GOULD, Circuit Judge:
In response to recent state appellate court decisions that exposed employers to significant and unexpected minimum wage liability, California passed Assembly Bill 1513 (AB 1513). This law created a "safe harbor" that gave employers an affirmative defense against the new claims so long as the employer made back payments under certain conditions. AB 1513 allowed the employers to avoid the costs and statutory penalties that they would otherwise face as a result of underpayment litigation. The legislation, however, also included specific "carve-outs" that were crafted such that three or four employers would be precluded from using the safe harbor in then-pending litigation against them. Plaintiffs Fowler Packing Company, Inc. (Fowler) and Gerawan Farming, Inc. (Gerawan), assert that the legislature added these carve-outs to AB 1513 to obtain the necessary support of a labor union. Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendants, who
We have jurisdiction to review the district court's order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We hold that Plaintiffs' complaint states a plausible claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause, but fails to state a plausible claim that AB 1513's carve-outs amount to a bill of attainder. The panel has previously filed an order on December 9, 2016, stating:
We now in this opinion provide our reasoning and note that the time for filing any petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc shall run from the filed date of this opinion.
Plaintiffs' complaint asserts the following facts. Fowler and Gerawan are California corporations engaged in the agriculture business that pay some of their employees on a "piece-rate" basis. Piece-rate payment is a system in which employees are compensated according to tasks completed rather than hours worked. Relying on the then-prevailing interpretation of federal minimum wage statutes, Plaintiffs ensured they met California minimum wage laws by averaging their piece-rate employees' payment during a fixed period of time and supplementing any deficiency below the applicable state minimum wage. In 2013, two California Court of Appeal decisions, Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013), and Bluford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 216 Cal.App.4th 864, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 212 (2013), held that piece-rate workers must also be paid for each hour of "non-productive time" — time in which a worker was at work but not completing a task — and for rest, recovery, and meal periods. According to Plaintiffs' complaint, these decisions exposed many employers, including Plaintiffs, to unanticipated and potentially crippling class litigation.
In response, California enacted Assembly Bill 1513 (AB 1513) on October 10, 2015, which codified the holdings in Gonzalez and Bluford. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(a). To protect California businesses from unforeseen liability arising from Gonzalez and Bluford, however, AB 1513 also created a "safe harbor" that provided employers with an affirmative defense against claims alleging failure to pay previously for nonproductive work time. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(b). Employers can use the safe harbor so long as they pay, no later than December 15, 2016, any minimum wage deficiencies occurring between July 1, 2012, and December 31, 2015. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(b)(1)(A).
But another provision of AB 1513, set forth in Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(g), makes certain defendants facing nonproductive work time claims ineligible for the safe
Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(g)(2). Section 226.2(g)(2) makes Gerawan ineligible to assert the safe harbor as an affirmative defense in a class action suit filed against it by the General Counsel of the United Farm Workers of America (UFW) on February 3, 2014, Amaro v. Gerawan Farming, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00147-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal.). It also would have precluded Delano Farms Company (Delano), another agricultural company that is not a party to this litigation, from asserting the safe harbor as an affirmative defense in a class action suit filed against it by the UFW, in which the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to add nonproductive time allegations to their complaint on June 22, 2015, Arredondo v. Delano Farms Company, No. 1:09-cv-01247-MJS (E.D. Cal.).
Still another carve-out provision precludes the use of the safe harbor as an affirmative defense by a defendant facing:
Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(g)(5). This carve-out prevents Fowler from asserting the safe harbor as an affirmative defense in a class action suit filed against it by the UFW on March 17, 2015, Aldapa v. Fowler Packing Co., Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00420-JAM-SAB (E.D. Cal.). According to Plaintiffs, the class actions against Fowler, Gerawan, and Delano are the only three pending wage and hour class actions filed by the UFW in seven years before the filing of Plaintiffs' complaint.
Plaintiffs' complaint also sets forth allegations relating to AB 1513's legislative history. According to the complaint, late in the 2014 legislative term, a bill that established the safe harbor, but one without any of the carve-outs, was proposed to the
Plaintiffs' complaint asserts federal constitutional claims, contending that AB 1513's carve-outs violate the prohibition against bills of attainder as well as the Equal Protection Clause. It also asserts a claim under Article IV, Section 16 of the California Constitution. The district court dismissed all three claims with prejudice. It dismissed the California Constitution claim because the court lacked jurisdiction to address it. See Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). The district court dismissed the bill of attainder claim on the grounds that AB 1513's carve-outs did not amount to punishment and the legislative record did not show an intent to punish. And the district court dismissed the Equal Protection Clause claim on the grounds that the carve-outs were reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. Plaintiffs timely appeal the dismissal of their federal claims only. We therefore address the bill of attainder and equal protection claims, but need not address the claim under the California Constitution.
