McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Who knew that simple math could be so tricky? The parties to this dispute, the State of California and two California Indian tribes, signed Gaming Compacts intended
The Compacts stem from the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), passed by Congress in 1988 and designed "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments." 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1). IGRA sets out three classes of lawful gaming; at issue here are slot machines and other gaming machines ("gaming devices") that are included under Class III. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(B)(ii), (8). A tribal-state gaming agreement, known as a "compact," is required to conduct Class III gaming under IGRA. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
In 1999, California and approximately 60
This appeal springs from a disagreement between California and plaintiff Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian Community and plaintiff-intervenor Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians ("Picayune") (collectively, "Colusa").
Such a posture would normally suggest that summary judgment is inappropriate, even though contract interpretation is a matter of law. Nonetheless, both parties agreed that the matter should be decided on cross motions for summary judgment. An additional twist is that the parties'
We affirm in part the grant of summary judgment to Colusa because we agree that the limit on licenses exceeds that recognized by California. However, our interpretation of the governing provisions differs slightly from the district court's formulation. We also affirm the denial of California's motion for summary judgment. Finally, we uphold the remedy ordered by the district court of a license draw open to all eligible tribes, administered according to the process delineated in the Compacts. Before we wade into the somewhat mind-numbing discussion of numbers, it is useful to provide a background context for the formula.
Following a successful ballot initiative permitting California Indian tribes to run "Nevada and New Jersey"-type casinos, and in response to the likely imminent invalidation of that initiative, then-Governor Gray Davis invited California tribes to negotiate Class III gaming compacts. By that time—April 1999—a number of California tribes were already operating gaming devices, although without authorization under IGRA. These tribes operated around 19,000 devices state-wide. In late August 1999, the California Supreme Court invalidated the ballot initiative permitting casino operation by Indian tribes. See Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 21 Cal.4th 585, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 56, 981 P.2d 990 (1999). California and the tribes, including Colusa, continued negotiating, however, intending to condition execution of the Compacts on the ratification of a constitutional amendment that would exempt Indian tribes from the prohibition on Class III gaming.
The final Compact negotiation sessions were held on September 8 and 9, 1999, and continued into the early hours of September 10. Late on September 9, the lead negotiator for California presented the entire draft Compact to the tribal representatives for approval. The representatives were given until September 10 to sign letters of intent to enter into bilateral Compacts with California. The Compacts required legislative ratification, and the end of the legislative session was fast approaching. Colusa's Chairman signed the tribe's letter of intent in the early hours of September 10. In total, about 60 tribes (the "Compact Tribes"), including Colusa and Picayune, entered into bilateral Class III gaming Compacts with California. These Compacts are substantially identical. See Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 717-18 (9th Cir.2003).
The California legislature ratified the agreements in September 1999. On the same day, the Governor's Press Office released an "information sheet" regarding the number of licenses available, stating that the Compacts authorized 44,448 gaming devices total statewide, including those already in operation. California voters ratified the constitutional amendment in March 2000, enabling the Compacts to be executed. Colusa and Picayune's Compacts went into effect on May 16, 2000.
While the Colusa Compact includes a variety of provisions relating to the operation and licensing of Class III gaming devices, the only provisions at issue in this appeal relate to the aggregate number of gaming devices authorized statewide in addition to those already in operation as of September 1, 1999, i.e., the size of the "license pool." The Compact provides a
The Compact defines Non-Compact Tribes as federally-recognized tribes that are operating fewer than 350 gaming devices, whether or not the tribe executed a Compact with the State. § 4.3.2(a)(1). In other words, some tribes are both Compact and Non-Compact Tribes under the agreement. Section 4.3.1, which is referenced by § 4.3.2.2(a)(1), states:
For convenience, we refer to §§ 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.2(a)(1) as the "License Pool Provisions."
A Compact Tribe may operate a certain number of gaming devices without securing licenses from the pool. This initial "free pass" covers either 350 devices or the number of devices the tribe was already operating as of September 1, 1999, whichever is larger. § 4.3.1. Colusa operated 523 gaming devices as of September 1, 1999, so it was permitted to continue operating all of those devices without licenses. A Compact Tribe must secure a license from the statewide pool for each additional device above the Tribe's "free pass" number, up to the maximum of 2000 devices per tribe. § 4.3.2.2(a).
