Judges: Per Curiam
Filed: Jan. 15, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted January 14, 2019* Decided January 15, 2019 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge No. 18-2682 IRMA ROSAS, Appeal from the United States District Plaintiff-Appellant, Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. v. No. 18 C 2706 ROMAN CATHO
Summary: NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted January 14, 2019* Decided January 15, 2019 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge No. 18-2682 IRMA ROSAS, Appeal from the United States District Plaintiff-Appellant, Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. v. No. 18 C 2706 ROMAN CATHOL..
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NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 14, 2019*
Decided January 15, 2019
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 18‐2682
IRMA ROSAS, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, Eastern Division.
v.
No. 18 C 2706
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE
OF CHICAGO, Charles R. Norgle,
Defendant‐Appellee. Judge.
O R D E R
Irma Rosas alleges that, in denying her access to a private cemetery to build an
altar, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago violated Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d–7. That law bars discrimination by entities receiving
federal funds. The district court denied Rosas’s request to proceed in forma pauperis
and later, after she paid the filing fee, granted the Archdiocese’s motion to dismiss,
which argued that Rosas did not allege that the Archdiocese receives federal funds. We
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 18‐2682 Page 2
affirm because Rosas’s complaint does not state a violation of Title VI, so her contention
that the denial of pauper status kept her from litigating a valid claim is meritless.
When Rosas sought to sue in forma pauperis, she filed a complaint swollen with
disconnected allegations. In her complaint, which was over 250 pages long, Rosas
accused more than 40 unrelated defendants of violating federal laws regarding
firearms, housing, labor, education, food, and voting. The district court denied the
application for pauper status, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), determining that Rosas was not
indigent. The court also reviewed the complaint’s content and ruled that the
“unwieldy” pleading violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, which limits
complaints to related claims and defendants. The court dismissed it without prejudice,
giving Rosas a chance to amend it after paying the $400 filing fee.
Rosas paid the entire fee, but her amendments did not survive scrutiny. Her first
amended complaint asserted claims only on behalf of her mother. The judge dismissed
this too, also without prejudice, and gave Rosas one last chance to amend. Rosas then
filed her second amended complaint, which is the subject of this appeal. It alleges that
Rosas visited a cemetery owned by the Archdiocese to build an altar at her father’s
grave. A groundskeeper told her to stop; she replied that she wanted to celebrate El Día
de los Muertos (the Day of the Dead). The Archdiocese informed her that the holiday was
not celebrated at the cemetery. Rosas contends that these actions violated Title VI
because, in her view, the Archdiocese discriminated against her based on her race and
national origin. The Archdiocese moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to allege
that it receives federal funds. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). It notified Rosas by mail that its
counsel “shall appear” before the district judge seven days later to present the motion to
dismiss. Rosas did not appear at the hearing, and the district court granted the
defendant’s motion apparently because Rosas had not alleged that the Archdiocese
received federal funding. After Rosas appealed to this court, the district court granted
her request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
On appeal Rosas first challenges the district court’s decision denying her leave to
file her suit with pauper status. But for two reasons, that ruling does not warrant relief
on appeal. First, Rosas already paid the entire filing fee in the district court, as was her
eventual obligation. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a district court may allow a litigant to
proceed “without prepayment of fees,” (emphasis added) but not without ever paying
fees. See Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 897–88 (7th Cir. 1997). Second, Rosas does not
contend that the court’s ruling that she prepay her fee harmed her ability to litigate. To
No. 18‐2682 Page 3
the contrary, Rosas’s ability to litigate this case was not harmed because, as we explain
below, the district court permissibly dismissed her complaint as legally insufficient.
Rosas maintains that the district court should not have dismissed her complaint.
She gives two arguments. First, she contends that the district judge did not adhere to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(c), which provides that a party moving to dismiss
must notify the parties of the hearing at least 14 days before the hearing. True, the
Archdiocese notified Rosas about its motion to dismiss just seven days before its
hearing. But a district court may adopt local rules that alter the default deadlines of
Rule 6, see FED. R. CIV. P. 83; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 191 (2010); Stewart Title
Guar. Co. v. Cadle Co., 74 F.3d 835, 837 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996). The district court’s local rules
state that a motion served by mail must be presented to the court at least 7 days after
mailing the notice to the parties. N.D. ILL. LOC. RS. 5.3(b), 78.1, 78.3. Because the
Archdiocese followed the district court’s permissible local rules, no error occurred.
Second, Rosas argues that the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)(1)(B) because, after the Archdiocese moved to dismiss, the court did
not grant her 21 days to file “as a matter of course” yet another amended complaint. But
if, as Rosas contends, she was entitled to file an amended complaint “as a matter of
course” within 21 days of the Archdiocese’s motion, permission from the judge was
unnecessary. See Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 775 F.3d 953, 963 (7th Cir. 2015) (under
Rule 15(a)(1), “whether to allow” a party’s timely amendment is “out of the court’s
hands entirely” because the party has a “right” to amend). Yet Rosas did not even
attempt to submit a proposed pleading. Nor has she explained on appeal how she
would cure the deficiency that the Archdiocese identified (no federal funding). Rosas
also has not argued that, despite the absence of a federal‐funding allegation, her
complaint is legally sufficient under Title VI. Under these circumstances, the judge did
not err by dismissing the complaint without inviting Rosas to amend her complaint a
third time. See Gonzalez‐Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2015).
AFFIRMED