We review the district court's order dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint de novo. Brewster v. Sun Trust Mortg., Inc., 742 F.3d 876, 877 (9th Cir. 2014). We must determine whether Plaintiffs' complaint pleads "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "In doing so, we accept as true all factual allegations and determine whether they are sufficient to state a claim for relief; we do not, however, accept as true allegations that are conclusory.... [The f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We first consider whether the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' claim under the Equal Protection Clause. We conclude that it did.
The parties agree, as do we, that AB 1513 implicates no suspect class or fundamental right. As a result, we scrutinize the carve-outs using rational basis review. Romero-Ochoa v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1328,
Plaintiffs argue that AB 1513 fails to satisfy rational basis review because the only reason the carve-outs were included in the final bill was to procure the support of the UFW. As Defendants conceded at oral argument and as we conclude, if that is the only justification for the carve-outs, that justification alone does not survive constitutional scrutiny. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the cut-off dates in sections (g)(2) and (g)(5) were included in AB 1513 for only that illegitimate purpose. Each cut-off date corresponds, within a matter of weeks (or even a matter of days), to the corresponding filing dates of the cases against Fowler, Gerawan, and Delano. Accepting Plaintiffs' allegations as true, as we must at this stage of the litigation, we can conceive of no other reason why the California legislature would choose to carve out these three employers other than to respond to the demands of a political constituent.
We must, however, consider the justifications Defendants offer. With respect to section (g)(2)(A), Defendants contend that the government sought to protect expectations developed as a result of already-pending litigation and to prevent unlimited relief to employers. We need not question the legitimacy of such a justification. Although we defer to legislatures in the necessary process of regulatory line-drawing, Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315-16, 113 S.Ct. 2096, legislatures may not draw lines for the purpose of arbitrarily excluding individuals, see Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a California statute excluding certain workers from an exemption from licensing requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause because the exclusion was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest). This is exactly what AB 1513, as alleged, does to Plaintiffs. Because Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the choice of cut-off dates can only be explained as a concession to the UFW in exchange for its support for AB 1513, section (g)(2) does not reasonably further this suggested justification.
The justifications Defendants offer in explanation of section (g)(5) are also insufficient to support dismissal of Plaintiffs' equal protection claim. Defendants assert that damages in "ghost worker" claims are more difficult to calculate and that the legislature may not have wanted to extend relief to employers who use ghost workers to engage in wage theft. But ghost worker claims are completely irrelevant to AB 1513's safe harbor, which deals with claims of underpayment as a result of failing to pay for nonproductive work time. It would be no less rational to base the ability of a defendant to use the safe harbor on the grounds of whether that defendant has ever received a speeding ticket.
Moreover, section (g)(5)'s reliance on particular allegations directed to a completely unrelated claim as the basis for denying an affirmative defense further supports the inference that its purpose is to target the class action against Fowler. We could understand if California wanted to prevent employers who stole employees' wages by using ghost worker manipulation from enjoying the benefits of the safe harbor in an unrelated claim because they have engaged in particularly wrongful conduct. But section (g)(5) does no such thing. It excludes employers from the safe harbor based on mere allegations made against them, even if those allegations turn out to be completely frivolous.
As a final matter, we note that Defendants' offered justification does not explain why section (g)(5) uses a cut-off date different from that used in section (g)(2). Again, we cannot conceive of a legitimate interest that would explain this decision.
Accepting Plaintiffs' allegations as true, the only conceivable explanation for AB 1513's carve-outs is that they were necessary to procure the UFW's support in passing that legislation. Because that justification would not survive even rational basis scrutiny, we conclude that Plaintiffs' complaint plausibly states a claim that those provisions violate the Equal Protection Clause.
We next address Plaintiffs' bill of attainder claim. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides that, "[n]o State shall.... pass any Bill of Attainder."
