Filed: Jul. 08, 2020
Latest Update: Jul. 08, 2020
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 8 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARK ANTHONY HAZELTON, No. 18-16795 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02650-GMS v. MEMORANDUM* ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding Submitted on July 6, 2020** Before: GOODWIN, SCHROEDER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Jud
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 8 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARK ANTHONY HAZELTON, No. 18-16795 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02650-GMS v. MEMORANDUM* ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding Submitted on July 6, 2020** Before: GOODWIN, SCHROEDER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judg..
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 8 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARK ANTHONY HAZELTON, No. 18-16795
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02650-GMS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted on July 6, 2020**
Before: GOODWIN, SCHROEDER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Mark Anthony Hazelton appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Hazelton’s application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review the district court’s affirmance of the administrative law judge’s
(“ALJ”) decision de novo and will “reverse only if the ALJ’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.”
Molina v. Astrue,
674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “Where
evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s
conclusion that must be upheld.” Burch v. Barnhart,
400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.
2005).
I. The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial
evidence, to reject Hazelton’s testimony about the severity of his symptoms. See
Garrison v. Colvin,
759 F.3d 995, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2014). First, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Hazelton’s testimony was not
corroborated by the objective medical evidence. See
Burch, 400 F.3d at 681
(holding an ALJ may consider a lack of corroborating medical evidence as one
factor in the credibility determination). The ALJ interpreted the whole record (a) to
find that Hazelton suffers from degenerative disk disease, (b) but did not establish
the severity of symptoms alleged. Even if some evidence could be read differently,
that interpretation appears rational. See
id. at 679. For example, Hazelton points to
various medical records that indicate he “ambulates with antalgic gait,” but, as
highlighted by the ALJ, numerous other medical records indicate he had normal
strength, coordination, ranges of motion, and gait. Therefore, we must uphold the
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ALJ’s “rational interpretation.”
Id.
Second, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Hazelton’s
symptom testimony was inconsistent with his history of conservative and effective
treatment. See Tommasetti v. Astrue,
533 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008)
(where claimant “responded favorably to conservative treatment,” ALJ properly
discounted subjective reports of disabling pain). The record contains multiple
records indicating that Hazelton’s symptoms were alleviated through medications
and injections. One medical record indicates Hazelton even reported 80% relief
following lumbar injections.
Further, despite Hazelton’s arguments to the contrary, the record supports the
ALJ’s reasonable interpretation that the treatments were “conservative.” For
example, Dr. Gordon’s treatments notes indicated that Hazelton had “attempted
multiple conservative therapies in the past such as physical therapy, steroid
injections, nerve blocks, nerve ablation, activities modification, over-the-counter
anti-inflammatories, prescription anti-inflammatories and narcotic pain
medication.” (emphasis added).
Third, although the ALJ may have erred in finding Hazelton’s testimony
inconsistent with his daily activities, any error was harmless in light of the other
valid reasons to discredit the testimony. See
Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13, 1115 (an
ALJ may discount symptom testimony as contradicted by daily activities or if daily
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activities indicate capacities transferable to a work setting; any error is harmless
where it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination).
II. The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons to reject the controverted
opinion of treating physician Dr. Whitaker. Where a treating physician’s opinion is
controverted by the opinion of another physician, an ALJ must provide “specific
and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence” to reject the
opinion See Trevizo v. Berryhill,
871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted). The ALJ gave Dr. Whitaker’s opinion that Hazelton could not work full
time and was disabled by pain little weight, because it was unsupported by the
medical record and inconsistent with conservative treatment. As explained above,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that the medical record did not
establish such severe limitations and that Hazelton had received conservative and
effective treatment. Thus, the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Whitaker’s
opinion. See Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.
2004) (an ALJ may discount a medical opinion that is not supported by the record
as a whole or by objective medical findings).
Similarly, the ALJ did not err in assigning significant weight to the opinion
of examining physician Dr. Gordon, because the ALJ properly considered the
requisite factors and explained how they weighed in favor of Dr. Gordon’s
opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (factors ALJ should consider in weighing
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medical opinions, including whether the opinion is consistent with the record as a
whole and is supported by objective evidence, and whether the opining physician
has a specialization in the pertinent field); Thomas v. Barnhart,
278 F.3d 947, 957
(9th Cir. 2002) (“The opinions of non-treating . . . physicians may also serve as
substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical
findings or other evidence of record.”).
AFFIRMED.
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