Filed: Jan. 14, 2020
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 14 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOHAMMED MOSTAFA ALTAYAR, No. 17-73308 AKA Mohammed Mastafa Majid, 18-71754 Petitioner, Agency No. A212-377-363 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted October 24, 2019 San Francisco, California Before: WALLACE and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,**
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 14 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOHAMMED MOSTAFA ALTAYAR, No. 17-73308 AKA Mohammed Mastafa Majid, 18-71754 Petitioner, Agency No. A212-377-363 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted October 24, 2019 San Francisco, California Before: WALLACE and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,** ..
More
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 14 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MOHAMMED MOSTAFA ALTAYAR, No. 17-73308
AKA Mohammed Mastafa Majid, 18-71754
Petitioner, Agency No. A212-377-363
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted October 24, 2019
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,** District Judge.
Mohammed Mostafa Altayar filed petitions for review of two Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) orders (1) dismissing his appeal challenging his
removability, the denial of asylum and withholding of removal, and the denial of
relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT); and (2) denying his motion to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
reopen. In a published opinion issued concurrently with this memorandum
disposition, we held that Altayar’s Arizona conviction for aggravated assault under
A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2) constitutes a crime involving moral
turpitude, rendering him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). We now
reject the remainder of Altayar’s arguments and deny his petitions for review.
The BIA did not err in concluding that Altayar was convicted of a
“particularly serious crime,” rendering him ineligible for asylum and withholding of
removal. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). “We have jurisdiction
to review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s conclusion that an offense constitutes a
particularly serious crime,” but “[o]ur review is limited to ensuring that the agency
relied on the appropriate factors and proper evidence to reach this conclusion.”
Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch,
800 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotations and
alterations omitted). The relevant factors for consideration are “described in the
BIA’s decision in Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1982), [which]
requires the agency to ask whether the nature of the conviction, the underlying facts
and circumstances and the sentence imposed justify the presumption that the
convicted immigrant is a danger to the community.”
Id. (quotations omitted).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in this case and did not rely upon any
improper factors. Agreeing with the Immigration Judge, the BIA found that Altayar
had committed a particularly serious crime because he “drew his gun in response to
2
an attack, but then continued to wield this weapon and to chase, and then threaten at
gunpoint, the person who had punched him,” “well after any threat to [Altayar]
remained.” (The facts surrounding Altayar’s conviction are explained in more detail
in our published opinion.) Altayar argues the BIA improperly credited the
presentence investigation report over his testimony and that of his brother. But the
BIA did not abuse its discretion in crediting that report over Altayar’s and his
brother’s self-serving statements, and “[w]e may not reweigh the evidence and reach
our own determination about the crime’s seriousness.”
Avendano-Hernandez, 800
F.3d at 1077.
We turn next to the BIA’s denial of CAT relief, which we review for
substantial evidence. Yali Wang v. Sessions,
861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017).
Under this deferential standard, the IJ’s “[f]actual findings are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
Id. at 1007
(quotations omitted). Based on the record, no evidence would “compel[]” a
“reasonable adjudicator,”
id., to conclude that Altayar would more likely than not be
tortured at the government’s instigation or with its consent if he is removed to Iraq.
See Garcia-Milian v. Holder,
755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014).
Finally, we review the BIA’s denial of Altayar’s motion to reopen for an abuse
of discretion, see De Martinez v. Ashcroft,
374 F.3d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 2004), and
find none. Although Altayar attempted to introduce a declaration from a human
3
rights researcher that had been filed in another case, the BIA could permissibly
decline to reopen proceedings on the ground that the information in this declaration
could have been presented earlier. See Najmabadi v. Holder,
597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th
Cir. 2010). Although the declaration was signed several months after Altayar’s
hearing, the material events described in the declaration occurred before the hearing.
See Goel v. Gonzales,
490 F.3d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“Because this
report also concerns events that occurred well before the IJ hearing, and there is also
no reason why Goel could not have obtained and presented this evidence to the IJ,
this report cannot qualify as evidence that was previously unavailable either.”). The
BIA also determined that the researcher’s statements in his declaration concerning
recent events would not have changed the result in this case, and Altayar identifies
no error in that determination. The BIA similarly did not abuse its discretion in
declining to reopen based on allegedly new information about the criminal histories
of certain witnesses to Altayar’s offense, on the ground that these histories were
immaterial.
We have carefully reviewed Altayar’s other contentions and have concluded
they are without merit. Altayar’s petitions for review are therefore DENIED.
4