The licenses are allocated from the license pool to Compact Tribes that request them according to a detailed draw process. § 4.3.2.2(a)(3). The draw process, which includes tiers of priority for different tribes, was designed to skew the distribution of the available licenses towards those Compact Tribes that did not yet conduct large gaming operations. § 4.3.2.2(a)(3).
For the first two years, the license draw process was administered by an accounting agency engaged by the Compact Tribes, Sides Accountancy Corporation ("Sides"). In 2001, following complaints regarding the accounting and administration of the draws and Sides's unwillingness to provide certain information to California, Governor Davis issued an executive order creating the California Gambling Control Commission ("the Commission"), which took over the licensing process.
During its administration, Sides issued 29,398 licenses, exceeding by about 25% the 23,450 number that would have been available in the pool according to the Governor's summary "information sheet," which limited the total devices to 44,448 statewide, including those already in operation. After taking control, in 2002 the Commission evaluated the various interpretations of the License Pool Provisions that had been suggested and adopted an interpretation that authorized a license pool of 32,151 licenses. This number surpassed the number of licenses that Sides previously issued, allowing all of those licenses to remain valid. According to the Commission—and California, which has adopted the Commission's formulation— 2753 licenses remained in the license pool for distribution after the Commission took charge.
The Commission notified the Compact Tribes that it would conduct a draw in September 2002. Colusa was placed in the third priority tier for the first draw, in
Immediately following the December 2003 draw, Colusa requested that California meet and confer regarding, among other issues, the size of the license pool and Colusa's placement within the lower priority tier for the 2003 draw. Following an unsuccessful meeting, Colusa initiated suit in October 2004.
Colusa's initial complaint alleged five claims for breach of the Compact. Only one claim—California's unilateral determination of the aggregate number of licenses authorized by the Compact under the License Pool Provisions—is at issue here; in its complaint, Colusa sought a declaration that the license pool consisted of "more than 62,000 Gaming Device licenses," and requested that the court order California to immediately issue 377 licenses to Colusa.
The district court dismissed four of the claims on the ground that Colusa was required to join other Compact Tribes as necessary parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19; the fifth claim was dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies. On appeal, we reversed and held that the non-party Compact Tribes did not have a protectable legal interest in the size of the license pool and were not required parties that must be joined under Rule 19. Colusa I, 547 F.3d at 972. We affirmed the dismissal of the unexhausted claim. Id. at 968 n. 3.
While Colusa I was pending, California negotiated Compact amendments with at least five tribes. Neither Colusa nor Picayune entered an Amended Compact, although Colusa negotiated regarding a potential amendment. The Amended Compacts provided up to 22,500 additional gaming devices outside of the aggregate limits established by the original Compacts.
In June 2007, also during the time Colusa I was pending, Colusa filed a second suit, alleging California breached the Compact by refusing to conduct another round of draws, miscounting multi-station games as equal to the number of terminals, and failing to negotiate in good faith. The district court consolidated Colusa's two actions. In January 2009, Picayune intervened, alleging the Commission breached the Compact by miscalculating the size of the license pool.
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of the size of the license pool. On April 22, 2009, the district court granted summary judgment to Colusa on the aggregate number of gaming devices authorized by the Compact and on Colusa's placement within the priority tiers. The court entered final judgment on all claims on August 19, 2009, and ordered California to conduct a draw of the remaining licenses in the pool that would be open to all eligible Compact Tribes. California's request to stay the order for thirty days was denied. California timely appealed and then moved for a stay of the district court's remedy order. Following denial of the stay motion, in October 2009, California conducted a license draw open to all eligible Compact Tribes. In that draw, 1878 licenses were issued to ten
General principles of federal contract law govern the Compacts, which were entered pursuant to IGRA. Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1032 (9th Cir.1989). In practical terms, we rely on California contract law and Ninth Circuit decisions interpreting California law because we "discern, and the parties note, no difference between [California] and federal contract law." Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir.2006) (employing Idaho contract law to interpret a tribal-state compact that was to be "construed in accordance with the laws of the United States").
