MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARGARET A. NAGLE, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on May 18, 2011, seeking review of the denial of plaintiff's application for supplemental security income ("SSI"). On June 23, 2011, the parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. The parties filed a Joint Stipulation on May 9, 2012, in which: plaintiff seeks an order reversing the Commissioner's decision and remanding this case for the payment of benefits or, alternatively, for the correction of legal errors; and the Commissioner requests that his decision be affirmed.

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

On October 5, 2007, plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI. (Administrative Record ("A.R.") 17.) Plaintiff, who was born on May 9, 1962 (A.R. 100),1 claims to have been disabled since January 1, 2005 (A.R. 17), due to schizophrenia, insomnia, nervousness, anxiety, nightmares of past assault, irritability, paranoia, visual and auditory hallucinations, difficulties understanding and remembering, and a fear of crowds (see A.R. 20, 41, 56, 61).

After the Commissioner denied plaintiff's claim initially and upon reconsideration (A.R. 17, 56-59, 61-66), plaintiff requested a hearing (A.R. 12-13). On July 23, 2009, plaintiff, who was represented by an attorney, appeared and testified at a hearing before Administrative Law Alexander Weir, III (the "ALJ"). (A.R. 26-51.) Vocational expert Sandra Trost also testified. (Id.) On August 18, 2009, the ALJ denied plaintiff's claim (A.R. 17-25), and the Appeals Council subsequently denied plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision (A.R. 1-6). That decision is now at issue in this action.

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

The ALJ found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 5, 2007, the application date. (A.R. 20.) The ALJ also found that plaintiff does not have any physical impairments, but she does have the severe mental impairment of psychotic disorder. (Id.) The ALJ further found that plaintiff's mental impairment causes "mild limitations on [her] activities of daily living and social functioning" and "moderate limitations in [her] ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace," but her mental impairment "has not caused any episodes of decompensation of extended duration." (Id.) The ALJ determined that plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.925, 416.926). (A.R. 21.)

After reviewing the record, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform "a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: [plaintiff] cannot engage in complex tasks and will have moderate limitations in maintaining attention and concentration." (A.R. 22.) Based upon his RFC assessment for plaintiff and the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found that plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as a hospital cleaner and home attendant, because "[t]his work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by [plaintiff]'s [RFC]." (A.R. 24.)

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since October 5, 2007, the date her application was filed. (A.R. 25.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether it is free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. (citation omitted). The "evidence must be more than a mere scintilla but not necessarily a preponderance." Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003). "While inferences from the record can constitute substantial evidence, only those `reasonably drawn from the record' will suffice." Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006)(citation omitted).

Although this Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, the Court nonetheless must review the record as a whole, "weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion." Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health and Hum. Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) "The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities." Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).

The Court will uphold the Commissioner's decision when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the Court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision "and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely." Orn, 495 F.3d at 630; see also Connett, 340 F.3d at 874. The Court will not reverse the Commissioner's decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists only when it is "clear from the record that an ALJ's error was `inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.'" Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006)(quoting Stout v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch, 400 F.3d at 679.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to give clear and convincing reasons for finding plaintiff's testimony regarding her mental limitations to be not credible.2 (Joint Stipulation ("Joint Stip.") at 4-14, 18.)

I. The ALJ Failed To Give Clear And Convincing Reasons For Finding Plaintiff's Testimony Regarding Her Mental Limitations To Be Not Credible.

Once a disability claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that is reasonably likely to be the source of claimant's subjective symptom(s), all subjective testimony as to the severity of the symptoms must be considered. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a) (explaining how pain and other symptoms are evaluated). "[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an applicant not credible by making specific findings as to credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each." Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883. The factors to be considered in weighing a claimant's credibility include: (1) the claimant's reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies either in the claimant's testimony or between the claimant's testimony and her conduct; (3) the claimant's daily activities; (4) the claimant's work record; and (5) testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which the claimant complains. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c).

An ALJ may not rely on a plaintiff's daily activities to support an adverse credibility determination when those activities do not affect the claimant's ability to perform appropriate work activities on an ongoing and daily basis. Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990). As the Ninth Circuit noted in Lester v. Chater, the ALJ must evaluate claimant's "`ability to work on a sustained basis.'" 81 F.3d 821, 833 (9th Cir. 1995)(emphasis in original; citation omitted). A claimant need not be "utterly incapacitated to be eligible for benefits . . . and many home activities are not easily transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of the workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication." Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)(internal citations omitted).

