MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARGARET A. NAGLE, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on March 9, 2011, seeking review of the denial of plaintiff's application for supplemental security income ("SSIH). On April 5, 2011, the parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. The parties filed a Joint Stipulation on April 24, 2012, in which: plaintiff seeks an order reversing the Commissioner's decision and remanding this case for further administrative proceedings; and the Commissioner requests that his decision be affirmed. The Court has taken the parties' Joint Stipulation under submission without oral argument.

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

On June 16, 2008, plaintiff filed an application for 881. (Administrative Record ("A.R.") 21.) Plaintiff was born on January 7, 1947 (A.R. 218)1 and claims to have been disabled since November 1, 2007 (A.R. 21) due to "osteoarthritis, hypothyroidism, nervousness, pain in her back and legs, kidney problems, and depression" (A.R. 24).

After the Commissioner denied plaintiff's claim (A.R. 21, 34-38), plaintiff requested a hearing (A.R. 21; see A.R. 40-69). On February 8, 2008, plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Marilyn Mann Faulkner (the "ALJ"). (A.R. 21, 213-28.) Frank Thomas Corso, Jr., a vocational expert, also testified. (Id.) On February 26, 2010, the ALJ denied plaintiff's claim (A.R. 21-27), and the Appeals Council subsequently denied plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision (A.R. 3-6). That decision is now at issue in this action.

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

The ALJ found that plaintiff "has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 16, 2008, the application date." (A.R. 23.) The ALJ also found that plaintiff has the medically determinable impairments of "hypothyroidism, history of urinary tract infections, and lumbar spine scoliosis" but "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that has significantly limited (or is expected to significantly limit) the ability to perform basic work-related activities for 12 consecutive months." (Id.) As such, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff "does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments." (Id.; citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.921 et seq.)

In the alternative, the ALJ determined that even if plaintiff's scoliosis were a severe impairment — a finding which the ALJ noted was "not supported by the objective medical evidence" — "any resulting limitations would not reduce [plaintiff's] residual functional capacity [("RFC")] to less than light to medium work" (A. R. 26.) In support of her finding, the ALJ noted that: (1) plaintiff's clinical findings revealed no tenderness or spasm in her back; (2) plaintiff "could perform full range of motion of the back without pain"; (3) plaintiff stated she could walk a half mile; and (4) plaintiff's recent treatment notes indicated that she had "no back pain." (Id.) Accordingly, based on this RFC assessment for plaintiff and the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a biology teacher as actually performed. (Id.)

The ALJ concluded, therefore, that plaintiff has not been under a disability since June 16, 2008, the date her application was filed. (A.R. 26-27.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether it is free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. (citation omitted). The "evidence must be more than a mere scintilla but not necessarily a preponderance." "Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003). "While inferences from the record can constitute substantial evidence, only those `reasonably drawn from the record' will suffice. "Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Although this Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, the Court nonetheless must review the record as a whole, "weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion. "Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health and Hum. Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). "The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities." Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).

The Court will uphold the Commissioner's decision when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the Court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision "and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely." Orn, 495 F.3d at 630; see also Connett, 340 F.3d at 874. The Court will not reverse the Commissioner's decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists only when it is "clear from the record that an ALJ's error was `inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.'" Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stout v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch, 400 F.3d at 679.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred at step two of the sequential evaluation in determining that plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments is not severe. (Joint Stipulation ("Joint Stip.") at 4, 11.) Specifically, plaintiff claims that, in finding plaintiff to have no severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ failed to consider properly the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician, Sergio Ugalde, M.D. (Joint Stip. At 4-8.)

At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ is tasked with identifying a claimant's "severe" impairments. 20 C. F. R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(c). A severe impairment is one that "significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities."2 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Despite use of the term "severe," most circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have held that "the step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, "[a]n impairment or combination of impairments may be found `not severe only if, the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on [a claimant's] ability to work.'" Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686-87 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). When determining whether an impairment is severe, claimant's age, education, and work experience will not be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).

In her decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff has the medically determinable impairments of "hypothyroidism," "[a] history of urinary tract infections," and "lumbar spine scoliosis." (A.R. 23.) The ALJ determined, however, that plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments is not severe, because plaintiff "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that has significantly limited (or is expected to significantly limit) the ability to perform basic work-related activities for 12 consecutive months." (Id.) In so finding, the ALJ relied upon not only the opinion of the consultative examiner and the medical evidence of record3 but also the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician, Sergio Ugalde, M.D. (A.R. 24-25.)

In an October 15, 2009 Physical Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire, Dr. Ugalde diagnosed plaintiff with hypothyroid dyslipidemia and indicated that plaintiff's prognosis was "good." (A.R. 208.) When asked to list "[plaintiff]'s symptoms, including pain, dizziness, diarrhea, fatigue, etc. [,]" Dr. Ugalde wrote, "NONE." (Id.; emphasis in original.) Dr. Ugalde did indicate, however, that plaintiff has "occasional leg pain." (Id.) When asked whether plaintiff's impairments have lasted, or are expected to last, over 12 months, Dr. Ugalde wrote, "No Impairments." (A.R. 209.) Further, when asked "how often [during a typical eight hour workday] . . . is/are [plaintiff]'s pain or other symptoms sever[e] enough to interfere with the attention and concentration necessary to sustain simple, repetitive work tasks," Dr. Ugalde wrote, "No Pain." (Id.; emphasis in original.)

As properly noted by the Commissioner, to the extent that Dr. Ugalde found that plaintiff had any functional limitations, such limtiations appear to be based upon plaintiff's age. Specifically, Dr. Ugalde noted that plaintiff can tolerate normal work stress "according to a 61 [year old woman]." (A.R. 209.) Dr. Ugalde wrote that the basis for this restriction was "age." (Id.) Further, after finding that plaintiff had various functional limitations, inter alia, in her ability to walk, stand, sit, lift, carry, twist, stooplbend, crouch, and climb ladders and stairs, Dr. Ugalde wrote, "[plaintiff] is a 61 [year old woman, and] age consideration should be observed. [Plaintiff] can perform certain tasks but not a heavy 8 [hour] work-day." (A.R. 211.)

Accordingly, because the functional limitations assessed by Dr. Ugalde appear to be based solely upon plaintiff's age — a factor that is not considered when determining severity at step two — the ALJ did not commit any reversible error in considering Dr. Ugalde's opinion and determining that plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments is not "severe."4

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from material legal error. Neither reversal of the Commissioner's decision nor remand is warranted.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum Opinion and Order and the Judgment on counsel for plaintiff and for defendant.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.