The California Court of Appeal recently reviewed the court's role in interpreting contracts, according to California law:
Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1125-26, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 585 (Cal.Ct.App.2008).
The License Pool Provisions are repeated here, to facilitate their explanation. The calculations fall naturally into two steps:
§ 4.3.2.2(a)(1).
Section 4.3.1 provides:
§ 4.3.1.
From the beginning of this litigation, Colusa and California have agreed on the operation of Step 1 of the § 4.3.2.2(a)(1) sum. The Compact defines "Non-Compact Tribes" as federally-recognized tribes that were operating fewer than 350 gaming devices as of September 1, 1999, whether or not they ultimately entered Compacts. § 4.3.2(a)(i). There are 84 such tribes. Step 1 is therefore:
The parties vigorously dispute the operation of Step 2. That step is defined by the following formula:
In the original summary judgment submissions, California and Colusa championed
The value of X—the number of tribes that should be multiplied by 350 in order to aggregate § 4.3.1(b)—is where California and Colusa parted ways. California claimed X should be 16, because 16 tribes operated fewer than 350 gaming devices, but more than zero, as of September 1, 1999.
Colusa disagreed, and contended in its original summary judgment filing that X equaled 84, because 84 reflected those California tribes that operated fewer than 350 devices on September 1, 1999, including those operating zero.
In a footnote in its original summary judgment filing, and expanded on in its reply brief, at argument, and through supplemental briefing, Colusa introduced another interpretation of the License Pool Provisions, which the district court termed the "alternative formulation." The alternative formulation employs the same interpretation of Step 1. But Step 2 identifies whether each Compact Tribe, treated as an individual Compact Tribe, would have the limit on permissible unlicensed devices set by § 4.3.1(a) or set by § 4.3.1(b). Aggregate numbers are separately calculated
Applied, the alternative formulation under Step 2 proceeds as follows.
To begin, the district court acknowledged that "[t]he parties do not dispute that the meaning of [§ ] 4.3.2.2(a) is unclear and susceptible to varying interpretations." Before interpreting the License Pool Provisions as a matter of law, the court concluded that the parties' extrinsic evidence shed no light on their mutual intention at the time of contracting. The court was also influenced by its observation that the original formulations of both parties forced a "strained reading of the Compact language." In interpreting an ambiguous term as a matter of law, the court stated its obligation as "provid[ing] an interpretation that will make an agreement lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect." Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 800, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 (Cal. Ct.App.1998). The court then concluded the alternative formulation reflected these necessary qualities, and that of the three interpretations offered "the alternative formulation most accurately follows the language of § 4.3.2.2(a)(1), giving the words their ordinary meaning." The conclusion that 42,700 licenses are available in the pool provided the court's basis for ordering a new license draw, which took place in October 2009.
On de novo review, we agree with the district court that the License Pool Provisions are ambiguous and reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. v. GTE Mobilnet, Inc., 281 F.3d 929, 933-934 (9th Cir. 2002) ("We also review de novo the determinations of whether contract language is ambiguous, Tyler v. Cuomo, 236 F.3d 1124, 1134 (9th Cir.2000), and "[w]hether the written contract is reasonably susceptible of a proffered meaning." Brinderson-Newberg Joint Venture v. Pac. Erectors, 971 F.2d 272, 277 (9th Cir.1992))." That the parties and the district court each, in good faith, divine multiple results from the same formula underscores this ambiguity. For example, the opaque language of the provisions permits more than one interpretation of how the word "authorized" should be understood when interpreting § 4.3.1 in the context of the § 4.3.2.2(a)(1) sum. The fact that the term "authorized" is not used in the text of § 4.3.1 only exacerbates the ambiguity.
Given this ambiguity, we are permitted to consider extrinsic evidence when interpreting the Compact as a matter of law if the language of the provisions is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation of the party proffering the evidence. See In re Bennett, 298 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002). We use a two-step process to determine whether extrinsic evidence passes
Although we ultimately decline to consider the extrinsic evidence, in light of the parties' extensive briefing on the issue, we first address our rationale on this point before turning to interpretation of the Compact.
California offers extrinsic evidence to support its view that the parties' mutual intention was the Compact would authorize no more than approximately 23,450 devices in the license pool, because the parties agreed on a statewide cap of approximately 44,500 devices total.
