Alan Harris, Harris & Ruble, Los Angeles, CA, and Maxwell M. Blecher, Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Rex S. Heinke, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Ronald S.W. Lew, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-01-08591-RSWL.

Before: D.W. NELSON and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER,* Senior District Judge.

SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge.

Rodney Gregory brought this action against SCIE, LLC, dba EPSG Management Services, LP ("SCIE"), in state court under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code, which entitles "any employee receiving less than ... the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee ... to recover ... the unpaid balance of the full amount." He alleged he was not paid for overtime work performed for SCIE at premium wage rates in violation of California Labor Code Section 510 and Wage Orders 11 and 12. SCIE removed the action to the district court, alleging that the claims arise under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and are, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the federal district court.1

The district court dismissed the action with prejudice on the ground that four of Gregory's causes of action are preempted by § 301; it remanded a fifth cause of action for continuing wages under California Labor Code Section 203 to the Superior Court. Gregory appeals. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and vacate and remand with directions to remand to the Superior Court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Gregory is employed in the entertainment industry. He is a member of Local 44 of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Motion Picture Technicians Artists and Allied Craft of the United States and Canada ("IATSE"). The terms and conditions of his employment, including overtime, are governed by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between IATSE and a multi-employer bargaining unit, the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers ("Alliance"). SCIE is a company represented by the Alliance and is a signatory to and covered by the CBA.

While employed by SCIE, Gregory worked on multiple television and motion picture productions. During a period of two months, he worked six consecutive days on two productions in one week: one day on one production and five on the other. While working on two other productions, he worked twenty and one-half hours on one day: eight hours on one show and twelve and one-half hours on the other. He alleges that SCIE violated the California Labor Code by failing to pay him at premium wage rates for the hours worked in excess of eight hours in one workday and forty hours in one workweek, as required by Section 510.2

DISCUSSION

Because this is a state law action between nondiverse parties, this court's subject matter jurisdiction depends on whether Gregory's claim is preempted under § 301. A federal law defense to a state-law claim does not confer jurisdiction on a federal court. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 77 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1983). Thus, a plaintiff may generally avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading solely state-law claims. An exception to that general proposition exists, however, if federal law completely preempts the plaintiff's state-law claim. In that case, federal law completely displaces plaintiff's state-law claim, no matter how carefully pleaded. "In such instances, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir.2000).

The complete preemption exception is applied primarily under § 301 of the LMRA. Id. That Section vests jurisdiction in federal courts over "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court has expanded § 301 preemption to cases whose resolution "is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of [a collective bargaining agreement]." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985). However, § 301 does not preempt a claim alleging state law substantive rights that apply without regard to a CBA and can be resolved without interpreting a CBA. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc. 486 U.S. 399, 413, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988). In Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 129 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1994), the Court provided further clarification, stating that "§ 301 cannot be read broadly to preempt non-negotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law.... [W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of a dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished." Id. at 122-24, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). Finally, in Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), we summarized the preemption analysis:

The plaintiff's claim is the touchstone of [the preemption] analysis; the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's claim. If the claim is plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption is not mandated simply because the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense.

Id. at 691.

Here, Gregory's claim is based entirely on state law. There is no dispute over the terms of the CBA or its interpretation. While overtime is calculated in accordance with the terms of the CBA, this case involves no issue concerning the method of calculation. The issue here is not how overtime rates are calculated but whether the result of the calculation complies with California law, i.e., whether Gregory is paid at premium wage rates for "[a]ny work in excess of eight hours in one workday and any work in excess of 40 hours in any one work week" (emphasis added), as required by California law. Cal. Lab.Code § 510. The issue arises because the work Gregory performed for SCIE on different productions exceeded in the aggregate eight hours in one work day and forty hours in one work week. He was not paid premium wage rates because SCIE does not lump together different productions to calculate overtime hours. The dispute between the parties may require interpretation of the words "any work" in the statute, but its resolution does not require reference to, much less interpretation of, the CBA.

In support of its position, SCIE invokes Section 514, which provides: "[S]ection 510... do[es] not apply to an employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if the agreement ... provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked ...." CAL. LAB. CODE § 514 (emphasis added.) SCIE argues that by reason of Section 514, Section 510 does not apply because the CBA under which Gregory works and is paid provides premium wage rates for overtime. Even assuming the CBA provides premium wage rates for overtime, the question here is the same as that raised by Section 510: whether when overtime is paid under the CBA it is paid for all overtime hours worked, as required by California law. This is a question of interpretation of state law, not of the CBA, that we leave to the state court. SCIE does not contend that Gregory's claim based on aggregating all hours worked in a workday or a workweek arises under the CBA. Nor has SCIE shown that the CBA, which is silent about whether hours worked on different productions are or are not to be aggregated when calculating overtime hours worked, has any bearing on this issue.3 Here, all that was needed to determine Gregory's claim were the earning reports for each day worked.4 See Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that determination of timeliness of wage payments under California wage payment statute does not require reference to the CBA.).5

Federal jurisdiction depends on preemption of Gregory's claim. Because his claim is "plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption is not mandated simply because the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense." Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691. We hold that federal jurisdiction has not been established. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand with directions to remand to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Because we lack jurisdiction, we do not reach Gregory's other claims.

VACATED and REMANDED.