Filed: Nov. 05, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 5 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT D.C., a minor by and through his Guardian No. 18-55853 Ad Litem, Helen Garter, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-01868-MMA-NLS Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Michael M. Anello, Senior Di
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 5 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT D.C., a minor by and through his Guardian No. 18-55853 Ad Litem, Helen Garter, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-01868-MMA-NLS Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Michael M. Anello, Senior Dis..
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 5 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
D.C., a minor by and through his Guardian No. 18-55853
Ad Litem, Helen Garter, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, D.C. No.
3:15-cv-01868-MMA-NLS
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Michael M. Anello, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 16, 2019
Pasadena, California
Before: NGUYEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and VITALIANO,** District
Judge.
D.C., on his own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, brought
this action against the County of San Diego, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
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of his constitutional rights. He now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
to certify a liability-only class.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e)
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), and we affirm.
D.C. contends that determination of the question of liability on the claims he
seeks to advance could fit comfortably within the ambit of Rule 23(c)(4). See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Notwithstanding any success D.C. might have in advancing
liability-only class claims against the County—and his burden has very likely been
lightened by our decision in Mann v. County of San Diego,
907 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2018)—certification of such a class would be “appropriate” only if the adjudication
of the certified issues would “significantly advance the resolution of the underlying
case, thereby achieving judicial economy and efficiency.” Valentino v. Carter-
Wallace, Inc.,
97 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996).
Consideration of D.C.’s request for certification of a liability-only class
cannot be divorced from the impact the certification decision might have on the
resolution of class claims. In his complaint, D.C. alleges that he and other putative
class members suffered damages for, inter alia, emotional distress, humiliation, and
loss of “human dignity” resulting from the County’s overly intrusive physical
1
D.C.’s motion for certification of a liability-only class under Rule 23(c)(4)
followed the district court’s earlier denial of certification to his proposed Rule
23(b)(3) class. The latter determination is not before us on this appeal.
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examinations of them. The district court found that, regardless of any resolution of
issues a liability-only class might afford, individualized injuries of each class
member would still potentially require tens of thousands of trials. It was
appropriate for the district court to bring its practical assessment and broader
perspective to its consideration of D.C.’s request for certification of a liability-only
class.
Although we are, of course, mindful that individualized questions of
damages cannot alone defeat class certification, Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc.,
716
F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 2013), plaintiffs seeking certification must nevertheless
carry their burden of showing damages are capable of efficient calculation.
Id. at
514; see also Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013) (damages must
only be “capable of measurement on a classwide basis” to promote the efficient
resolution of the class action for certification) (emphasis added); Nguyen v. Nissan
N. Am., Inc.,
932 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2019).
The district court correctly recognized and applied this standard in
considering D.C.’s request for certification of a Rule 23(c)(4) liability-only class,
finding, within the bounds of its discretion, that D.C. failed to show that damages
could be efficiently calculated on a classwide basis following success in the
liability phase of the litigation. Based on its finding that certification of a liability-
only class would not significantly advance the resolution of the class claims, the
3
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying D.C.’s motion for certification
of a liability-only class.
AFFIRMED.
4