Colusa offers extrinsic evidence to counter California's position and demonstrate that the Compact Tribes never intended that the license pool would be limited to 23,450 based on a statewide cap of around 44,500. Colusa claims that the Tribes originally believed the license pool would, in fact, be around 56,000 devices, not including the devices already in use.
The district court admitted the parties' extrinsic evidence, but then concluded that
California contends on appeal that the district court erred in admitting the extrinsic evidence because the credibility of the conflicting evidence should have been tested by the jury. According to California, the district court erred by skipping that step and interpreting the contract as a matter of law.
California is correct that when there is a material conflict in extrinsic evidence supporting competing interpretations of ambiguous contract language the court may not use the evidence to interpret the contract as a matter of law, but must instead render the evidence to the factfinder for evaluation of its credibility. See City of Hope Nat'l Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 43 Cal.4th 375, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 333, 181 P.3d 142, 156-57 (2008) ("Interpretation of a written instrument becomes solely a judicial function only when it is based on the words of the instrument alone, when there is no conflict in the extrinsic evidence, or a determination was made based on incompetent evidence.").
That general principle comes with a key preliminary caveat: The extrinsic evidence must qualify for admission. In this case, we never reach the question of what happens when the court is faced with conflicting admissible extrinsic evidence, because neither California's nor Colusa's evidence qualifies for admission in the first place. If credited, California's evidence, drawn heavily from the "information sheet," would show that the parties agreed upon a statewide cap of around 44,500 devices, which would mean the license pool should not exceed around 23,450 licenses.
In briefing before the district court, California proposed a formulation, different from its original interpretation, one that would permit 32,151 licenses in the pool and around 53,000 devices statewide.
Colusa's extrinsic evidence suffers from the same infirmity as that of California. The tribe's evidence tends to show that the Compact Tribes believed the license pool included around 56,000 licenses. Colusa offers no connection between this extrinsic evidence regarding its initial intentions and the alternative formulation it now supports, which concludes that only 42,700 licenses are available in the pool. Like California's proffer, Colusa's evidence may not be admitted to construe the License Pool Provisions.
"It is [ ] solely a judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of the extrinsic evidence." Parsons v. Bristol Dev. Co., 62 Cal.2d 861, 44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839, 842 (1965). California and Colusa, however, have not provided credible evidentiary support for their interpretations of the disputed provisions. "Even if we indulge in every reasonable inference that can be drawn from this evidence, the ... ] issue [of the interpretation of the License Pool Provisions] cannot be reasonably construed as turning on the credibility of such insubstantial evidence." New Haven Unified Sch. Dist. v. Taco Bell Corp., 24 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1483, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 469 (Cal.Ct.App.1994) (concluding that, although defendant introduced extrinsic evidence, it was "of marginal relevance," and therefore the appellate court should retain interpretation as a judicial function).
In Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir.1983), we concluded that summary judgment on an ambiguous insurance contract claim was permissible under California law when there was a lack of evidentiary support for competing interpretations of the contract language. That reasoning applies equally here, when considering California's argument:
Id. at 97.
Because the extrinsic evidence submitted by both parties is inadmissible, no genuine issue of material fact precluded the district court from interpreting the ambiguous License Pool Provisions as a matter of law or precludes us from doing the same. We turn to that challenge now.
We have the task of interpreting the ambiguous License Pool Provisions as a
Nor does the alternative formulation, adopted by the district court, provide a viable choice. The alternative approach treats "the difference between 350 and" language of Step 2 as an afterthought in the aggregation process, to be subtracted from whichever aggregate number is deemed "the lesser number authorized under Section 4.3.1." Yet it is not a natural reading of § 4.3.2.2(a)(1) that only half of Step 2 was designed to aggregate, and the other half was intended merely to make a minor adjustment. A more reasonable reading of Step 2, one that would give meaning to the "difference between 350 and" language, includes both elements in the aggregation process.
Concluding the alternative formulation is unsatisfactory, we turn a fresh eye to the meaning of the § 4.3.2.2(a)(1) sum. To reiterate, the § 4.3.2.2(a)(1) sum sets the "number of machines that all Compact Tribes in the aggregate may license pursuant to this Section." In other words, the sum calculates the size of the license pool.
