Filed: Feb. 07, 2020
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 7 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CANTRAN GROUP, INC., a California No. 18-56545 corporation, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellant, 2:18-cv-02044-R-RAO v. MEMORANDUM* CUPS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; SMA GROUP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; THE BRIAD GROUP, a registerd service mark; THE BRIAD RESTRAURANT GROUP, LLC, a New Jersey limited liability company, Defendants-Appellees. A
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 7 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CANTRAN GROUP, INC., a California No. 18-56545 corporation, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellant, 2:18-cv-02044-R-RAO v. MEMORANDUM* CUPS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; SMA GROUP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; THE BRIAD GROUP, a registerd service mark; THE BRIAD RESTRAURANT GROUP, LLC, a New Jersey limited liability company, Defendants-Appellees. Ap..
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 7 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CANTRAN GROUP, INC., a California No. 18-56545
corporation,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellant, 2:18-cv-02044-R-RAO
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CUPS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company; SMA GROUP, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; THE BRIAD
GROUP, a registerd service mark; THE
BRIAD RESTRAURANT GROUP, LLC, a
New Jersey limited liability company,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 4, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and WARDLAW and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Cantran Group, Inc. appeals from the district court’s judgment of dismissal
with prejudice as a sanction for failure to timely oppose defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)
motions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing for abuse of
discretion, see Ghazali v. Moran,
46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), we
reverse and remand.
While district courts have broad discretion to enforce local rules, see
Delange v. Dutra Constr. Co.,
183 F.3d 916, 919 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam),
before dismissing an action as a sanction for noncompliance with those rules, a
court is required to consider five factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious
resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of
prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases of
their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.”
Id. (quoting
Henderson v. Duncan,
779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)).
The public’s interest in expeditious litigation plays only a negligible role
here because resolving the motions on the merits would have required, at most, a
brief continuance of the scheduled hearing date.
A plaintiff’s willful impairment of a district court’s docket management
supports a dismissal sanction, see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Nat. Beverage Distribs.,
69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995), but the district court’s finding that Cantran
engaged in a “pattern of repeated [filing] errors and local rule violations”
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suggesting “more than mere inadvertence” is unsupported by the record. Cantran
had no history of delay and promptly corrected deficiencies in its filings that the
district court flagged. The district court improperly struck the amended complaint
Cantran filed on June 4, 2018, on the basis that it required the court’s leave. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
While Cantran’s untimely opposition briefs left defendants with less than a
day to respond, the district court failed to consider sanctions less drastic than
dismissal—such as extending defendants’ time to respond or striking the
opposition briefs—that would have resulted in no prejudice to defendants.
Moreover, the public policy favoring resolution of disputes on their merits is
particularly strong at the pleadings stage where, as here, the plaintiff has no history
of dilatory tactics and the delay is only one week. See Raiford v. Pounds,
640 F.2d
944, 945 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Tolbert v. Leighton,
623 F.2d 585, 587 (9th
Cir. 1980). Ghazali, which involved a post-pleadings dismissal sanction in the
face of the plaintiff’s failure to respond to discovery requests, is inapposite.
Under these circumstances, the district court’s dismissal sanction was an
abuse of discretion. On remand, the district court should consider the merits of
defendants’ motions to dismiss.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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