Filed: Dec. 18, 2020
Latest Update: Dec. 19, 2020
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 18 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEOBARDO JIMENEZ-DOMINGUEZ, No. 20-70207
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-274-719
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted December 10, 2020
Seattle, Washington
Before: BERZON, MILLER, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Leobardo Jimenez-Dominguez, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review
of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming an immigration judge’s
denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1),
and we deny the petition.
1. Jimenez-Dominguez seeks review of the Board’s denial of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
withholding of removal based on his membership in two proposed social groups:
(1) his biological family and (2) “property owners in Santo Domingo Yosonama,”
Mexico. Jimenez-Dominguez contends “that he will be extorted, kidnapped, and
killed just like his three cousins . . . because he is a member of their extended
family and because he co-owns property in Santo Domingo Yosonama.” Jimenez-
Dominguez does not claim that he suffered past persecution, so he must
demonstrate “a clear probability of future persecution.” Tamang v. Holder, 598
F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). He must also show that the feared persecution has
a nexus to a protected ground. Garay Reyes v. Lynch,
842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3,
1136 (9th Cir. 2016).
Substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s finding, adopted by
the Board, that Jimenez-Dominguez did not establish a nexus between the feared
persecution and membership in his biological family. Jimenez-Dominguez does
not know who killed his cousins, and he testified that he believed his cousins were
attacked because they owned land—not because they belonged to his biological
family. In addition, members of Jimenez-Dominguez’s immediate family currently
live in Mexico and have not been threatened or subjected to mistreatment. Cf.
Tamang, 598 F.3d at 1094; Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey,
542 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir.
2008), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder,
707 F.3d 1081
(9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The record does not contain “direct or circumstantial”
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evidence sufficient to compel the conclusion that Jimenez-Dominguez will more
likely than not be targeted for persecution on account of his biological family. INS
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483–84 (1992). Because Jimenez-Dominguez did
not demonstrate a nexus between any threat of harm and his membership in his
biological family, we need not consider the Board’s alternative holding that his
family is not cognizable as a particular social group.
Substantial evidence also supports the immigration judge’s finding, adopted
by the Board, that Jimenez-Dominguez did not establish a nexus between the
feared persecution and his status as a property owner. Jimenez-Dominguez co-
owns a house in Santo Domingo Yosonama and claims that his home ownership
will enmesh him in a violent dispute in the area over adjoining agricultural lands.
Jimenez-Dominguez does not own agricultural land, however, and did not
demonstrate that his home ownership puts him at risk of future persecution.
Although Jimenez-Dominguez claims that his cousins were threatened and killed
because they were landowners, he does not share that characteristic. See Flores
Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2015) (petitioner, unlike his
father, “did not engage in proselytizing efforts,” so was unlikely to be persecuted
on account of his religion). Nor does the record compel the conclusion that
Jimenez-Dominguez will more likely than not be forced to fight against the rival
town due to his home ownership. See Movsisian v. Ashcroft,
395 F.3d 1095, 1097
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(9th Cir. 2005). Finally, the Board’s characterization of the proposed social group
as “landowners” rather than “property owners” is immaterial, as the Board
correctly recognized that Jimenez-Dominguez “fears returning to Mexico due to
his ownership of a home,” which lacks a nexus to “the local dispute about
agricultural land.”
2. Jimenez-Dominguez seeks protection under the Convention Against
Torture based on his fear of “cartels and criminal groups” and his fear that “he will
be killed like his cousins once he takes up residence in the house he co-owns with
his long-term partner.” To qualify for relief, “an alien must establish that ‘it is
more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed
country of removal.’” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir.
2014) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). And “the torture must be ‘inflicted by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.’”
Id. (quoting Zheng v. Ashcroft,
332 F.3d
1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Jimenez-Dominguez
“is not likely to face torture by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official . . . upon repatriation to Mexico.” Jimenez-
Dominguez’s generalized country-conditions evidence is insufficient to
demonstrate that he will more likely than not be tortured with the acquiescence of
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government officials. Garcia-Milian, 755 F.3d at 1034–35; Delgado-Ortiz v.
Holder,
600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010). And Jimenez-Dominguez’s further
claim that local police failed to properly investigate the death of his cousins is
likewise insufficient to demonstrate government acquiescence.
Garcia-Milian, 755
F.3d at 1034.
3. Jimenez-Dominguez’s challenge to the agency’s jurisdiction based on
defects in his original notice to appear is foreclosed by our decisions in
Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2019), and Aguilar
Fermin v. Barr,
958 F.3d 887, 893–95 (9th Cir. 2020).
PETITION DENIED.
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