Because Step 1 is undisputed, we turn to Step 2, which requires calculating "the difference between 350 and the lesser number authorized under Section 4.3.1." A reasonable reading of Step 2 within § 4.3.2.2(a)(1) is that it contemplates application of Step 2 to all Compact Tribes in order to calculate how many machines "all Compact Tribes in the aggregate may licence." If all of Step 2 is not applied, then part of the Step 2 language is left hanging as surplusage or an afterthought. If Step 2 is not applied to each Compact Tribe, then the aggregation is incomplete. Therefore, to give Step 2 meaning and consistent application, it makes sense to apply all of Step 2 to each Compact Tribe in order to create an aggregate number.
Standing on its own, § 4.3.1 is written so as to apply to a single Compact Tribe, and sets the number of devices the Tribe may operate without securing licences. It states a tribe "may operate no more Gaming Devices than the larger of the following [two options]." Accordingly, § 4.3.1 calculates two numbers for each Compact Tribe. The Tribe may operate either the smaller or the larger number of devices calculated in §§ 4.3.1(a) and 4.3.1(b) without securing licenses. Stated another way, the Tribe is "authorized under Section 4.3.1" to operate either number of devices. Of course, within the context of setting individual limits, the larger of these two numbers would be the pertinent number for the individual Tribe, as that sets the limit of "free pass" devices.
Step 2 of the § 4.3.2.2(a)(1) sum references the same numbers calculated under § 4.3.1 on its own. However, under Step 2 the key number is the smaller number
Simple math allows us to save time by grouping similar Compact Tribes according to how many devices they operated as of September 1, 1999, and using the same basic steps. We can then add the group totals to reach the same overall total for Step 2 that would result from aggregating individual calculations. The aggregate calculation would go as follows:
To complete Step 2, we add the results of each of the component calculations:
To solve the entire § 4.3.2.2(a)(1) sum, we then add
On summary judgment, the district court concluded that the size of the license pool was 42,700 licenses. Based on this conclusion, the court determined that 10,549 licenses remained in the license pool beyond the 32,151 licenses California claimed were authorized. Colusa requested the district court to order a draw for all Compact Tribes to distribute the additional licenses and the district court ordered that within 45 days California conduct "a draw of all available gaming device licenses, in accordance with the court's April 22[,2009,] order, and in which all eligible Compact Tribes may participate." California conducted a draw in October 2009, following an unsuccessful motion in this court to stay the order. In that draw, 1878 licenses were requested by ten interested Compact Tribes, including Colusa and Picayune, and all requested licenses were issued.
California contends that the district court did not have the discretion to order a draw open to all eligible Compact Tribes, claiming the draw would impermissibly extend relief to non-parties. We review the district court's choice of remedy for abuse of discretion. United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 431 F.3d 643, 655 (9th Cir.2005).
It is worthwhile to recap the license draw scheme created by the Compact to provide context for reviewing the district court's remedy. The Compact between California and Colusa creates the right for Colusa to draw from a pool of gaming device licenses that are available to all Compact Tribes. § 4.3.2.2. ("The Tribe, along with all other Compact Tribes, may acquire licenses to use Gaming Devices in excess of the number they are authorized to use under Sec. 4.3.1, but in no event may the Tribe operate more than 2,000 Gaming Devices . . . ." § 4.3.2.2(a)). The Compacts executed by the Tribes that are not parties to this suit all include an identical right to draw from that same license pool. See, e.g., Picayune Compact, § 4.3.2.2(a). The Colusa Compact and the other Compacts set out identical instructions for how the series of license draws must be administered. § 4.3.2.2(a)(3); see, e.g., Picayune Compact § 4.3.2.2(a)(3). Once a round of draws is announced, any interested Compact Tribe may request licenses from the pool. The requesting Tribe will then be placed into a priority tier for distribution, depending on how many devices the Tribe currently operates. § 4.3.2.2(a)(3). That priority tier governs the maximum licenses the Compact Tribe may request for that round. § 4.3.2.2(a)(3)(i)-(v). The licenses are allocated according to the priority tiers. § 4.3.2.2(a)(3). Rounds are to continue until Tribes stop making draws, and to resume again once a Tribe requests additional licenses. § 4.3.2.2(a)(3)(vi).
