Appellant Jones filed a civil rights action against officials of Multnomah County, Oregon. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds that Jones had, in exchange for $500 paid to him, signed a release in favor of all the defendants. We find that summary judgment was inappropriate and reverse.

The facts are not disputed in any material respect by the appellees. Jones was being held in county jail after conviction and while awaiting sentence. On the night of July 3, 1976, Jones was taken from his cell, stripped, gagged, bound, chained to a wall, hosed with cold water and beaten with a night stick. The incident lasted 3 to 5 hours. He was then replaced in a special segregation facility and held there for nineteen days until, on July 22, he was escorted without notice to an interview room to meet with a deputy county counsel and a claims adjuster. The subject of the meeting was whether or not Jones would accept $500 for a release in favor of the county and the individual defendants for all claims arising from the beating and mistreatment on the night of July 3.

At the conclusion of the meeting Jones accepted the release and executed the documents presented to him. A transcribed tape recording covering part of the interview is in the record below and on appeal. A transcript of the interview discloses that representatives of the county did not advise Jones that the county was liable for its conduct or that he had a federal claim. The adjuster did ask Jones whether he had retained an attorney for the July 3 incident or if he wanted one, and Jones responded, "Not really. It all depends on how things turn out."

In the district court, the threshold issue in this civil rights suit was, of course, the validity of the release. To support their summary judgment motion, the defendants took Jones' deposition. It, too, was part of the record considered by the trial court. At the deposition Jones testified that he had signed the release "voluntarily," that he had realized that there "might have been a violation" of his rights, but that he had signed the release "for the money," and that it had crossed his mind that settlement might be better than taking his chances at trial. When asked at the deposition why he had not requested to talk with an attorney, he responded, "I didn't think I really needed one." Based on these admissions and on the transcript of the interview at the time of settlement, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the release was a complete bar to recovery.

We turn to the principles that should control our examination of whether or not the release in the instant case is valid. Counsel for Jones hesitantly suggested to us that federal law might have a bearing on the case, and then proceeded to an extensive analysis of Oregon law. The conditions affecting the validity of a release of significant federal rights are eminently a matter of federal law, and we find it unnecessary to examine Oregon authorities. See Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 87 (7th Cir. 1975) (§ 1983 waiver void as a matter of law and against public policy; no analysis of when release might be valid).1

A release of claims under section 1983 is valid only if it results from a decision that is voluntary, deliberate, and informed. See id. at 87-88. Cf. McCarthy v. Cahill, 249 F. Supp. 194 (D.D.C.1966) (release of personal injury claims set aside for fraud). There are both subjective and objective aspects to each of these elements. See Boyd, supra, 513 F.2d at 88. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973) (discussion of objective factors relevant to voluntariness).

Although we do not find cases which analyze the necessary criteria of validity for a section 1983 release, we find adequate and instructive guidance from decisions interpreting maritime releases. "A party who attempts to rely on a maritime release has the burden of proving its validity." Charpentier v. Fluor Ocean Servs., Inc., 534 F.2d 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 246-49, 63 S. Ct. 246, 251-52, 87 L. Ed. 239 (1942). Of course, the burden is always on the party advancing an affirmative defense to establish its validity. The special significance of maritime release cases is that a release's validity must be predicated on an unusually strong showing that the nature and extent of the seaman's injuries and the shipowner's potential liability for them was explained clearly to the seaman in circumstances where his signing of the release was quite free and intelligent. In maritime cases, a seaman's release of claims for injuries cannot be relied on by a shipowner otherwise liable for the injury unless the shipowner can affirmatively demonstrate that the claimant understood the nature of whatever statutory and common-law remedies he waived by the release. See Charpentier v. Fluor Ocean Servs., Inc., 613 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1980) (after remand). See also Strange v. Gulf & South American Steamship Co., 495 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1974); Blanco v. Moran Shipping Co., 483 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1973). The federal solicitude for claimants under section 1983 is at least as great as that for seamen and in both situations the claimant's dependence on potential defendants requires the release to be examined with particular care. Because the indicia of reliability required of section 1983 releases must be no less unambiguous than those required of maritime releases, we hold that defendants relying on section 1983 releases signed by prisoners must meet the same standard of validity applicable to maritime releases.

In the context of section 1983 waivers, several factors are relevant: although both parties may agree on certain facts, including the accuracy of the transcript of the claimed settlement conference, summary judgment is precluded when conflicting inferences might be drawn about a party's state of mind as reflected by objective indications. See, e. g., Higgins v. Fuessenich, 452 F. Supp. 1331 (D.Conn.1978). Jones' state of mind, that is to say the subjective aspect of the case, is a significant factor that must be considered on remand of the case to the finder of fact. That Jones admitted in his deposition that his signature on the release was "voluntary" is not by itself controlling in this regard, absent a showing that he understood the meaning of the term in its legal sense. On the record before us his statement amounts to little more than a legal conclusion on a question as to which he was not well informed.

There are, moreover, objective indications of coercive pressures and a lack of understanding2 here that preclude granting summary judgment for defendants.

One objective factor that must be considered on remand is the presence of a noncoercive atmosphere for the execution of the release, or how significant is the absence of such an atmosphere. See Boyd, supra, 513 F.2d at 88. Immediately after the beating and mistreatment were sustained by Jones, he was put back into a special segregation facility.3 The circumstances of the original injury may thus be tied in a direct and proximate way to the release in that they may have been inherently coercive.4 Objective factors that might dissipate this coercive atmosphere, such as the presence of an attorney representing the releasing party or the opportunity for Jones to consider the consequences of his actions in a neutral environment, appear to have been absent.5 We do not foreclose a finding of a voluntary release when the release is entered into by a prisoner without presence or assistance of counsel, but these circumstances must be weighed carefully.

The statements by the attorney and the adjuster representing the county may not have served to dispel these inherently coercive pressures. The transcript shows only a minimal attempt to explain to Jones the nature or extent of the rights he was waiving. The following excerpt is representative:

Ross (claims adjuster): Well, Multnomah County isn't necessarily in trouble at all. They are investigating the thing with regard to their internal investigation, any kind of incident that occurs like this and there are a lot of incidents that they investigate. But just the fact that they investigate it doesn't mean that they are necessarily liable. What I'm saying is that I think Multnomah County has some exposure and rather than going to all of the hassle of furthering the investigation, defending the matter in court and going through all of that sort of thing

Record at 27. Defendants must demonstrate that the meeting gave Jones a clear and sensible idea of the existence of a very significant federal remedy for the abuse of prisoners by state officials. The following exchange is pertinent in this regard:

Jones: No, I don't have any questions about it myself. I didn't think anything would happen about it. I thought they had the right to do it all really.

Ross: You thought that the officers had the right to do it?

Jones: Yeah. It seemed like they like you know they kept always threatening to do stuff like that to the rest of the men they did it so I figured maybe they had a right cause we were in jail.

Ross: I see well that's like I say, we have an exposure I think

Record at 27-28. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 249, 93 S.Ct. at 2059 (knowledge of right to refuse a factor in determining voluntariness of consent to search); Apitsch v. Patapsco & Back Rivers R. R., 385 F. Supp. 495, 503-07 (D.Md.1974) (failure to explain to plaintiff his rights under FELA a material fact in determining validity of release of claims).

Finally, one of the major factors bearing upon the question of free consent here may have aggravated coercive pressure, rather than mitigating it: sentence was still pending at the time the interview took place.6 See Boyd, supra, 513 F.2d at 85.

For these reasons we conclude that there is a triable issue of fact as to the validity of the release relied upon by the county.7

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.