Filed: Jun. 13, 2012
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 13 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LISA CASWELL, in her capacity as No. 10-35748 executor of the estate of Robert Caswell, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05232-BHS Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* OLYMPIC PIPELINE COMPANY; et al., Defendants - Appellees. LISA CASWELL, in her capacity as No. 11-35260 executor of the estate of Robert Caswell, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05232-BHS Plaintiff - Appellant, v. UNION OIL COM
Summary: FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 13 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LISA CASWELL, in her capacity as No. 10-35748 executor of the estate of Robert Caswell, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05232-BHS Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* OLYMPIC PIPELINE COMPANY; et al., Defendants - Appellees. LISA CASWELL, in her capacity as No. 11-35260 executor of the estate of Robert Caswell, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05232-BHS Plaintiff - Appellant, v. UNION OIL COMP..
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FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 13 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LISA CASWELL, in her capacity as No. 10-35748
executor of the estate of Robert Caswell,
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05232-BHS
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
OLYMPIC PIPELINE COMPANY; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
LISA CASWELL, in her capacity as No. 11-35260
executor of the estate of Robert Caswell,
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05232-BHS
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNION OIL COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Argued and Submitted June 6, 2012
Seattle, Washington
Before: SILVERMAN and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and HALL, District
Judge.**
Plaintiffs Robert and Lisa Caswell appeal the district court’s summary
judgment orders that dismissed their product liability claims. The court ruled that
the Caswells’ claims were barred by Oregon’s 8-year statute of repose. The
Caswells also ask us to review the Washington state trial court’s order granting
summary judgment to Olympic Pipeline Company on the same basis. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Like the district court, we apply Washington’s choice-of-law rules to decide
whether Washington’s or Oregon’s substantive law applies. See Fields v. Legacy
Health Sys.,
413 F.3d 943, 950–52 (9th Cir. 2005). Also like the district court, we
hold that Oregon had the most significant relationship to this action. At the time of
injury, the Caswells were Oregon residents. Robert Caswell was injured in Oregon
while working in Oregon for an Oregon employer. In Rice v. Dow Chemical Co.,
875 P.2d 1213, 1217–18 (Wash. 1994), the Washington Supreme Court applied
Oregon’s statute of repose in a scenario very similar to this one.
**
The Honorable Janet C. Hall, District Judge for the District of
Connecticut, sitting by designation.
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The Caswells also argue that the district court erred when it denied their
request for further discovery on whether the petroleum products were
manufactured and designed in Washington. We disagree. The district court
correctly held that, even if the Caswells can show that the products were
manufactured and designed in Washington, Oregon would still have more
significant contacts. Therefore, additional discovery would have been futile.
The Caswells raise two new arguments for the first time on appeal. The first
is that, even if Oregon law applies, Oregon’s statute of repose was not triggered
because there was no evidence that the petroleum had been purchased for use or
consumption. The second argument is that the Oregon statute of repose violates
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. We decline to review
these arguments because they were not raised before the district court. Barrientos
v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC,
583 F.3d 1197, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 2009).
Lastly, the Caswells argue that the Washington state trial court erred in
applying Oregon’s statute of repose before the action was removed. We have
jurisdiction to review the state court’s order because the district court necessarily
adopted that order as its own after removal. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bayside
Developers,
43 F.3d 1230, 1238 (9th Cir. 1994); Butner v. Neustadter,
324 F.2d
783, 785–86 (9th Cir. 1963). We also have jurisdiction because, at the time
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judgment was entered, there was complete diversity between the parties. See
Gould v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
790 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986).
First, we note that removal based on diversity jurisdiction was proper here,
despite the lack of complete diversity, because the Caswells failed to contest the
allegations in the notice of removal that Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company
and Olympic Pipeline Company were fraudulently joined and that the Caswells
cannot state a claim against them. The Caswells’ failure to object to the factual
allegations in the notice of removal and their decision not to move for remand are
construed as an admission that Tesoro Refining and Olympic Pipeline were sham
defendants joined solely to destroy complete diversity. See Schnabel v. Lui,
302
F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2002). After removal, the district court correctly
adopted as its own the state court’s decision to dismiss Tesoro Refining and
Olympic Pipeline on the grounds that Oregon’s statute of repose barred the
Caswells’ claims against them. Although Olympic Pipeline has its principal place
of business in Washington, the decision to apply Oregon law was correct.
AFFIRMED.
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