Colusa claims injury based on the denial of licenses in earlier draws. To be effective, any remedy must allow Colusa the opportunity to apply for some of the 10,549 licenses remaining in the pool. The district court ordered the only effective remedy derived from the Colusa Compact—an open draw of available licenses— and did not abuse its discretion by turning to the process for management of the license pool agreed upon by both California and Colusa. Indeed, the district court demonstrated prudence by mirroring its relief on a system agreed upon by the participants in the 1999 Compacts, instead of crafting relief that may have had adverse effects on non-party Compact Tribes.
Although California argues it was improper to afford relief that benefits non-party Compact Tribes, an exception to the requirement of limiting relief to the parties applies when effective relief is otherwise unavailable. See Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170-71 (9th Cir.1988) ("[A]n injunction is not necessarily made over-broad by extending benefit or protection to persons other than the prevailing parties in the lawsuit—even if it is not a class action—if such breadth is necessary to give prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled."). See also, e.g., Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1501-02 (9th Cir.1996) (upholding injunction from enforcing helmet law without reasonable suspicion against all motorcyclists, instead of against just fourteen individual plaintiffs, since California Highway Patrol policy is set on statewide level, and so in practical terms it is unlikely to expect officers would inquire whether an individual was one of the prevailing plaintiffs before issuing a citation).
Our decision in Colusa I contemplates the open draw remedy ordered by the district court. There we concluded that Colusa need not join other Compact Tribes as parties because those tribes did not have a protectable legal interest in the size of the license pool. 547 F.3d at 971-72. The district court observed that Colusa I supported its remedy:
The district court correctly read Colusa I to assume that a decision within this litigation resulting in a larger license pool than California had yet recognized would be followed by a remedy ordering the eventual distribution of the remaining licenses to all Compact Tribes that applied and were eligible to receive them. Although we concluded that non-party Compact Tribes did not have a protectable legal interest under Rule 19, we discussed how their economic interests would nonetheless be affected by an adjudication that the license pool was smaller or larger than California previously maintained:
547 F.3d at 971.
We anticipated what was surely the response by some non-party Compact Tribes to the district court's remedy, that "those [non-party Compact Tribes] who intend to expand their gaming operations and compete with the dominant gaming tribes will gladly accept an increase in the size of the license pool." Id. at 971.
Finally, we preempted California's contention in this appeal that the remedy deprived the state of its right to "litigate the size of the license pool under different facts in other pending and future cases." Colusa I anticipated that California would be liable for a single number of licenses in the statewide pool, not separate numbers for separate litigants based on their respective situations. Notably, we declared that any "inconsistent conclusions with respect to the size of the license pool created under the 1999 compacts" that were reached in separate district courts "could be resolved by an appeal to this court." 547 F.3d at 972 n. 12. Through this decision, we have indeed removed any danger that California will face inconsistent interpretations regarding the size of the license pool, at least as it obtains under the 1999 Compacts.
In sum, to provide effective relief to Colusa, the district court appropriately ordered a license draw according to the process the parties agreed to in the Compacts. Through ordering the open draw, the district court did not abuse its discretion by misapplying the law or "rul[ing] in an irrational manner." See Alisal, 431 F.3d at 655 (internal quotations omitted). The open draw falls within the exception to the restriction against extending relief to non-parties as the benefits to non-party Compact Tribes were incidental to providing effective relief to Colusa. Our opinion in Colusa I bolsters this conclusion.
The License Pool Provisions that California and Colusa included in their Compact as a foundation for establishing Class III gaming in California are murky at best. The multiple interpretations offered in this litigation underscore this reality. The language of the License Pool Provisions is not reasonably susceptible to the interpretations advanced by the parties, which do not give effect to the structure and explicit terms of the Compact. Because the Provisions are not reasonably susceptible to the parties' interpretations, the extrinsic evidence submitted by the parties is inadmissible. Taking a fresh
(350 × 84)(Step 1 )+[23(350-350)+[16(350)-2849]+23(350-0)](Step 2 )= 29,400+(0+2751+8050)= 29,400+10,801=40,201 total