Filed: Jun. 16, 2020
Latest Update: Jun. 16, 2020
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 16 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-50202 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:19-cr-00965-L-1 v. MEMORANDUM* CARLOS EFREN AHEDO-AGUILAR, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California M. James Lorenz, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 1, 2020** Pasadena, California Before: CALLAHAN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judg
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 16 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-50202 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:19-cr-00965-L-1 v. MEMORANDUM* CARLOS EFREN AHEDO-AGUILAR, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California M. James Lorenz, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 1, 2020** Pasadena, California Before: CALLAHAN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judge..
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 16 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-50202
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:19-cr-00965-L-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CARLOS EFREN AHEDO-AGUILAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
M. James Lorenz, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 1, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and R. COLLINS,***
District Judge.
Appellant Carlos Ahedo-Aguilar was arrested and convicted on a charge of
illegal re-entry, 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Appellant appeals the district court’s decision to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
sentence him to eight months in custody followed by three years of supervised
release. Appellant claims that the district court improperly calculated his criminal
history score where it added criminal history points based on one of his prior
convictions and a subsequent probation revocation. This calculation resulted in a
higher sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“Sentencing Guidelines”). Additionally, Appellant asserts that the district court
abused its discretion under the Sentencing Guidelines by imposing three years of
supervised release when he is likely to be deported. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing the district court’s
sentencing decision for abuse of discretion, United States v. Gasca-Ruiz,
852 F.3d
1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), we affirm.
I. Appellant’s challenge to the custodial sentence fails for lack of prejudice.
First, Appellant argues that his eight-month custodial sentence was the result
of the district court’s improper calculation of his criminal history category under
§4A1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Under the district court’s calculation,
Appellant fell under criminal history category III. Consequently, Appellant’s
Guidelines Range, based on the district court’s calculation, was twenty-four to
thirty months in custody. Appellant contends that this calculation is incorrect and
proffers his own. Under Appellant’s calculation, his Guidelines Range was
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supposed to be between eight and fourteen months. Ultimately, the district court
sentenced Appellant to eight months in custody.
Generally, “[a]ll sentencing proceedings are to begin by determining the
applicable Guidelines range.” United States v. Carty,
520 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc). The Guidelines “range must be calculated correctly” and “[i]t
would be procedural error for a district court to fail to calculate—or to calculate
incorrectly—the Guidelines range.” United States v. Hammons,
558 F.3d 1100,
1105 (9th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting
Carty, 520 F.3d at 991, 993).
However, “[t]here may be instances when, despite application of an erroneous
Guidelines range, a reasonable probability of prejudice does not exist.” Molina-
Martinez v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016). The sentencing process is
unique for each defendant, “and a reviewing court must consider the facts and
circumstances of the case before it.”
Id. (citing United States v. Davila,
133 S. Ct.
2139, 2149 (2013) (“Our essential point is that particular facts and circumstances
matter.”)).
Assuming, but not deciding, that the district court calculated Appellant’s
Guidelines Range incorrectly, the custodial sentence the district court issued fell at
the low end of Appellant’s own sentencing calculation. Furthermore, the particular
facts of this case indicate that the custodial sentence was not a factor in the district
court’s decision to sentence Appellant to three years of supervised release.
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Appellant thus fails to show any prejudice suffered from the district court’s
Guidelines Range calculation.
Id. Consequently, the challenge to Appellant’s
custodial term fails.
II. Appellant’s challenge to the length of supervised release also fails.
Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion in imposing
three years of supervised release because the Sentencing Guidelines suggest that
“[t]he court ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release in a case in
which supervised release is not required by statute and the defendant is a
deportable alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. §
5D1.1(c) (emphasis added). There is no dispute that Appellant is a deportable
alien. Application Note 5 of the Sentencing Guidelines § 5D1.1 states that courts
should “consider imposing a term of supervised release on such a defendant if the
court determines it would provide an added measure of deterrence and protection
based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” See also United States v.
Valdavinos-Torres,
704 F.3d 679, 693 (9th Cir. 2012).
Here, the district court provided a particularized explanation justifying the
imposition of supervised release when it listed Appellant’s aggravating and
mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
The district court noted the length of Appellant’s criminal history from 2002 to
2019 as an aggravating factor. Next, the district court noted that Appellant’s
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criminal history was old, and Appellant appeared to have rehabilitated himself
after his past violent crimes. Finally, the district court noted that, while Appellant’s
criminal history was old, he did attempt to illegally re-enter the United States
numerous times. Ultimately, the district court decided that because of Appellant’s
attempts to re-enter the country illegally, the added safeguard of supervised release
was necessary despite the suggestion of Sentencing Guideline § 5D1.1(c).
Lastly, it is well established that the Sentencing Guidelines are merely
advisory. See United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). The district court
was not bound by the suggestions of the Sentencing Guidelines as Appellant
suggests. Consequently, Appellant’s challenge to the imposition of supervised
release fails.
AFFIRMED.
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