United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 18-3273
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                        v.

                                William Andrews

                                    Defendant – Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                   for the District of South Dakota - Rapid City
                                   ____________

                            Submitted: June 28, 2019
                               Filed: July 3, 2019
                                 [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before COLLOTON, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
                         ____________

PER CURIAM.

      A jury convicted William Andrews of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). In an Anders brief, Andrews’s counsel requests
permission to withdraw and questions the district court’s 1 decision to admit evidence
that Andrews had previously been convicted of a felony involving a firearm. See
Anders v. California, 

(1967).

       We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
this evidence. See United States v. Rembert, 

, 839 (8th Cir. 2017)
(explaining that a court’s admission of prior-bad-act evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) will be reversed “only when such evidence clearly ha[d] no bearing
on the issues in the case and was introduced solely to prove the defendant’s
propensity to commit criminal acts” (citation omitted)). Evidence that Andrews had
previously possessed a gun was relevant to show that he knowingly possessed the
gun recovered in this case. See United States v. Halk, 

, 487 (8th Cir.
2011). And the court’s limiting instruction to the jury helped “diminish[] the danger
of any unfair prejudice arising from [its] admission.” 

(citation omitted).

      We have also independently reviewed the record and conclude that no other
non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 

(1988). Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment and grant counsel permission to withdraw.
                       ______________________________




      1
        The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota.
                                         -2-