Filed: Jun. 29, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 29 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KIM KERRIGAN, No. 17-35174 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01528-JCC v. MEMORANDUM* QUALSTAR CREDIT UNION; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 12, 2018** Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. Kim Kerrig
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 29 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KIM KERRIGAN, No. 17-35174 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01528-JCC v. MEMORANDUM* QUALSTAR CREDIT UNION; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 12, 2018** Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. Kim Kerriga..
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 29 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KIM KERRIGAN, No. 17-35174
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01528-JCC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
QUALSTAR CREDIT UNION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2018**
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Kim Kerrigan appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing her
action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Washington state law claims
arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Paul,
547 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th
Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Kerrigan’s quiet title claim because
Kerrigan failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the statute of limitations bars
any threatened foreclosure action. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.28.300 (providing for
quiet title action by record owner of real estate where an action to foreclose on a
mortgage or deed of trust on the real estate would be barred by the statute of
limitations); Edmundson v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
378 P.3d 272, 276-77 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2016) (stating that “the deed of trust foreclosure remedy is subject to a six-
year statute of limitations” and “when recovery is sought on an obligation payable
by installments, the statute of limitations runs against each installment from the
time it becomes due”); Bingham v. Lechner,
45 P.3d 562, 566-68 (Wash. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that the commencement of a nonjudicial foreclosure tolls the statute
of limitations).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kerrigan’s request
for certification to the Washington Supreme Court because Kerrigan failed to show
that Washington law regarding whether a nonjudicial foreclosure tolls the statute of
limitations for reinstituting foreclosure “has not been clearly determined.” Wash.
Rev. Code § 2.60.020; see
Thompson, 547 F.3d at 1059 (standard of review);
Bingham, 45 P.3d at 566-68.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kerrigan’s request
for leave to amend the complaint because amendment would be futile. See
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to
amend is permitted when amendment would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kerrigan’s Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) motion because Kerrigan did not establish
any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,
5
F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds
for relief under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b)).
We reject as meritless Kerrigan’s contention that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (granting
jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal law).
AFFIRMED.
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