PATRICK J. WALSH, Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner brings this habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that: 1) his sentence is unconstitutional because he received concurrent sentences for multiple convictions arising out of a single act; 2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of attempted extortion in Count 10; and 3) his sentence of 17 years to life for attempting to extort $25 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. For the following reasons, the Court finds that the state courts did not err in rejecting these claims.
The following statement of facts, including the footnotes, was taken verbatim from the California Court of Appeal's decision affirming Petitioner's convictions and sentence on direct appeal:
(Lodgment No. 5 at 2-4).
The standard of review in this case is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if it applies a rule that contradicts Supreme Court case law or if it reaches a conclusion different from the Supreme Court's in a case that involves facts that are materially indistinguishable. Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 743 (2011) (citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). To establish that the state court unreasonably applied federal law, a petitioner must show that the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent to the facts of his case was not only incorrect but objectively unreasonable. Renico v. Lett, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). Where no decision of the Supreme Court has squarely decided an issue, a state court's adjudication of that issue cannot result in a decision that is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
Petitioner raised all three of his claims in a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 6.) The supreme court did not explain its reasons for denying them. (Lodgment No. 7.) The appellate court, however, did. (Lodgment No. 5.) This Court presumes that the state supreme court rejected Petitioner's claims for the same reasons the state appellate court did. The Court, therefore, looks to the appellate court's reasoning and will not disturb it unless it concludes that "fairminded jurists" would all agree that the decision was wrong. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
Petitioner argues that his sentence for extortion and the concurrent sentences that he received for attempted extortion violate California Penal Code § 654, because he is effectively being punished multiple times for a single, indivisible course of conduct. As a result, he argues, the concurrent sentences for attempted extortion should be stayed. (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") at 5.) There is no merit to this argument.
Because a state trial court's sentencing decisions are purely matters of state law, sentencing errors are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) ("[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to re-examine state-court determinations on state-law questions."); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) ("[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law."); Watts v. Bonneville, 879 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding claim based on California Penal Code § 654 is not cognizable on federal habeas review). Thus, even assuming arguendo that the trial court misapplied California sentencing law, Petitioner would not be entitled to relief unless he could show that his sentence was fundamentally unfair. Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). There is no evidence to support such an argument here. Consequently, this claim does not warrant federal habeas relief.
Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted extortion on March 26, 2007, because he had not demanded money or threatened to extort money from Merida on that date. (Petition at 5.) This claim, too, is without merit.
Federal habeas corpus relief is not available to a petitioner who claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction unless he can show that, considering the trial record in a light most favorable to the prosecution, "no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). This Court presumes, even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record, that the jury resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution. McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S.Ct. 665, 673 (2010) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). Furthermore, the Court reviews insufficiency claims "with an additional layer of deference," granting relief only when the state court's judgment was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Jackson. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 2005).
In California, extortion is defined as the "obtaining of property from another, with his consent ... induced by a wrongful use of force or fear. ..." Cal. Penal Code § 518. Attempted extortion is the "attempt[], by means of any threat ... to extort money or other property from another." Cal. Penal Code § 524. The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner's insufficiency claim, noting:
(Lodgment No. 5 at 6) (citations omitted).
The Court agrees that there was sufficient evidence to support Petitioner's conviction for attempted extortion on March 26, 2007. Prior to that date, Petitioner had confronted Merida twice before and threatened he would kill him or burn down his taco cart if Merida did not pay for protection. (Reporter's Transcript ("RT") 136-49.) Both times, Petitioner brought other gang members with him and brandished a gun. Merida was obviously afraid. (RT 137.) The third time that Petitioner approached Merida, March 26th, Petitioner was again armed and again in the company of others. (RT 140-41.) Petitioner told Merida that Merida "would have to start paying on [] Friday," and that this was the "last time" that Petitioner was warning him. (RT 140, 204.) This evidence was more than enough to support Petitioner's conviction for attempted extortion on March 26th. This is particularly so in the context of the first two encounters and the fourth encounter, wherein, after Petitioner confronted Merida again, Merida paid Petitioner the money. For these reasons, Petitioner's insufficiency claim is rejected.
In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that his sentence of 17 years to life "for a $25 theft with use of a weapon and for the benefit of a gang" constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. (Petition at 5-6, attachment.) This claim is without merit as well.
The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishment, contains a narrow proportionality principle that applies to non-capital sentences. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003). In non-capital cases, the Eighth Amendment prohibits only extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the severity of the crime. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) ("A gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years."). As a result, "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980); see also Andrade, 538 U.S. at 77 ("The gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case.").
In judging the appropriateness of a particular sentence, federal courts must give state legislatures "broad discretion to fashion a sentence that fits within the scope of the proportionality principle...." Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76. This includes taking into account the state's interest in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal laws. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 276; see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296 (1983) ("[A] State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender."). Current norms within society also determine whether the proportionality requirement has been met. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008).
The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner's claim that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, finding:
(Lodgment 5 at 10-11) (parallel citations omitted).
Again, the Court agrees. Petitioner was convicted of extortion, attempted extortion, and second degree robbery committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and while carrying a loaded firearm. (CT 175-82, 209-10.) His sentence was enhanced based on the fact that he had previously been convicted of carrying a loaded gun. (CT 206.) With that backdrop, there is nothing remotely improper or unconstitutional about this sentence. In fact, the Supreme Court has affirmed a sentence of 50 years to life for petty theft. See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72-77 (holding consecutive 25-year-to-life sentences for shoplifting $150 of video tapes from Kmart stores was not cruel and unusual punishment); and see Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1099-1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding sentence of 25-years-to-life for possession of 0.036 grams of cocaine was not an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's proportionality standard).
Petitioner's argument that the amount of money in controversy, $25, was so insignificant as to render his sentence extreme is misplaced. Petitioner's crime did not involve an attempted theft of $25. It involved him threatening the life of a vendor for refusing to pay protection money to operate a business in territory claimed by Petitioner's gang. Petitioner was armed with a gun when he made his threats and displayed the gun at times. In addition, this was not the first time Petitioner was out in public with a loaded gun. He had been convicted of carrying a loaded gun two years earlier. Thus, his sentence was not disproportionate to the severity of his criminal conduct. See Taylor, 460 F.3d at 1098 (holding permissible consideration of harm caused or threatened to victim or society, culpability of offender, and magnitude of crime in proportionality review); see also Ewing, 538 U.S. at 26 ("Recidivism is a serious public safety concern in California and throughout the Nation."); Solem, 463 U.S. at 296 (finding higher penalties for recidivists justified).
For all these reasons, the Petition is denied and the action is dismissed with prejudice. Further, because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, he is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. section 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); see also Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