At the July 23, 2009 administrative hearing, plaintiff testified, inter alia, that she: is depressed and nervous; has difficulty remembering, understanding, and keeping pace; and fears going outside by herself. (A.R. 35, 37, 41.) Plaintiff testified that she last worked approximately 10-15 years ago as a custodian and nurse's aide. (A.R. 32-33.) She also testified that "a couple of years ago" she did some "odd jobs" for income, including fixing people's hair and working as a home attendant. (A.R. 34-35.) However, she stopped performing these activities due to physical problems with her hands. (A.R. 35.) When asked by the ALJ, "What's the main thing that keeps you from working?" plaintiff responded, "Well, I had applied for a job but didn't — my abilities, I'm too slow. I'm not fast enough for them. And because of my understanding." (A.R. 41.)

With respect to her daily activities, plaintiff testified that she is able to clean her room, change her bed linens, dress herself, bathe, and handle her own money. (A.R. 32, 39-40.) Although plaintiff is able to read, she testified that she "do[es]n't really understand what [she is] reading. . . . [S]omebody has to help [her] understand." (A.R. 39.; see also A.R. 31.) Similarly, when watching television, plaintiff testified that she does not always remember the things she sees and hears. (A.R. 39.) Plaintiff also testified that she takes walks with her landlord, with whom she lives, and accompanies her to shop. (A.R. 39-40.) Plaintiff's landlord cooks for her and washes her laundry. (Id.)

Plaintiff testified that her medications help just a "little" with her depression and nerves. (A.R. 37.) She noted, for example, that she does not "[rock] as bad[ly] as [she] used to." (Id.) Plaintiff also testified that she no longer experiences visual and auditory hallucinations when taking prescribed medication. (A.R. 38.)

The ALJ found that while plaintiff's severe mental impairment of psychotic disorder "does limit certain aspects of [plaintiff]'s functioning, it does not provide limitations so severe as to prevent [plaintiff] from basic work abilities." (A.R. 23.) As the ALJ cited no evidence of malingering by plaintiff, his reason(s) for rejecting plaintiff's testimony must be clear and convincing.

In his decision, it appears that the ALJ rejected plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony because: (1) "the record does not . . . fully show that [plaintiff]'s symptoms lasted for a period of over 12 months"; (2) plaintiff's condition improved over the course of her treatment; and (3) plaintiff's daily activities demonstrate that she "is capable of a wide range of activities of daily living."3 (A.R. 23-24.)

Addressing his first reason for finding plaintiff's testimony to be not credible, the ALJ noted that "[plaintiff]'s record reflects that [she] was treated from August 28, 2007 through May 28, 2008, a period of less than a year. Accordingly, [the ALJ concluded that] the record does not . . . fully show that [plaintiff]'s symptoms lasted for a period of over 12 months." (A.R. 23.)

Following the ALJ's decision, however, plaintiff submitted, inter alia, additional treatment notes, which were considered and made part of the Administrative Record by the Appeals Council.4 (A.R. 1-6.) The first treatment note, dated August 25, 2008, stated that plaintiff was experiencing insomnia, post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") flashbacks, as well as increased depression, anxiety, and irritability. (A.R. 217.) Plaintiff was assessed with a Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") score of 50. (Id.) An October 20, 2008 treatment note noted that plaintiff was continuing to experience insomnia, PTSD flashbacks, and depression. (A.R. 216.) Plaintiff was again assessed with a GAF score of 50. (Id.) Lastly, in a March 10, 2009 treatment note, it was noted that plaintiff was experiencing symptoms of insomnia, depression, and flashbacks. (A.R. 215.)

The additional treatment records submitted by plaintiff undermine the ALJ's first reason for finding plaintiff to be not credible, because they show that plaintiff's symptoms have lasted for a period of over twelve months. Accordingly, in view of the additional evidence, this reason cannot constitute a clear and convincing reason for rejecting plaintiff's testimony.5

The ALJ's second reason for finding plaintiff to be not credible — to wit, that plaintiff's condition improved over the course of treatment — is unavailing, particularly in view of the additional evidence submitted by plaintiff. In support of his second ground for discrediting plaintiff, the ALJ noted that plaintiff's progress notes from April and May 2008 "indicated significant improvement." (A.R. 23.) The ALJ stated, for example, that plaintiff's initial GAF score rose from 44 to scores of 50-55. (Id.) The ALJ also concluded that plaintiff "reported a decrease in hallucinations," "that she was feeling better," and "that the medication was helping her." (Id.)

