Maureen A. Tighe, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
Salomon Llanos ("Debtor" or "Plaintiff") purchased the real property located at 23741 Burton St., Canoga Park, CA 91304 (the "Property") in June 1992. In July 2007, Debtor obtained a second position mortgage from Citibank, N.A. (the "Mortgage"). The alleged actions by Citibank and the subsequent transferees and servicers of the Mortgage form the basis for this adversary action.
Debtor fell behind on the Mortgage on the Mortgage beginning around 2014. On October 4, 2016, Debtor received a letter (the "Reinstatement Letter") from National Default Servicing Corporation on behalf of Citimortgage, Inc. (Citimortgage apparently held the mortgage after Citibank). The Reinstatement Letter stated that Debtor could reinstate his mortgage loan by paying a total of $86,073.10 to cure the default. Debtor made a payment of $86,073.10 on October 10. Debtor alleges that Citibank failed to apply the reinstatement amount to arrears, and instead applied the payment to principal.
The Mortgage was subsequently purchased by Waterfall Victoria Grantor Trust II around May 2017.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. "A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a `lack of a cognizable legal theory' or `the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'"
In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.
The complaint contains ten claims against some or all the defendants. Many of those claims, however, have been voluntarily dismissed.
Citi argues that Debtor should be judicially estopped from asserting claims against Citi or the other defendants because Debtor provided for Cascade/Statesbridge's claim in the now-confirmed chapter 13 plan but made no mention of the litigation claims in Debtor's schedules. Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position.
Citi argues that Debtor's claims under the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act ("RESPA") and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") are preempted by bankruptcy law, citing
As stated in
Debtor's first claim is under the RESPA against all defendants for violations of 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)-(m) and related regulations 12 C.F.R. § 1024.37 for alleged wrongdoing in connection to force-placed insurance. This claim was voluntarily dismissed as against Statebridge and Cascade, ECF. Doc. 17 12:13-19, but remains as against Citi.
Title 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f) creates a cause of action for individuals to recover A) actual damages caused by violations of that section, and B) up to $2,000 in damages in cases where a pattern or practice of noncompliance is shown. Debtor has alleged that Citi violated 12 U.S.C. § 2605 by purchasing unnecessary force-placed insurance and charging Debtor for that insurance "on at least three (3) occasions."
Citi argues that Debtor's first cause of action fails because Debtor has failed to allege sufficient facts for the Court to determine when the insurance policies were issued—specifically, whether the insurance policies were issued before January 10,
First, neither the statement by Ms. Fawns nor Citi's factual allegations regarding the dates that the policy was implemented can be considered for purposes of this 12(b)(6) motion. Ms. Fawns' statement that the funds have been reimbursed contradicts allegations in the complaint at ¶ 82, which the Court assumes to be true for purposes of this motion. The complaint also alleges that force-placed insurance was purchased by Citi in 2016,
The Court agrees with Debtor that the factual arguments raised by Citi are best reserved for summary judgment. Debtor has stated a plausible claim under 12 U.S.C. § 2605 against Citi for improperly purchasing force-placed insurance on the Property.
Debtor's second claim is against Statebridge for violation of RESPA regulation 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(d) regarding failure to acknowledge receipt of Debtor's first "Notice of Error" letter ("NOE #1").
Under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(d), a servicer must acknowledge a Notice of Error letter within five days of receipt. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(d). A servicer then has thirty days from the receipt of the letter to adequately investigate and respond to a borrower in writing. The response must state that no error has been discovered or that the error has been remedied. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(e). A servicer may also request a fifteen-day extension if the request is made within thirty days of receiving the Notice of Error letter. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(e)(3)(ii).
Debtor sent Statebridge NOE #1 on October 2, 2018.
Debtor asserts that Statesbridge's failure to acknowledge its receipt of NOE #1 within five days of receiving it on October 10 is a violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(d). The complaint states that Statesbridge had until October 17, 2018 to acknowledge receipt of NOE #1, but it did not do so until November 19.
Statesbridge asserts in its Motion to Dismiss that it sent an acknowledgement letter on October 11, 2018, well within the statutory timeframe. Statesbridge filed a declaration by Kristin Fawns to support this allegation and attaches a number of documents including what it alleges is the acknowledgment letter sent to Debtor on
Generally speaking, courts consider only the contents of the complaint when deciding a motion under FRCP 12(b)(6). However, a court may consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
Ms. Fawns' declaration indicating that Statebridge sent an acknowledgement letter on October 11,
The facts here mirror those in
The Court must assume the truth of the allegations of the complaint, which asserts that Statebridge did not acknowledge receipt of NOE #1 until November 19, 2018.
Debtor's third claim is the similar theory as the second claim, but with respect to a Notice of Error letter sent to Statebridge dated February 12, 2019 and delivered February 19, 2019 ("NOE #3"
In its Motion to Dismiss, Statebridge claims that it responded to Debtor with a letter dated March 12, 2019, explaining that two of the referenced payments were rejected for non-sufficient funds and one of the checks was accepted. Statebridge attaches copies of the response letter to the Declaration of Kristin Fawns in support of the Motion to Dismiss.
This argument by Cascade has the same deficiency as the response to NOE #1. Debtor questions whether the response to NOE #3 was actually mailed timely. The Court will construe this, combined with paragraph 140 of the complaint, as a claim that neither Debtor nor Debtor's counsel received the March 12 letter attached to Ms. Fawns' declaration. Cascade responds that Debtor is attempting to make a semantic distinction between the words "sent" and "mailed." That distinction is irrelevant here, as the Court must assume the truth of the allegation in paragraph 140 of the complaint that "[t]o date, neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's Counsel has received this response [to NOE #3]." Debtor's complaint does not "necessarily rely" on the March 12 response letter and Debtor appears to dispute its authenticity by questioning whether it was in fact sent to Debtor.
