Filed: May 12, 2020
Latest Update: May 12, 2020
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 12 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHEKESHA RENEE SHELTON, No. 19-15989 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:18-cv-00187-JGZ v. MEMORANDUM* TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee, and TONYA STROZIER, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 6, 2020** Before: BERZON, N.R. SMITH, and MILLER,
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 12 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHEKESHA RENEE SHELTON, No. 19-15989 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:18-cv-00187-JGZ v. MEMORANDUM* TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee, and TONYA STROZIER, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 6, 2020** Before: BERZON, N.R. SMITH, and MILLER, C..
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 12 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHEKESHA RENEE SHELTON, No. 19-15989
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:18-cv-00187-JGZ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
TONYA STROZIER,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 6, 2020**
Before: BERZON, N.R. SMITH, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Shekesha Renee Shelton appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
judgment in her employment action alleging claims under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (“PDA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,
642 F.3d 728,
736 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Shelton
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Tucson Unified
School District’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Shelton’s
November 2015 and May 2016 evaluation scores, and its failure to accommodate
Shelton’s request for coverage to express breast milk on May 19, 2016, were
pretextual. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
575 U.S. 206, 228-30 (2015)
(setting forth burden-shifting framework for PDA claims).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shelton’s motion to
amend the complaint because Shelton failed to comply with the local rules. See
Bias v. Moynihan,
508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that this court gives “[b]road deference” to district court’s
interpretation of its local rules); D. Ariz. Loc. R. 15.1(a).
We reject as without merit Shelton’s contention that the district court’s grant
of summary judgment violated her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. See
Johnson v. Neilson (In re Slatkin),
525 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]
summary judgment proceeding does not deprive the losing party of its Seventh
2 19-15989
Amendment right to a jury trial.”).
AFFIRMED.
3 19-15989