DOLLY M. GEE, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Moroccanoil, Inc.'s January 31,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) provides that a court may enter default judgment and, if necessary to effectuate judgment, the court may conduct an accounting, determine the amount of damages, establish the truth of any allegation by evidence, or investigate any other matter. Default judgments are usually disfavored. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir.1986).
In Eitel, the Ninth Circuit set forth a number of factors that courts may consider when evaluating a default judgment application: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Id. at 1472-73 (citing 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 55-05[2]).
In evaluating a motion for default judgment, a court deems the complaint's factual allegations, other than those relating to the amount of damages, to be true. See Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir.2008).
Moroccanoil has met the procedural requirements for default judgment. It obtained an entry of default against Bederoff on the first amended complaint [Doc. # 19] in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). Although Moroccanoil is not required to serve Bederoff with its application for default judgment because Bederoff has not appeared in this action, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2), it provided Bederoff with a copy of the application. (Ryan Decl. ¶ 12.)
Local Rule 55-1 requires the party seeking default judgment to submit a declaration stating (1) when and against what party the default was entered; (2) the identification of the pleading to which default was entered; (3) whether the defaulting party is an infant or incompetent person, and if so, whether that person is represented; (4) that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 501 et seq., does not apply; and (5) that notice has been served, if required, on the defaulting party. Moroccanoil has complied with the applicable provisions of Local Rule 55-1. (See Ryan Decl. ¶¶ 2-6, 12.)
The Court considers each of the Eitel factors in series.
Moroccanoil will generally be prejudiced if a court declines to grant default
Moroccanoil alleges four causes of action: (1) trademark counterfeiting and infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (2) false designation of origin and false representation in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (3) unfair business practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200; and (4) common law unfair competition and conspiracy to unfairly compete. At the crux of all the claims is Moroccanoil's allegation that Bederoff infringed on the Trademarks by developing and manufacturing counterfeit products that bear the Trademarks and by offering for sale and selling, transporting, and distributing the counterfeit products.
All of Moroccanoil's infringement claims are subject to the same test.
Moroccanoil is the owner of the federally registered trademarks at issue, including the word "MOROCCANOIL" (U.S. Reg. No. 3,478,807), the vertical "M Moroccanoil Design" (U.S. Reg. No. 3,684,910), and the horizontal "M Moroccanoil Design" (U.S. Reg. No. 3,684,909) (together, the "Trademarks"). (1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.) Moroccanoil owns all of the right, title and interest in the United States in the Trademarks and the goodwill associated with them. (Id.) Moroccanoil continuously used one or more of the Trademarks in commerce in the United States. (Id. ¶ 21.) The Trademarks are also inherently distinctive and have acquired secondary meaning in the marketplace. (Id.)
As the complaint appears both sufficiently pled and meritorious, these factors favor default judgment.
This Eitel factor "requires that the court assess whether the recovery sought is proportional to the harm caused by defendant's conduct." Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.Supp.2d 916, 921 (C.D.Cal.2010); See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. While the allegations in a complaint are taken to be true for the purposes of default judgment, courts must make specific findings of fact in assessing damages. Fair Hous., of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002).
In addition to injunctive relief pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a), Moroccanoil seeks statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), the Court may award statutory damages in an amount of up to $200,000 per counterfeit mark or up to $2,000,000 per counterfeit mark if the use of the mark was willful.
The possibility of a dispute as to material facts is remote because Bederoff has not defended himself herein and there is no indication that he intends to do so. Therefore, this factor favors entry of default judgment.
There is no evidence that Bederoff has failed to defend against this lawsuit due to excusable neglect. Moroccanoil served Bederoff on June 15, 2011 [Doc. # 11]. Moroccanoil also provided Bederoff with a copy of this application and, as of the date of this Order, Bederoff has not appeared in this action. This factor favors default judgment.
"Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible." Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Although default judgment is disfavored, a decision on the merits is impractical, if not impossible, when the defendant takes no part in the action. See Penpower Tech. Ltd. v. S.P.C. Tech., 627 F.Supp.2d 1083, 1093 (N.D.Cal.2008). This factor thus weighs weakly against default judgment.
Balancing the Eitel factors, the Court finds that they weigh almost uniformly in favor of default judgment.
As discussed supra, the Court has discretion to determine the amount of statutory damages to be awarded pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). Moroccanoil requests $20,000 per counterfeit mark. Section 1117(c) permits an award in an amount up to $200,000 per counterfeit mark or up to $2,000,000 per counterfeit mark if the use of the mark was willful. The Court finds that an award of $60,000, or $20,000 per counterfeit mark, is a conservative award and appropriate under the circumstances in this case.
Moroccanoil seeks injunctive relief pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). The Lanham Act gives the Court "power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office or to prevent a violation under [the Lanham Act]." 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a); see also Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Castworld Products, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D.Cal.2003).
Moroccanoil requests that the Court issue a permanent injunction against Bederoff and his representative officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all persons acting in concert and participation with him to prohibit them from:
The Court finds that the proposed injunctive relief is appropriate and necessary to prevent continuing irreparable harm to Moroccanoil.
Moroccanoil asks for a seizure of all counterfeits of Moroccanoil goods and marks, as well as an order requiring Bederoff to deliver to Plaintiff:
The Lanham Act permits a Court, "upon ex parte application" to grant an order providing for the seizure of goods and counterfeit marks involved in the violation of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A). Section 1116(d) provides, however, that the Court shall not grant an application unless "the person obtaining an order under this subsection provides the security determined adequate by the court for the payment of such damages as any person may be entitled to recover as a result of a wrongful seizure or wrongful attempted seizure under this subsection" and unless the Court makes certain findings listed in section 1116(d), including inter alia, that an order other than an ex parte seizure order is not adequate to achieve the purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1114. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4).
Insofar as Moroccanoil has not satisfied the requirements under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d), the Court denies its request for seizure of all counterfeit products.
Moroccanoil seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of $4,000. Section 1117(a) provides the Court with discretion to award reasonable attorneys' fees in "exceptional cases." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). "A trademark infringement is viewed as exceptional under § 1117(a) when the infringement is malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful." Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1409 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A defendant's failure to defend is one factor that courts consider in determining whether the defendant's conduct was willful. See, e.g., Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket,
In this case, it appears that Bederoff's copying was deliberate and willful. The counterfeit products were packaged in bottles with nearly identical trade dress as that of the genuine products, including the size, shape, color, wording, and overall appearance of the products. (1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 36.) Moreover, Bederoff failed to defend this action. The Court therefore finds that reasonable attorneys' fees are appropriate in this case. Pursuant to Local Rule 55-3, Moroccanoil is entitled to attorneys' fees in the amount of $4,000 (i.e., the amount of $3600 plus 4% of amount over $50,000). C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-3.
Moroccanoil seeks costs in the amount of $194.50. Upon a finding of defendant's liability for a violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) also permits the Court to award costs of the action. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Thus, the Court grants Moroccanoil's request for an award of costs.
In light of the foregoing, Moroccanoil's application for default judgment is
Moroccanoil shall submit a proposed judgment in Word format consistent with this Order.
Id. at 1154.
15 U.S.C. § 1117.