RILEY, Chief Judge.
We first address whether the Browns have Article III standing to challenge an allegedly invalid mortgage assignment between creditors. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 628 F.3d 451, 455 (8th Cir.2010). To establish standing to raise their assignment claim, the Browns must show they have "suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2661, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013). The Browns have not done that.
The Browns' invalid assignment claim is nearly identical to the claim two homeowners asserted against a foreclosing lender in Quale v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 561 Fed.Appx. 582, 582-83 (8th Cir.2014) (unpublished per curiam). In Quale, we determined the homeowners did not have standing to raise such a claim because they "were not injured by the assignment" and any harm to the homeowners was not fairly traceable to the allegedly invalid assignment. Id. at 583 (noting the assignor, not the homeowner, is "[t]he party injured by an improper or fraudulent assignment"). We reach the same conclusion here.
We also reject the Browns' contention that the district court erred in dismissing their amended complaint "[b]ecause the Amended Complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Browns, shows that Green Tree's predecessor failed to comply with the notice requirements of Paragraph 22" of their mortgage. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A claim is facially plausible — rather than sheerly possible — "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Although we accept the factual
In the event of an uncured default, Paragraph 22 of the Browns' mortgage authorizes the lender, at its option, to accelerate the Browns' loan "without further demand and ... invoke the power of sale and any other remedies permitted by" law. Before doing so, the lender must give the Browns notice by certified mail and an opportunity to cure the default. Specifically, Paragraph 22 provides in relevant part
The Browns acknowledge they were sent a notice of intent to accelerate from their lender by certified mail, dated April 29, 2011. But they argue the notice was insufficient to comply with Paragraph 22 in three ways. The Browns allege the notice failed to (1) "`specify the action required to cure the default' as required by Paragraph 22" because it "require[d] payment of a sum certain, plus unspecified `additional regular [monthly] payment or payments, late charges, fees and charges which become due on or before May 29, 2011'"; (2) apprise them "that they have the unconditional right to reinstate"; and (3) "give the requisite 30-days notice of default."
We agree with the district court that the Browns failed to state a facially plausible claim to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. First, the notice not only notified the Browns their default resulted from missed payments, but also calculated the $24,850.47 in monthly charges and late charges the Browns would have to pay to cure that default as of the date of the notice. That was sufficiently specific to comply with Paragraph 22 of the mortgage. The reference to additional charges that might accrue depending on the Browns' future conduct did not prevent the notice from specifying "the action required to cure the[ir] default."
Second, the mortgage does not give the Browns an unconditional right to reinstate, so the notice could not be deficient in failing to apprise them of such a right. Paragraph 19 of the mortgage expressly declares the Browns must "meet[] certain conditions" for reinstatement and imposes four broad conditions on the Browns' right to reinstate after acceleration and clarifies the right does not apply at all in certain circumstances.
Finally, the notice the Browns received was dated April 29 and required them to cure "on or before May 29," exactly thirty days later. In their amended complaint, the Browns reasoned notice mailed on April 29 could not have been delivered
We affirm the judgment of the district court.