The Supreme Court has identified three elements of a bill of attainder claim: "[1] specification of the affected persons, [2] punishment, and [3] lack of a judicial trial." Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 847, 104 S.Ct. 3348, 82 L.Ed.2d 632 (1984). "In judging the constitutionality of [the challenged legislation], we may only look to its terms, to the intent expressed by [members of the legislature] who voted [for] its passage, and to the existence or nonexistence of legitimate explanations for its apparent effect." SeaRiver, 309 F.3d at 673 (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that AB 1513's carve-outs do not impose punishment and we need not address whether they satisfy the other two elements of a bill of attainder claim.
The Supreme Court has also identified three "necessary inquiries" that can indicate whether a law inflicts punishment for purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clauses: "(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, `viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes'; and (3) whether the legislative record `evinces a congressional intent to punish.'" Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 852, 104 S.Ct. 3348 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475-76, 478, 97 S.Ct. 2777). We must consider these three inquiries together, none of which is by itself necessary or dispositive. SeaRiver, 309 F.3d at 673. Further, as case law requires, we must view the law functionally as we engage in this analysis. E.g., Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 852, 104 S.Ct. 3348 ("It is ... apparent that, though the governing criteria for an attainder may be readily indicated, `each case has turned on its own highly particularized context.'" (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960))). In so doing, we conclude that the carve-outs do not impose punishment. Any liability Plaintiffs face in the class action cases being pursued against them is a result of judicial interpretations of preexisting California law, not any action by the legislature linked to the passage of AB 1513. For that reason, AB 1513 cannot be held to impose punishment.
First, the carve-outs do not fall within the historical meaning of legislative punishment, which includes execution, imprisonment, banishment, punitive confiscation of property, and the prohibition of "participation by individuals or groups in specific employments or professions." Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 852, 104 S.Ct. 3348; see also id. at 852 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 3348 (collecting cases). A law making a defendant ineligible to assert an affirmative defense in a civil lawsuit simply does not fit within that category of legislative action.
Third, we consider "whether the legislative record is probative of nonpunitive intentions or instead evidences legislative overreaching that enlivens `the fear that the legislature, in seeking to pander to an inflamed popular constituency,' found it `expedient openly to assume the mantle of judge — or, worse still, lynch mob.'" SeaRiver, 309 F.3d at 676 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480, 97 S.Ct. 2777). Outright statements of punitive intent are not necessary; instead, we look for evidence permitting an inference of punitive intent. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480, 97 S.Ct. 2777 ("We, of course, do not suggest that such a formal legislative announcement of moral blameworthiness or punishment is necessary to an unlawful bill of attainder."). The only allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint relevant to this analysis are (1) the last-minute nature of AB 1513's enactment and (2) post-enactment statements purportedly made by Assemblymember Williams.
The second set of allegations, the post-enactment statements purportedly made by Assemblymember Williams, suggests that the carve-outs were motivated by political expediency, but not, in our view, an intent to punish. According to Plaintiffs' allegations, Assemblymember Williams stated that the carve-outs were necessary to maintain the support of labor, and that "[f]rom [his] perspective, if we're going to create a grand compromise that helps most growers and helps most workers, you don't want to let it get blown up because there's somebody who's a potential bad actor." These statements support the contention that the carve-outs served only as a concession to the UFW in exchange
Plaintiffs argue that AB 1513 places a "functional burden" on them because their competitors now avoid costly litigation and statutory fees using the safe harbor. We first note that such an argument is much more appropriate in the context of an equal protection challenge because it challenges the reason a legislature subjected one group to a particular policy, but not another. Second, denying certain individuals a benefit that had not previously existed is not an imposition of punishment. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367. To be sure, a plaintiff need not be entitled to the benefit denied her by a bill of attainder. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965) (holding that a law barring Communist Party members from offices in labor unions is a bill of attainder). But the benefit at issue must have been in some way available to the plaintiff before the enactment of the law being challenged. Because the safe harbor was never available to Plaintiffs in the first place, they cannot claim they have been punished by being excluded from AB 1513's protections.
Viewing the effect of AB 1513's carve-outs functionally, we conclude AB 1513's carve-outs do not impose punishment upon Plaintiffs. Because punishment is a necessary element of a bill of attainder, the district court properly dismissed this claim.
The district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' equal protection claim, but correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' bill of attainder claim. We
Each party shall bear its own costs.