Appellant, Troy Arthur Burke, Jr., appeals a jury verdict of guilty on a charge of transporting in interstate commerce a motor vehicle he knew to have been stolen, a violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).

Appellant contends that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the latter two of the three elements of the offense charged, namely (1) that the automobile was stolen; (2) that the defendant transported it in interstate commerce; and (3) that at the time of the transportation he knew the automobile had been stolen. Appellant premises his argument on the ground that the only government evidence presented was proof of his possession of the car in Missouri soon after its theft from a car lot in Illinois. Appellant does not dispute the settled law that such possession gives rise to permissible inferences of interstate transportation and guilty knowledge. See McIntosh v. United States, 341 F.2d 448 (8 Cir. 1965); Harding v. United States, 337 F.2d 254 (8 Cir. 1964); Travers v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 276, 335 F.2d 698 (1964); Jones v. United States, 378 F.2d 340 (9 Cir. 1967); cf. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 619, 16 S. Ct. 895, 40 L. Ed. 1090 (1896). He argues, however, that here no other evidence of any kind substantiated those inferences, and that therefore the proof was insufficient to warrant submission to the jury.1 See Van Gorder v. United States, 21 F.2d 939 (8 Cir. 1927); Torres v. United States, 270 F.2d 252, 258 (9 Cir. 1959); cf. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 66 S. Ct. 402, 90 L. Ed. 350 (1946). We affirm the conviction.

Appellant's assertion that "bare possession of the fruits of crime was the sum total of the government's evidence," is unwarranted. The evidence showed that the stolen vehicle, a white 1962 Thunderbird, was taken sometime between 5:00 p. m., on Saturday, August 20, 1966, and 9:00 a. m., on Monday, August 22, 1966, from a used car lot in Joliet, Illinois. The keys, locked in the car lot office, were not taken. Appellant was married in Ironton, Missouri, on Wednesday, August 24. He was seen by his new father-in-law driving a white 1962 Thunderbird, Illinois license No. HN9563, in Missouri on a Sunday in "late August."2 The witness said that he took down the license number since appellant and his daughter "were planning to be married and going away" (on August 24) and he wrote down the license number in case he would want to contact them. There is thus a reasonable inference that this Sunday was August 21, within 24 hours of the time the car was last observed by its owner in Illinois. Although the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, there exists some proof that on the first day appellant was seen driving the car in Missouri he did not have any keys to the automobile.3 Another circumstance substantiating the government's case took place on September 11, 1966. On that date the appellant left the car at a service station in Ironton, Missouri, ostensibly for repairs; he then obtained a ride to the train depot, mentioning that "he was going to Illinois." The car was left at the station for a period of 20 days, suggesting an abandonment by appellant. After that time passed, the service station operator called the Missouri State Highway Patrol, ultimately leading to the identification of the stolen vehicle and appellant's arrest.

Although the evidence presented is rather brief, nevertheless, in view of the favorable verdict, we must examine it in the light most favorable to the government. Thus, there was evidence of (1) appellant's possession of the stolen vehicle within 24 hours in a state other than its rightful owner's residence, cf. United States v. Kolakowski, 314 F.2d 699 (4 Cir. 1963); (2) operation of the stolen car without keys, cf. Brubaker v. United States, 183 F.2d 894 (6 Cir. 1950); (3) control of the automobile for 21 days, demonstrating at least putative ownership, and (4) abandonment in Missouri, cf. Platts v. United States, 378 F.2d 396 (9 Cir. 1967). We think it clear that the proof of possession did not stand unsupported and was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding of guilt.

Judgment affirmed.