas proceedings, it was within the context of an ineffective-assistance claim. The State also defended Mr. McGhee's conviction on the merits, contending (1) that he never clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation, and (2) that he forfeited his right to self-representation based on his disruptive conduct.

The district court denied Mr. McGhee's petition. With respect to his self-representation claim, the court determined that the state court of appeals's ruling on his Knight petition was sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement for federal habeas review. Turning to the merits, the court concluded that Mr. McGhee's request to proceed pro se was ambiguous and thus that the state court had not erred in denying his Faretta claim. The court declined to issue a certificate of appealability.

Mr. McGhee timely appealed and sought a certificate of appealability from this court with respect to his Faretta claim only. We granted the certificate.15

II

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. McGhee contends that his 2004 convictions were obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and that the state court's determination that he had not clearly and unequivocally invoked that right was objectively unreasonable.16 We review the district court's denial of Mr. McGhee's habeas petition de novo. Smith v. Brown, 764 F.3d 790, 795 (7th Cir.2014).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a federal court may grant habeas relief to a petitioner whose claim has been "adjudicated on the merits in State court," only if the state court's adjudication of that claim (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "`Unreasonable' in [the AEDPA] context means more than just incorrect; it means something... lying well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion." Corcoran v. Neal, 783 F.3d 676, 683 (7th Cir.2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The relevant decision for purposes of our assessment under AEDPA is the decision of the last state court to rule on the merits of the petitioner's claim," Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 671 (7th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) — in this case, the decision of the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin denying post-conviction relief.

The Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), establishes the substantive law governing our analysis of Mr. McGhee's claim. In Faretta, the Court held that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, see id. at 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, and that, to exercise that right, a defendant must "knowingly and intelligently" waive his right to counsel, see id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. The Court further concluded that, under the facts of the case, the defendant's right to self-representation had been violated. See id. at 835-36, 95 S.Ct. 2525. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized, among other facts, that the defendant had "clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and did not want counsel." Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. On the basis of this language, many courts, including the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, have interpreted Faretta as requiring that a defendant "clearly and unequivocally" articulate a desire to represent himself in order to invoke his Faretta rights.17

Here, Mr. McGhee does not contest this widely held view of Faretta. Rather, he contends that he is entitled to habeas relief because the state court's determination that he had not clearly and unequivocally invoked his Faretta rights was objectively unreasonable. Specifically, he submits that his desire for self-representation was evident from the following: (1) his repeated demands to discharge his attorney, (2) his declaration that he was going to "speak up for [himself]" and that he could not be "expect[ed].... to sit [t]here and... say nothing in [his] own defense," and (3) his request "to speak like everybody else."18 Taken together, Mr. McGhee asserts, these statements leave "no question that [he] was requesting to represent himself."19 In response, the State submits that none of Mr. McGhee's statements, "whether viewed in isolation or in [the] aggregate, amount to a clear and unequivocal invocation of [his] right [to] self-representation."20

The State's argument makes clear that the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin reached a reasonable conclusion. Mr. McGhee never clearly articulated a desire to represent himself. A request to discharge counsel, without more, ordinarily does not signal a clear desire for self-representation. See United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 724 (5th Cir.2010) ("[S]omething more than just firing one's attorney is required before one clearly and unequivocally requests to proceed pro se."). Here, although Mr. McGhee did request, explicitly, to discharge his attorney, he never asked to forego counsel entirely.21 Tellingly, when asked whether he was ready to proceed to trial that day without counsel, Mr. McGhee did not ask to represent himself, but rather declared that he was not "going to no trial today."22 Because this statement suggests that Mr. McGhee was "seeking more time to retain other counsel rather than seeking to proceed pro se," we cannot conclude that it expresses a clear desire for self-representation. United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 737, 742 (7th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Loya-Rodriguez, 672 F.3d 849, 857 (10th Cir.2012) (noting that conduct which could be construed as "result[ing] from a desire for different counsel" does not clearly and unequivocally express a desire for self-representation).

Similarly, Mr. McGhee's declaration that he was going to "speak up for [himself]" and that he could not be "expect[ed] ... to sit [t]here and ... say nothing in [his] own defense" do not clearly communicate a desire to proceed without counsel.23 Mr. McGhee made these statements during the course of an expletive-ridden tirade against the court's earlier rulings excluding his witnesses and denying the withdrawal of his attorney. During that out-burst, he accused the court of trying to "railroad" him and stated that he was not going to "sit ... [t]here and accept" it.24 Further, when warned about his behavior, Mr. McGhee responded, "Fuck warned. I'm telling you if I can't have my witnesses, fuck this trial too."25 Viewed in this context, Mr. McGhee's desire to "speak up for [himself]" suggests an intent to disrupt the proceedings rather than a request for self-representation.

Finally, Mr. McGhee's request "to speak like everybody else" does not clearly express a desire for self-representation.26 Whether considered in isolation or in con text, this statement is ambiguous. See Loya-Rodriguez, 672 F.3d at 858 (concluding that a defendant's request "to communicate..., personally and verbally, during the following hearings, with the Court, ... without the help of an attorney" did not clearly indicate a desire for self-representation). At the time Mr. McGhee made this request, he had just been reprimanded for his disruptive courtroom behavior. When asked what he meant by the request, Mr. McGhee responded, "I mean speak when they saying something. You going to speak up for it. I'm going to speak up for myself if somebody got to say it. Judge ain't going to say it for me."27 The court understood these remarks as a request for permission to interrupt the proceedings. In light of Mr. McGhee's prior disruptive conduct, we believe that the court's interpretation of his remarks was reasonable.28 Thus, even if his request to "speak like everybody else" could be interpreted as a request to proceed without counsel, it certainly does not constitute a clear and unequivocal demand to do so. See Burton v. Collins, 937 F.2d 131, 134 (5th Cir.1991) ("The fact that there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the dialog between Burton and the trial judge is, in a sense, the best evidence that Burton did not clearly and unequivocally assert his right to self-representation."); cf. United States v. Best, 426 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir.2005) (noting that "we will indulge every reasonable presumption against [a defendant's] waiver" of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Viewing these various requests together, as Mr. McGhee suggests, does not change our conclusion. Whether considered individually or in the aggregate, Mr. McGhee's statements do not clearly and unequivocally communicate a desire for self-representation. The state court's decision was certainly not unreasonable. The district court properly denied habeas relief.

Conclusion

Because the state court reasonably determined that Mr. McGhee had not clearly and unequivocally invoked his Faretta rights, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED