United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eighth Circuit
                      ___________________________

                              No. 18-1978
                      ___________________________

                            Robert Wayne Watson

                     lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

                                        v.

                               State of Nebraska

                           lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant

    Mutual of Omaha Bank; Old Republic National Title Insurance Company

                    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees
                                    ____________

                  Appeal from United States District Court
                   for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln
                               ____________

                         Submitted: January 17, 2019
                           Filed: January 30, 2019
                                [Unpublished]
                                ____________

Before BENTON, BOWMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
                         ____________

PER CURIAM.
       Robert Watson challenged the foreclosure of his home in federal court. He
alleges that various state-court orders violated his equal-protection rights and,
separately, that Old Republic National Title Insurance breached a title-insurance
policy by failing to make an insurance payment to Mutual of Omaha Bank. The
district court1 dismissed both claims.

       The district court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to
consider Watson’s equal-protection claim. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 

, 284 (2005) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . .
[applies to] cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”). Federal
courts have no authority to “quash” state-court judgments, which is what Watson
asked the district court to do. See Skit Int’l, Ltd. v. DAC Techs. of Ark., Inc., 

, 1157 (8th Cir. 2007) (describing a “classic illustration” of an appeal
covered by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

       The district court also properly dismissed Watson’s breach-of-contract
claim. When a state-law claim is brought in federal court, the plaintiff must meet
both Article III and state standing requirements. See Myers v. Richland County,

, 749 (8th Cir. 2005). Under Nebraska law, a plaintiff like Watson
may not sue for breach of contract without being either a party or an intended
third-party beneficiary of the contract. See Marten v. Staab, 

,
441–42 (Neb. 1996). We agree with the district court that Watson was, at most, an
incidental beneficiary who had no standing to sue. See Palmer v. Lakeside
Wellness Ctr., 

, 850 (Neb. 2011) (discussing the requirements for
enforcing a contract as a third-party beneficiary); Spring Valley IV Joint Venture v.
Neb. State Bank of Omaha, 

, 782–83 (Neb. 2005) (dismissing a

      1
        The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., United States District Judge for the
District of Nebraska.
                                         -2-
breach-of-contract claim for lack of standing because the claimant was only an
incidental beneficiary).

      The judgment of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

                          ______________________________




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