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ALCAZAR v. BANK OF AMERICA, CV 11-05645 DDP (MANx). (2012)

Court: District Court, C.D. California Number: infdco20120801908 Visitors: 9
Filed: Jul. 30, 2012
Latest Update: Jul. 30, 2012
Summary: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART AND REMANDING FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION [Dkt. No. 54] DEAN D. PREGERSON, District Judge. Presently before the court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint filed by Defendants' Bank of America, N.A., Countrywide Home Loans Inc., and ReconTrust Compant, N.A. 1 Having considered the submissions of the parties, the court grants the motion, adopts the following order, and dismisses the entire action. In August 2006, Plaintiffs obtained a r
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART AND REMANDING FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION [Dkt. No. 54]

DEAN D. PREGERSON, District Judge.

Presently before the court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint filed by Defendants' Bank of America, N.A., Countrywide Home Loans Inc., and ReconTrust Compant, N.A.1 Having considered the submissions of the parties, the court grants the motion, adopts the following order, and dismisses the entire action.

In August 2006, Plaintiffs obtained a refinancing loan on property located at 14628 Helwig Avenue, Norwalk, California 90650. (First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶¶ 4, 13.) The FAC alleges that Defendants Countrywide and Bank of America were not and are not holders of the security instrument associated with the loan. (FAC ¶ 15.) In August 2008, Plaintiffs loan payments fell into arrears, and Bank of America began foreclosure proceedings. (FAC ¶ 16.)

In 2009, Plaintiffs applied for a loan modification and received approval for a "trial plan" requiring payments of $2,004.10. (FAC ¶ 17.) Soon after, Plaintiffs were approved for a second trial, with payments of $1,688.58. (Id.) Plaintiffs made payments of $1,688.15 until January 2010. (FAC ¶ 18.) At that point, Bank of America rejected the trial plan, stating that Plaintiffs had failed to make the required monthly payments of $2,0004.10. (Id.)

On June 9, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a verified Complaint against Defendants in Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Notice of Removal, Ex. 1.) Defendants removed the case to federal court on July 8, 2011. A court in this district subsequently dismissed all but on of the causes of action alleged in the original complaint. (See Dkt. No. 16.) Plaintiffs then filed the FAC, which alleges four causes of action for 1) declaratory relief, 2) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2605, 3) violation of California Civil Code Section 2923.5, and 4) promissory estoppel.2 Defendants now move to dismiss all but the promissory estoppel cause of action.

Plaintiffs, represented by counsel, filed a brief opposition to the instant motion. (Dkt. No. 56.) Plaintiffs' memorandum does not oppose Defendants' motion with respect to the RESPA claim or the declaratory relief claim. This court, therefore, interprets Defendants' failure to oppose as consent to the dismissal of those claims. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12. Plaintiffs' first and second causes of action are therefore DISMISSED.

Defendants removed to this court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Notice of Removal at 2.) A defendant may remove to federal court "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District courts have original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

This court must independently examine the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of the parties' arguments. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). Having dismissed Plaintiffs' only federal cause of action, only state law claims for promissory estoppel and violation of California Civil Code Section 2923.5 remain. The court must therefore determine whether to exercise its discretion to retain pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Scheneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.3d 986, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1991). In most instances, the balance of factors weigh against exercising jurisdiction over remaining state law claims. Id. at 993. Such is the case here. Accordingly, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' promissory estoppel and violation of California Civil Code Section 2923.5 claims, and remands this case to state court.

For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, in part. Plaintiffs' declaratory relief and RESPA claims are DISMISSED. The remaining claims are hereby REMANDED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FootNotes


1. Though titled "Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint," Defendants' motion only seeks dismissal of three of Plaintiffs' four causes of action.
2. The FAC lists the RESPA, California Civil Code Section 2923.5, and promissory estoppel claims as the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action, respectively. The FAC does not, however, include a second cause of action.
Source:  Leagle

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