To be clear, if Debtor is attempting to play words games to avoid admitting that he received the March 12 response letter, the third cause of action will fail and Debtor may be subject to sanctions for making a false allegation in paragraph 140 of the complaint. The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to the third cause of action.
The Fourth claim alleges that Statebridge failed to acknowledge a Notice of Error sent by Debtor on February 20, 2019 ("NOE #4"
The fifth cause of action asserts that all defendants have failed to
Debtor's fundamental dispute with respect to the Mortgage is that the defendants maintained that the that the mortgage was significantly in arrears, even after Debtor paid $86,073.10 pursuant to a reinstatement quote around October, 2016. NOE #3 is attached to the declaration of Kristin Fawns as exhibit D, and
These billing statements are significant because they seem to show that Debtor was several years behind on payments, despite having reinstated the loan less than eight months beforehand in October 2016. Cascade represented to this Court in connection with the objection to its claim that the entire delinquency Debtor complained of was accrued after April 2017, when Statebridge began servicing the loan. Neither accounting attached to the original or amended proofs of claim reflect that Statebridge asserted that Debtor was delinquent $50,000 in June 2017. One Statebridge employee allegedly informed Debtor in February 2018 that Citi "had erroneously applied the payment to principal rather than to the negative balance."
Statebridge's response to NOE #1 states that "[i]t appears that on April 16, 2018 Statebridge did adjust the payment to satisfy Mr. Llano's [sic] requests regarding how the funds from the prior reinstatement were applied to his account." Reviewing the accounting provided in response to NOE #1, Statebridge added $47,586 to the principal of Debtor's loan on April 16. The accounting does not show the amount overdue, as the billing statement does, but the Court assumes the truth of Debtor's assertion in NOE #3 that this adjustment in April 2018 corrected the issue of the pre-transfer delinquency.
Debtor asserts that whether Statesbridge's response to NOE #1, NOE #2, and NOE #3 are insufficient is a question of fact that should not be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage. Having reviewed the accountings provided by Statebridge, the Court agrees. Statebridge's responses were evasive and failed to address the underlying issue, which involved misapplication of a payment by the previous loan servicer. Statebridge's reply to the Motion to Dismiss states "there was no need to Statebridge to include additional history from the prior servicer, as the payment history provided began prior to the date of default, and clearly demonstrated the basis of Plaintiff's default." ECF Doc. 20 7:6-8. The problem with this statement is that there are fundamentally two defaults at issue: the first caused by servicer error as reflected in the June 26, 2017 billing statement, and the second caused by Debtor ceasing to pay the mortgage in response to the servicer error. Statebridge wants to focus on the second default, which is clear from the accountings provided to both the Debtor and the Court. The servicer error is omitted from all the accountings. Looking at the accountings, one would not know that Statebridge was telling Debtor that he was $50,000 in arrears in June 2017. Statebridge's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to the fifth cause of action.
Citi raises its own arguments in support of its Motion to Dismiss the fifth cause of action. Debtor sent separate notices of error to Citi, which he refers to as NOE #A, NOE #B, and NOE #C. Citi
12 C.F.R. § 1024.35.
The Sixth cause of action, like the fifth, alleges a failure to sufficiently respond to notices of error against all Defendants. There are no allegations against Citi in the sixth cause of action and any such claim would be outside the one-year limitation as to Citi, as described above. Citi's motion is therefore granted as to the sixth cause of action.
The sixth cause of action alleges that Statebridge "failed to accept three (3) payments from Plaintiff that confirmed to the written requirements to follow in making payments." However, in the accounting attached to the Response to NOE #1, the checks applied on June 1, 2017 and July 14, 2017 were clearly reversed and "NSF" fees were charged, which is common denotation of "non-sufficient funds." The third payment was received on July 6 and applied, with no apparent issue. Debtor has not stated a claim for violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(e) with respect to the three payments made by Debtor as Statebridge's response complied with the requirements of RESPA. Statebridge's motion is GRANTED as to the sixth cause of action.
Debtor has dismissed with prejudice all claims against Citi under cause of action seven. Debtor also admits that its allegations against Statebridge are outside the statute of limitations, but "believes that allegations exist that Statebridge's actions taken from April 2, 2018 through April 2, 2019 may violate" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e)(2) and (f). Debtor therefore requests time to replead the allegations under the FDCPA. The Court is not going to rule on allegations that are not before it. The allegations in the seventh cause of action fail to state a claim due to being beyond the statute of limitations. The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice as to those allegations. This ruling has no effect on additional claims that Debtor may have under the FDCPA within the statute of limitations.
Debtor has agreed to dismiss the eighth cause of action with prejudice as against all Defendants.
The Ninth cause of action asserts a quiet title claim against all Defendants. Debtor
Debtor's tenth cause of action objects to claim #1 filed by Cascade Funding. The Court has already ruled on Debtor's objection to claim. The tenth cause of action is therefore DISMISSED.
Cascade/Statebridge's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to the second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action and GRANTED as to the first, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action.
Citi's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to the first cause of action and GRANTED as to the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action.
7.
The "Draw Period" under the note is 10 years and 25 days from the date of the agreement, which was July 17, 2007. The Draw Period, during which the borrower needed only pay Finance Charges, therefore ended in August 2017. Beginning in September 2017, the Repayment Period, defined as the twenty years following the Draw Period, payments under the loan increased to interest plus 1/240th of the principal balance. In other words, Statebridge is correct that Debtor was liable for principal and interest payments beginning around September 2017. The Court ruled against the Debtor on the objection to claim because Debtor had not provided any clear grounds or theory for disputing the claimed arrears, but noted that the Debtor could bring another objection to claim if he could articulate the grounds more clearly.