The ALJ has overstated the improvement in plaintiff's GAF scores, however. While it is true that plaintiff's social worker Angela Vergara, MSW, gave plaintiff a GAF score of 44 on August 28, 2007 (A.R. 173), plaintiff's psychiatrist, Richard D. King, M.D., gave plaintiff a GAF score of 50 on that same day (A.R. 174). To the extent the ALJ suggests that plaintiff's condition improved because she was given GAF scores of 44 and 50 on the same day, the ALJ's reasoning in unpersuasive. The evidence, when fairly viewed, shows that plaintiff's GAF scores, as assessed by her treating physician, rose from a score of 50 to 55 for a few months (see, e.g., A.R. 178 (11/26/07 — 55); A.R. 177 (2/26/08 — 55)), and then subsequently decreased to a score of 50 for the remainder of plaintiff's course of treatment (see, e.g., A.R. 198 (3/25/08 — 50); A.R. 197 (4/30/08 — 50); A.R. 196 (5/28/08 — 50)).6 Accordingly, contrary to the ALJ's assertion, plaintiff's GAF scores do not demonstrate significant improvement; rather, at best, they show a period of brief improvement.

Likewise, while it is true that plaintiff reported some improvement with medication, the additional treatment notes show that plaintiff continued to experience insomnia, flashbacks, and depression. In fact, the August 25, 2008 treatment note indicates that plaintiff was experiencing increased depression, anxiety, and irritability.7 (A.R. 217.) Accordingly, considering the record as a whole, including the additional evidence submitted by plaintiff, the ALJ's second reason does not constitute a clear and convincing reason for rejecting plaintiff's testimony.

The ALJ's last reason for rejecting plaintiff's testimony is also unavailing. The ALJ states that "[plaintiff] is capable of a wide range of activities of daily living." (A.R. 24.) The ALJ notes, for example, that "[plaintiff] is able to take care of her own personal hygiene, clean her room, go shopping, and go out for walks. She is able to get along with her landlord, and they do activities together." (Id.) The ALJ also notes that in the last ten years, plaintiff has performed "odd jobs" and "only stopped working because of physical impairments (which [the ALJ] found to be unsubstantiated) and not mental impairments." (Id.) The ALJ thus determined that plaintiff's mental impairment caused only "mild limitations on [plaintiff]'s activities of daily living and social functioning."8 (Id.)

Although not entirely clear, it appears that the ALJ found plaintiff to be not credible because her daily activities were inconsistent with her alleged mental limitations. However, the ALJ does not articulate how plaintiff's daily activities are at odds with her alleged mental limitations. Further, the ALJ fails to explain how plaintiff's basic activities and light household chores translate into the ability to perform full-time work. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001)(noting that the "mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability"). Therefore, the ALJ's reason is not a clear and convincing reason, as required, for finding plaintiff to be not credible.

Moreover, to the extent the ALJ discredits plaintiff because she stopped working due to "physical impairments . . . and not mental impairments," the ALJ's reasoning is unpersuasive. (A.R. 24.) While it is true that plaintiff testified she stopped working at one of her "odd jobs" due to physical reasons, plaintiff later testified that she had applied for a job but could not meet the demands of the job due to her mental limitations. Specifically, when asked by the ALJ, "What's the main thing that keep you from working?" plaintiff responded, "Well, I had applied for a job but didn't — my abilities, I'm too slow. I'm not fast enough for them. And because [of] my understanding." (A.R. 41.) Taken in context, and contrary to the ALJ's finding, plaintiff's testimony was that her mental limitations, as opposed to her physical limitations, prevented her from currently performing sustained work.

Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, the ALJ failed to give clear and convincing reasons for discrediting plaintiff's testimony.

II. Remand Is Required.

The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or order an immediate award of benefits is within the district court's discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000). Where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits. Id. at 1179 ("[T]he decision of whether to remand for further proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings."). However, where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated, remand is appropriate. Id. at 1179-81.

Remand is the appropriate remedy to allow the ALJ the opportunity to remedy the above-mentioned deficiencies and errors. See, e.g., Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004)(remand for further proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (remand appropriate to remedy defects in the record). On remand, the ALJ must correct the above-mentioned deficiencies and errors. In so doing, the ALJ may determine that a consultative examination, based upon a complete review of the medical record, is appropriate under the circumstances.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum Opinion and Order and the Judgment on counsel for plaintiff and for defendant.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.