Filed: Aug. 17, 2020
Latest Update: Aug. 17, 2020
Summary: FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 17 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-10198 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:18-cr-08230-SPL-1 v. SILAS DESWOOD YAZZIE, MEMORANDUM* Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 13, 2020** San Francisco, California Before: GRABER and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and D
Summary: FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 17 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-10198 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:18-cr-08230-SPL-1 v. SILAS DESWOOD YAZZIE, MEMORANDUM* Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 13, 2020** San Francisco, California Before: GRABER and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and DA..
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FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
AUG 17 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-10198
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:18-cr-08230-SPL-1
v.
SILAS DESWOOD YAZZIE, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 13, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and DAWSON,*** District Judge.
Defendant Silas Yazzie timely appeals his jury conviction for assault with a
dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 113(a)(3), and misdemeanor
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.
simple assault, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 113(a)(5). We affirm.
1. The district court permissibly allowed joinder of the three counts under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) because the offenses were of the "same or
similar character." See United States v. Jawara,
474 F.3d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 2007)
(stating standard of review). The indictment alleged that two counts were identical
statutory offenses, that the deadly weapon used on both occasions was a knife, and
that the offenses took place only two weeks apart. Even if joinder was improper,
Defendant cannot show "actual prejudice." United States v. Terry,
911 F.2d 272,
277 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court properly
instructed the jury to consider the charges separately, and the jury acquitted
Defendant of one count, demonstrating that it was able to keep each offense
compartmentalized. See
Jawara, 474 F.3d at 580 (noting that a court’s jury
instruction to deliberate on the elements of each charge separately "militates
against a finding of prejudice" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by also denying the motion to
sever under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a). See United States v. Lewis,
787 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating standard of review), amended on
denial of reh'g,
798 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1986) . Because Defendant cannot show
that joinder prejudiced him under Rule 8(a)’s less demanding "actual prejudice"
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standard, he cannot show "manifest prejudice" under Rule 14(a).
Jawara, 474 F.3d
at 579, 581.
2. The district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.
See United States v. Price,
921 F.3d 777, 790 (9th Cir. 2019) (stating standard of
review). Defendant’s interactions with officers at the gas station did not constitute
a Fourth Amendment "seizure." Officer Mann approached Defendant calmly,
identified himself, asked some general questions at first, and then asked about the
reported assault. See Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) ("[M]ere police
questioning does not constitute a seizure."). Defendant was not physically
restrained during the conversation, and he produced the knife voluntarily, without
prompting from the officers. Mann stayed several feet away from Defendant
during their conversation. Although another officer was present, he was behind
Mann on the radio. Under those circumstances, a reasonable person would have
felt free “to disregard the police and go about his business.”
Id. (quoting
California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)); see, e.g. United States v.
Orman,
486 F.3d 1170, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an officer’s brief,
polite questioning in a public setting was not a seizure even though another officer
was also present).
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For the same reasons, Defendant’s conversation with Mann was not a
custodial interrogation implicating the Fifth Amendment. See United States v.
Bassignani,
575 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2009) ("A defendant is in custody if a
reasonable innocent person in such circumstances would conclude that after brief
questioning he or she would not be free to leave." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s
motion for a mistrial. See United States v. Marsh,
894 F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating standard of review). The prosecutor’s improper comment during
closing argument was an isolated remark. The court sustained defense counsel’s
objection to the statement and immediately instructed the jury to disregard the
prosecutor’s argument. The court’s instructions cured any possible prejudice to
Defendant. See
id. ("A trial judge may cure the effect of improper
comments . . . by giving appropriate curative instructions to the jury." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
4. Finally, the district court did not plainly err by allowing Mann to identify
Defendant in the surveillance video images. See United States v. Mendoza-Paz,
286 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating standard of review). Mann knew
Defendant as a member of the community and saw him on the night of the incident
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that the images depicted. Thus, even if it was error to admit the lay opinion
testimony, it was not plain error. See United States v. Henderson,
241 F.3d 638,
651 (9th Cir. 2000) (ruling officer’s lay opinion identification admissible where
officer had seen the defendant in attire similar to that worn by the robber in the
surveillance photos).
AFFIRMED.
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