Judges: Per Curiam
Filed: Nov. 29, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Argued November 7, 2016 Decided November 29, 2016 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge GARY S. FEINERMAN, District Judge* No. 16---1572 Appeal from the United States District Court for the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Northern District of Indiana, Plaintiff---Appellee, South Bend Division. v. No
Summary: NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Argued November 7, 2016 Decided November 29, 2016 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge GARY S. FEINERMAN, District Judge* No. 16---1572 Appeal from the United States District Court for the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Northern District of Indiana, Plaintiff---Appellee, South Bend Division. v. No...
More
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 7, 2016
Decided November 29, 2016
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
GARY S. FEINERMAN, District Judge*
No. 16-‐‑1572 Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Northern District of Indiana,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellee,
South Bend Division.
v.
No. 3:14CR078-‐‑001
MARY RAY, Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.
Defendant-‐‑Appellant.
Order
The only appellate issue in this criminal case is whether the evidence supports the
jury’s verdicts that Mary Ray committed wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §1343, by diverting mon-‐‑
ey from the assets of her elderly father-‐‑in-‐‑law Norman. Ray also was convicted of em-‐‑
bezzling funds from a federal program and making false statements on her tax returns;
she does not contest her sentences for those crimes. Imprisonment comes to 84 months
in total, allocated across the 11 counts of conviction. Ray did not file a motion for acquit-‐‑
* Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
No. 16-‐‑1572 Page 2
tal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, so only plain error could lead this court to reverse the
wire-‐‑fraud convictions. See United States v. Irby, 558 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 2009).
The evidence at trial shows that in 2013 Ray persuaded her father-‐‑in-‐‑law (then 84
years old) to give her a power of attorney to manage his funds, worth more than
$600,000. He did so because he deemed her financially prudent, while he thought his
other relatives to be spendthrifts. Ray concealed from Norman the fact that she, too,
could not be trusted with money and had recently been fired from her job after being
caught embezzling (which she did to cover gambling debts). Ray led Norman to believe
that she and her husband “were financially okay”; she did not tell him that the couple
had filed for bankruptcy in 2010 and that she was no longer employable.
The power of attorney required Ray to manage Norman’s money without compen-‐‑
sation, though it allowed her to reimburse reasonable expenses and make herself gifts
limited to $10,000 annually. Between March 2013 and October 2014 Ray withdrew about
$605,000 from accounts over which Norman and Ray were joint signatories and placed
them in accounts subject to her sole control. She then gambled away much of this mon-‐‑
ey, writing checks against these accounts or withdrawing funds from ATMs located in
casinos.
A jury could conclude both that Ray hatched a scheme to defraud Norman and that
she implemented this scheme using the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such
as the communications lines that permit ATMs to check account balances and dispense
cash. The evidence permitted the jury to find that Ray deceived Norman about how she
planned to use the money and deliberately exceeded her authority under the power of
attorney. Her conduct also permitted the jury to infer that she intended to defraud
Norman. Ray asserts that Norman gave her oral permission to use money for her bene-‐‑
fit (and her husband’s) if it was needed—but Norman, who testified that he could not
recall making such a statement and could scarcely recall events from day to day, added
that he did not view gambling as a need and would never have authorized either the
power of attorney or these withdrawals had Ray told the truth. No more is necessary
for conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Henningsen, 387 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 787–89 (7th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED
