MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER

JEAN ROSENBLUTH, Magistrate Judge.

I. PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner's final decision denying her application for Social Security disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). This matter is before the Court on the parties' Joint Stipulation, filed February 8, 2013, which the Court has taken under submission without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed and this action is dismissed.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on February 7, 1961, and has a 12th-grade education. (Administrative Record ("AR") 37, 123.) She previously worked in membership sales and as a cashier/checker and material handler. (AR 25, 56-57.)

On June 27, 2008, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB. (AR 62, 123-25.) Plaintiff alleged that she had been unable to work since January 23, 2007,2 because of bilateral plantar fasciitis and neck and back pain. (AR 64, 123.) Her application was denied initially, on September 18, 2008 (AR 62, 64-68), and upon reconsideration, on January 29, 2009 (AR 63, 69-73).

On March 12, 2009, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (AR 90-91.) A hearing was held on May 20, 2010, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified. (AR 32-56.) A vocational expert ("VE") also testified. (AR 55-59.) In a written decision issued on July 12, 2010, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 19-26.) On July 19, 2010, Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision. (AR 15.) On January 13, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (AR 1-5.) This action followed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The ALJ's findings and decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court "must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1996). "If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing," the reviewing court "may not substitute its judgment" for that of the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21.

IV. THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY

People are "disabled" for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or which has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992).

A. The Five-Step Evaluation Process

The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in assessing whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996). In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting his ability to do basic work activities; if not, the claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments ("Listing") set forth at 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity ("RFC")3 to perform his past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The claimant has the burden of proving that he is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets that burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id. If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant work, the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is not disabled because he can perform other substantial gainful work available in the national economy. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). That determination comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. § 404.1520; Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

B. The ALJ's Application of the Five-Step Process

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since March 1, 2008, her amended alleged onset date. (AR 21.) At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of "history of bilateral plantar fasciitis; and degenerative disk disease of the cervical spine, status post fusion." (Id. (citation omitted).) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal any of the impairments in the Listings, focusing specifically on Listing 1.00. (AR 21-22.) At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work4 but was limited to "occasionally performing postural activities; no ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional over shoulder/over head reaching bilaterally; no unprotected heights; no dangerous machinery; and she must avoid extreme cold and vibration." (AR 22.) Based on the VE's testimony, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work in membership sales and as a cashier. (AR 25.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled without reaching step five of the evaluation process. (AR 26.)

V. RELEVANT FACTS

Plaintiff underwent two surgeries to treat her plantar fasciitis, in 1999 and 2000, and continued to work on modified duty for several years after the surgeries. (AR 417, 454.) Her symptoms increased in 2007, and she received a series of off-work orders from her treating podiatrist, Dr. Glenn Ocker, between January 2007 and January 2008. (AR 180-81, 185, 189, 192, 196, 198-206, 208-09.) At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that between January 2007 and March 1, 2008, her alleged onset date, she would have been able to work in a "seated job." (AR 40.)

In March 2008, Plaintiff began experiencing neck pain and was initially treated with pain medication and physical therapy. (AR 303-06, 419-21.) On April 21, 2008, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Sachin Patel for right shoulder pain, and he treated her with a cortisone injection. (AR 423-24.) On May 7, 2008, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Patel that her shoulder impingement was "1000 times better after the cortisone injection." (AR 422.) Dr. Patel was "happy with her progress" and opined that Plaintiff might need another cortisone injection in the future if her symptoms recurred. (Id.)

On July 18, 2008, an MRI of Plaintiff's cervical spine revealed mild to moderate central canal stenosis and severe right neural foramina stenosis at C4-5 secondary to a six-millimeter right paracentral disc herniation/extrusion; minimal to mild central canal stenosis and minimal to mild left neural foraminal stenosis at C5-6 secondary to a three-millimeter left paracentral broad-based disc protrusion; and minimal central canal stenosis at C3-4 secondary to a two-millimeter bulging of the disc. (AR 338-39.) Plaintiff continued conservative treatment for her neck pain for approximately six months, but her symptoms did not improve. (AR 334.) As a result, on October 21, 2008, Plaintiff underwent an anterior cervical discectomy, arthrodesis or spinal fusion, and the insertion of titanium plates at C4-5 performed by Dr. Jose Rodriguez, Plaintiff's treating neurosurgeon. (AR 329-31.) On November 4, 2008, Plaintiff reported that her neck pain had improved since surgery. (AR 332.) She had limited range of motion in her right shoulder secondary to pain, with weakness in the biceps but normal triceps function. (Id.)

On November 24, 2008, x-rays showed straightening of Plaintiff's cervical spine, a plate and multiple screws through C4-5 with bone dowel, status post-spinal fusion, mild degenerative changes at C5-6 and C6-7, and mild levoscoliosis of the cervical spine; the rest of the bones appeared unremarkable. (AR 341.) Following surgery, Plaintiff continued conservative treatment with Dr. Rodriguez, including physical therapy and pain medications. (AR 380-89, 392-93.)

On September 18, 2008, consulting physician R. Bitonte reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and completed a physical RFC assessment; he opined that Plaintiff was capable of performing light work except that she could only occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl, and she should never balance. (AR 320-26.) Moreover, Dr. Bitonte stated that Plaintiff's ability to reach was limited and she should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, vibration, fumes, and hazards. (AR 322-23.) Dr. Bitonte's findings were affirmed by consulting physician S. Laiken on January 27, 2009. (AR 363-64.)

On January 12, 2010, Plaintiff was examined by consulting orthopedist Dr. Bunsri Sophon. (AR 367-72.) Dr. Sophon found that Plaintiff was obese but not in any acute distress; her posture and gait were normal; and examination of her cervical spine revealed "a well-healed non-tender 4 cm right transverse surgical scar on the neck" and no evidence of tenderness or muscle spasm, with 30/70-degree flexion, 30/60-degree extension, 20/45-degree lateral bending bilaterally, and 45/80-degree rotation bilaterally. (AR 369-70.) Further, her thoracic and lumbar spine showed no evidence of tenderness or muscle spasm, with 60/90-degree flexion, 25/30-degree extension, and 25/25-degree lateral bending bilaterally; her straight-leg-raising test was normal; her upper and lower extremities were all normal, with no decreased range of motion and no deformity, swelling, palpable mass, inflamation, or tenderness; and her neurological examination and motor strength were normal. (AR 370-71.) Dr. Sophon diagnosed Plaintiff with lumbosacral strain and cervical disc disease, status post-C4-5 spinal fusion. (AR 372.) Finally, Dr. Sophon concluded that Plaintiff was "capable of lifting and carrying 50 pounds occasionally, 20 pounds frequently," and "is restricted to sitting, standing and walking 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday." (Id.)

On February 1, 2010, Dr. Rodriguez reported that Plaintiff was in good spirits and her cervical spine had full range of motion. (AR 378-79.) She still experienced some pain, but it was reduced by physical therapy, massage, and the application of heat and ice. (AR 378.) Dr. Rodriguez compared an MRI done on December 9, 2009, to her old MRI and noted resolution of her previous herniated disc at C4-5. (AR 379.) He also noted his belief that Plaintiff had a right paracentral disc herniation at C5-6 and a small disc protrusion at C3-4. (Id.) On April 5, 2010, Plaintiff reported that on a scale of one to 10, her pain was a four. (AR 376.) The range of motion of her cervical spine had some limitations, but she had full range of motion in her right shoulder girdle. (Id.) Dr. Rodriguez opined that no further surgery was recommended and Plaintiff should continue with conservative care. (AR 377.)

On April 19, 2010, Dr. William Landrey, Plaintiff's treating podiatrist, noted that x-rays of Plaintiff's feet were positive for both plantar calcaneal spurs and posterior spurs; an excessive amount of pronation was evident on the right; and the talus was anteriorly displaced as well as excessively closer to the median plane of the body than normal compared to the calcaneus. (AR 455.) The same day, Dr. Landrey completed a Medical Statement Regarding Foot Problem for Social Security Disability Claim, on which he noted that Plaintiff had had "painful feet" for over 10 years and had been diagnosed with plantar fasciitis, achilles tendonitis, and heel spurs. (AR 456.) He opined that Plaintiff could stand or walk for less than 90 minutes in an eight-hour day for up to 30 minutes at a time and that she needed to elevate her legs occasionally in the morning and most of the time in the afternoon. (AR 456-57.) Moreover, she could sit for up to two hours in an eight-hour day and had to be able to walk around every hour during the day for about 15 minutes at a time. (AR 457.) Dr. Landrey also indicated that Plaintiff would be unable to walk one block at a reasonable pace on uneven or unstable ground and had mild foot pain that increased to severe with prolonged weight-bearing. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff needed 15-minute breaks every hour during an eight-hour workday and could lift 10 pounds occasionally and 20 pounds rarely. (Id.) Dr. Landrey further opined that Plaintiff could rarely twist, stoop, or crouch but should never climb ladders or stairs. (AR 458.) Finally, he stated that Plaintiff would likely have good days and bad days and miss more than four days a month because of her impairments. (Id.)

On April 23, 2010, four days after Dr. Landrey had filled out his medical statement, Dr. David Tran, who had been treating Plaintiff for about a year (AR 44), completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire and indicated that Plaintiff had had neck pain since October 2008, low-back pain since 2001, and bilateral plantar fasciitis since 1998. (AR 460-64.) He stated that Plaintiff's diagnoses included neck pain with cervical radiculopathy, chronic low-back pain, bilateral plantar fasciitis, depression, and anxiety. (AR 460.) Dr. Tran opined that Plaintiff's prognosis was poor and noted that she experienced symptoms of chronic pain in her neck, low back, and feet, as well as headaches, dizziness, and fatigue. (Id.) He also stated that Plaintiff's treatment had consisted of medications, and psychological symptoms affecting her physical condition included depression, anxiety, personality disorder, and sleep deprivation. (AR 460-61.) Moreover, Dr. Tran opined that Plaintiff frequently experienced pain that would interfere with her attention and concentration and was incapable of performing even a low-stress job because stress triggered her pain and headaches. (AR 461.) He explained that Plaintiff could sit or stand for 15 minutes at a time; sit, stand, or walk for up to two hours in an eight-hour workday; and rarely lift and carry less than ten pounds. (AR 461-62.) In addition, Dr. Tran stated that Plaintiff could rarely look down, occasionally turn her head right or left and look up, and frequently hold her head in a static position. (AR 463.) He also provided that she could rarely twist, stoop, or crouch, never climb ladders, and occasionally climb stairs. (Id.) Finally, for several of the questions on the form regarding Plaintiff's specific functional limitations, Dr. Tran simply wrote, "unable to work now." (AR 462-63.)

In his decision, the ALJ gave "limited weight" to the opinions of Drs. Landrey and Tran because both opinions were (1) "unsupported" by any treatment notes; (2) "not supported by the objective medical evidence"; (3) "inconsistent with one another despite being opined days apart"; (4) "inconsistent with the claimant's activities of daily living and her reports of reduced pain"; (5) "not consistent with the opinion that only conservative care is needed"; and (6) "inconsistent with findings of Dr. Sophon who examined the claimant three months earlier." (AR 24.) The ALJ also found that neither doctor specialized in psychology and that there was no evidence of a medically determinable mental impairment. (Id.) The ALJ gave "great weight" to Dr. Sophon's opinion because he "had the opportunity to examine the claimant, reviewed some of her records, and is a qualified expert in the field in which his opinions are based upon." (AR 25.) The ALJ also gave "great weight" to the reviewing nonexamining physicians' opinions because they "reviewed the claimant's records and are familiar with the [Social Security Administration's] rules and regulations." (Id.)

VI. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to consider the severity of Plaintiff's anxiety, depression, weight, right-shoulder impingement, and lower-back injury with disc damage; (2) failing to properly assess whether her condition met or equaled a Listing; (3) determining Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work; (4) failing to consider all the relevant factors in assessing Plaintiff's RFC; (5) failing to consider whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2; and (6) finding that Plaintiff's subjective allegations were not fully credible. (J. Stip. at 3-4, 10-12, 17-20, 22-24, 33-36, 38, 44-45.) None of these contentions warrant reversal.5

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Determining Plaintiff's RFC

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in determining that she retained the RFC to perform a limited range of light work. (J. Stip. at 22-24, 33-34.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to account for "the fact [Plaintiff] had to take leave from work prior to her alleged onset date" (J. Stip. at 23), (2) rejecting the opinions of her treating physicians, Drs. Landrey and Tran (J. Stip. at 24, 33-34), and (3) "neglecting to consider testimony from the [VE] that supported a finding of `disabled'" (J. Stip. at 24).

1. Applicable law

A district court must uphold an ALJ's RFC assessment when the ALJ has applied the proper legal standard and substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the decision. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ must have considered all the medical evidence in the record and "explain in [his or her] decision the weight given to . . . [the] opinions from treating sources, nontreating sources, and other nonexamining sources." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii). In making an RFC determination, the ALJ may consider those limitations for which there is support in the record and need not consider properly rejected evidence or subjective complaints. See Batson v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2004) ("ALJ was not required to incorporate evidence from the opinions of the claimant's treating physicians, which were permissibly discounted"); Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217 (upholding ALJ's RFC determination because "the ALJ took into account those limitations for which there was record support that did not depend on [claimant's] subjective complaints").

An ALJ does not need to adopt any specific medical source's RFC opinion as his or her own. Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant's physician, to determine residual functional capacity."); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) ("[T]he administrative law judge . . . is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity."). "The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); accord Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195. The Court must consider the ALJ's decision in the context of "the entire record as a whole," and if the "evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ's decision should be upheld." Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Discussion

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform less than a full range of light work. (AR 22.) Specifically, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff "is limited to lifting/carrying 10 pounds frequently, 20 pounds occasionally; sitting without restrictions but with normal breaks; standing and walking 6 hours in an 8 hour workday, with appropriate breaks; occasionally performing postural activities; no ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional over shoulder/over head reaching bilaterally; no unprotected heights; no dangerous machinery; and she must avoid extreme cold and vibration." (Id.) He further stated that in making that RFC finding, he "considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence" and "also considered opinion evidence." (Id.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his RFC finding because he did not properly consider that Plaintiff was off work prior to her alleged onset date. (J. Stip. at 23.) The ALJ, however, explicitly considered medical evidence prior to Plaintiff's alleged onset date. (AR 23.) In particular, the ALJ considered evidence that Plaintiff became unable to work in January 2007 and received a series of off-work orders between January 2007 and January 2008. (Id.) Although a portion of Plaintiff's testimony seems to indicate that she was off work a year prior to January 2007 (AR 45), she later clarified that she officially left her job in January 2008 and had not been working for a year prior. (AR 53.) This is confirmed by the record evidence discussed above regarding Plaintiff's off-work orders. (See AR 179-209.)

Additionally, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's testimony that she could have worked in a "seated job" between January 2007 and March 2008, when her neck impairment began. (AR 40, 45.) Indeed, following this discussion with the ALJ, Plaintiff and her counsel amended Plaintiff's alleged onset date to March 2008 because Plaintiff conceded that she could have performed full-time work prior to that date. (AR 53.) Thus, the ALJ properly considered the evidence that Plaintiff was off work prior to her alleged onset date. Plaintiff is not entitled to reversal on this basis.

Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ's RFC finding was improper because it did not reflect the findings of her treating doctors, Drs. Landrey and Tran. (J. Stip. at 23-24, 33-34.)

Three types of physicians may offer opinions in social security cases: "(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (non-examining physicians)." Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. The opinions of treating physicians are generally afforded more weight than those of nontreating physicians because treating physicians are employed to cure and have a greater opportunity to know and observe the claimant. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). The weight given a treating physician's opinion depends on whether it was supported by sufficient medical data and was consistent with other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If a treating physician's opinion was well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and was not inconsistent with other substantial evidence from the record, it should be given controlling weight and should be rejected only for "clear and convincing" reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). When a treating physician's opinion conflicts with other medical evidence or was not supported by clinical or laboratory findings, the ALJ must provide only "specific and legitimate reasons" for discounting that doctor's opinion. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). Factors relevant to the evaluation of a treating physician's opinion include the "[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination" and the "[n]ature and extent of the treatment relationship." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i)-(ii).

The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the opinions of Drs. Landrey and Tran.6 First, apart from the checklist-style questionnaires both doctors submitted, the record contains only two treatment notes from Dr. Landrey, in April 2010 (AR 454-55), and no records from Dr. Tran. One of the notes from Dr. Landrey contained no treatment observations, only plaintiff's complaints. (AR 454.) As a result, the ALJ properly rejected both opinions on the basis that they were "unsupported." (AR 24); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1194-95 (holding that treating physicians' conflicting, checklist-form opinions were entitled to minimal weight).

Second, the ALJ properly rejected the opinions on the basis that they were not supported by the objective medical evidence. (AR 24.) For example, Plaintiff's treatment records indicated that her neck pain improved after her surgery, and post-surgery diagnostic testing showed that her cervical spine had straightened and only mild degenerative changes at the C5-6 and C6-7 levels remained. (AR 341, 382, 386, 402.) The evidence also shows that while Plaintiff complained of right-shoulder pain in 2008, it improved after a cortisone shot, and she did not complain of any shoulder pain or exhibit reduced range of motion in her 2010 consultative exam. (AR 367, 370, 422.) It is also clear from the record that Plaintiff's plantar fasciitis had improved by January 2008; during her 2010 consultative exam, she did not complain of foot pain and her feet were "normal." (AR 179-209, 367-71.)

Third, the ALJ also properly gave the opinions less weight because they were inconsistent with each other despite being offered days apart. (AR 24); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4) (explaining that more weight should be afforded to medical opinions that are consistent with the record as a whole). For example, Dr. Landrey opined that Plaintiff could stand for 30 minutes at a time and Dr. Tran stated she could stand for only 15 minutes (AR 456, 462); Dr. Tran opined that she could never lift or carry more than 10 pounds and Dr. Landrey stated she could do so occasionally (AR 457, 462); and Dr. Tran indicated that Plaintiff could not even walk one block, but Dr. Landrey opined that she needed to walk for 15 minutes every hour (AR 457, 461).

Fourth, the ALJ properly concluded that the opinions were inconsistent with Plaintiff's reported daily activities. (AR 24.) Plaintiff testified that she was able to drive; take care of her six-year-old granddaughter, of whom she had sole custody; and occasionally grocery shop, cook, attend church, and read the Bible for three hours a day. (AR 37-38, 47-51.) The ALJ was entitled to determine that the ability to perform these activities was inconsistent with the opinions of Drs. Landrey and Tran that, for example, Plaintiff could not walk, stand, or sit for any extended period of time. (AR 454-64.)

Fifth, the ALJ properly found that the opinions of Drs. Landrey and Tran were inconsistent with the conservative treatment recommended for Plaintiff's neck and feet. (AR 24); see Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding ALJ properly rejected opinion of treating physician who prescribed conservative treatment yet opined that claimant was disabled). For example, following her neck surgery, Plaintiff was prescribed pain medication and physical therapy, and in April 2010, her treating neurologist, Dr. Rodriguez, opined that no further surgery was recommended and Plaintiff should continue with conservative treatment as needed for her pain. (AR 376-81, 383, 385, 387, 393.) Additionally, as discussed above, Plaintiff's plantar fasciitis improved by January 2008. (AR 179-209.)

Sixth, the ALJ was entitled to credit the opinion of Dr. Sophon instead of Drs. Landrey and Tran because his opinion was supported by independent clinical findings and thus constituted substantial evidence upon which the ALJ could properly rely. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). Dr. Sophon reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and conducted a complete orthopedic examination of Plaintiff. (AR 367-73.) The ALJ also properly relied on the fact that the opinions of Drs. Landrey and Tran conflicted with the opinions of nonexamining physicians Drs. Bitonte and Laiken. (AR 25, 320-36, 363-66); see Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 ("The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when. . . consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence."). Moreover, any conflict in the properly supported medical-opinion evidence was the sole province of the ALJ to resolve. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041.

The ALJ also properly rejected Dr. Tran's opinion that Plaintiff's psychological condition affected her physical condition and that she was incapable of even low-stress jobs because Dr. Tran was not a specialist in psychology and because no evidence existed in the record that Plaintiff alleged having a mental impairment or received any mental health treatment. (AR 24, 461); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5) ("We generally give more weight to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who is not a specialist.").

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his RFC assessment because he did not consider the VE's testimony that supported a finding of disability. (J. Stip. at 24.) The VE testimony cited by Plaintiff, however, refers to hypotheticals posed to the VE that contained limitations opined by Drs. Landrey and Tran that, as discussed above, were properly rejected by the ALJ and thus not required to be included in Plaintiff's RFC. (See AR 58-59); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Nor was the ALJ bound to accept as true the restrictions set forth in the second hypothetical question if they were not supported by substantial evidence. An ALJ is free to accept or reject restrictions in a hypothetical question that are not supported by substantial evidence."); Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 ("[B]ecause the ALJ included all of the limitations that he found to exist, and because his findings were supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did not err in omitting the other limitations that Rollins had claimed, but had failed to prove.").7

In sum, the ALJ's RFC assessment was supported by substantial evidence, and Plaintiff is not entitled to reversal on this claim.

B. The ALJ Did Not Err in His Step-Two Analysis

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in his step-two assessment by failing to consider the severity of Plaintiff's lower-back injury with disc damage, right-shoulder impingement, weight, anxiety, and depression. (J. Stip. at 3-4, 10-12.) Reversal is not warranted on this basis because substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's step-two determination.

At step two of the sequential evaluation process, a plaintiff has the burden to present evidence of medical signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings that establish a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that is severe and can be expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D));8 see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1509. Substantial evidence supports an ALJ's determination that a claimant is not disabled at step two when "there are no medical signs or laboratory findings to substantiate the existence of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment." Ukolov, 420 F.3d at 1004-05 (citing SSR 96-4p). An impairment may never be found on the basis of the claimant's subjective symptoms alone. Id. at 1005.

Step two is "a de minimis screening device [used] to dispose of groundless claims." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. Applying the applicable standard of review to the requirements of step two, a court must determine whether an ALJ had substantial evidence to find that the medical evidence clearly established that the claimant did not have a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Despite the deference usually accorded to the Secretary's application of regulations, numerous appellate courts have imposed a narrow construction upon the severity regulation applied here."). An impairment or combination of impairments is "not severe" if the evidence established only a slight abnormality that had "no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work." Webb, 433 F.3d at 686 (citation omitted).

1. Depression and anxiety

Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to present evidence of medical signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings that establish that her alleged depression and anxiety constituted medically determinable mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 ("A physical or mental impairment must be established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by your statement of symptoms."). The only evidence Plaintiff cites in support of her contention that the ALJ failed to properly consider the severity of her depression and anxiety is Dr. Tran's statement in his physical RFC questionnaire that Plaintiff had been prescribed antidepressant and anxiety medications. (J. Stip. at 4, 12.) Apart from this brief reference, the record is devoid of any mental-health treatment notes or functional limitations opined by any medical professional resulting from Plaintiff's depression or anxiety. Thus, the logical inference is that even if Plaintiff did suffer from depression and anxiety, any symptoms were adequately controlled with medication. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) (ALJ may consider effectiveness of medication in evaluating severity and limiting effects of impairment); Warre v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for [Social Security] benefits."). Further, Plaintiff testified that the only impairments affecting her ability to work were related to her feet and neck; she never mentioned any symptoms resulting from depression or anxiety. (AR 32-56.) Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's depression and anxiety did not constitute medically determinable impairments. (AR 24); see Ukolov, 420 F.3d at 1004-05.

2. Obesity

As a general rule, an ALJ must determine the effect of a claimant's obesity upon her other impairments and ability to work. Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003); see also SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281 (Sept. 12, 2002) (requiring an ALJ to consider the effects of obesity at several points in the five-step sequential evaluation). An ALJ must "evaluate each case based on the information in the case record," as obesity may or may not increase the severity or functional limitations of other impairments. SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281, at *6.

A review of the record reveals that in the proceedings before the Commissioner, neither Plaintiff nor her attorney ever claimed obesity constituted a disabling impairment or otherwise resulted in any functional limitations. Rather, Plaintiff claimed to be disabled as a result of neck and foot impairments, and the ALJ found, at step two, that Plaintiff has severe neck and foot impairments. (AR 21, 64, 69.) Plaintiff presented no evidence that her obesity exacerbated her other impairments, limited her functioning, or impaired her ability to work, whether alone or in combination with her other alleged impairments. The only medical evidence concerning Plaintiff's obesity was a statement from Dr. Sophon that Plaintiff was obese and an April 5, 2005 treatment note indicating that Plaintiff's complaints of foot pain might be related to her weight; but neither Dr. Sophon nor any other doctor ever discussed any limitations resulting from her obesity. (AR 214, 369.) Given the lack of any medical evidence that Plaintiff's obesity exacerbated her impairments or resulted in any functional limitation, as well as the failure of Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, to claim to be disabled based on obesity, whether as an impairment or a source of functional limitations, the ALJ's failure to address Plaintiff's obesity at step two does not require reversal. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no reversible error, notwithstanding ALJ's failure to consider obesity at step two, because, as in this case, there was little evidence that plaintiff's obesity exacerbated other impairments and plaintiff was represented by counsel).

3. Shoulder and back impairments

Even assuming there is sufficient evidence in the record to show that Plaintiff suffered from right-shoulder impingement and a lower-back injury, the existence of either of these conditions alone did not constitute a severe impairment if it did not prevent Plaintiff from working. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (severe impairment is one that "significantly limits [claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities"). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's right-shoulder and low-back pain were not severe. With respect to the right shoulder, as the ALJ noted, while Plaintiff presented with right-shoulder pain in April 2008, by May 2008 she reported feeling "1000 times better after the cortisone injection." (AR 23, 423-24, 428.) There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff required further treatment for her right shoulder or that any pain was not adequately controlled with medication. Moreover, regarding her low-back injury, while Plaintiff reported injuring her lower back in a fall in 1990, she continued to work until 2007. (AR 367); Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1165-66 (ALJ properly considered fact that plaintiff worked six years after injury in determining his functional capacity). As discussed above, at the hearing Plaintiff testified that the only impairments limiting her ability to work resulted from her neck and feet issues. (AR 32-56.) Indeed, even Plaintiff's counsel conceded at the hearing that Plaintiff was "not really mentioning the back although there were some complaints of it[.]" (AR 60.) Finally, Plaintiff fails to cite any medical opinions containing functional limitations resulting from her right-shoulder or lower-back injuries. Based on the aforementioned evidence, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Plaintiff's right-shoulder impingement and low-back injury did not constitute severe impairments because they did not have more than a minimal effect on her ability to work.

In any event, even if the ALJ erred by finding Plaintiff's alleged shoulder and low-back impairments nonsevere, that error was harmless because he considered these impairments when determining her RFC at step four. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (failure to address particular impairment at step two harmless if ALJ fully evaluated claimant's medical condition in later steps of sequential evaluation process); see also Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (ALJ's error harmless when "inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination"). Specifically, the ALJ properly accounted for any work-related impairments resulting from Plaintiff's shoulder and lower-back pain by limiting her to occasional shoulder/overhead reaching and postural activities and providing that she must be given normal breaks from sitting. (AR 22.)

Plaintiff is not entitled to remand on this ground.

C. The ALJ Did Not Err in Determining that Plaintiff's Condition Did Not Meet or Equal a Listing

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ "looked solely at Social

Security listing 1.00." (J. Stip. at 12.) In particular, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ failed to

(Id.)

1. Applicable law

At step three of the sequential disability-evaluation process, the ALJ must evaluate the claimant's impairments to see if they meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in the Listings. See 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(d); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). The claimant has the initial burden of proving that an impairment meets or equals a Listing. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530-33, 110 S.Ct. 885, 891-92, 107 L. Ed. 2d 967 (1990). "To meet a listed impairment, a claimant must establish that he or she meets each characteristic of a listed impairment relevant to his or her claim." Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099. "To equal a listed impairment, a claimant must establish symptoms, signs and laboratory findings `at least equal in severity and duration' to the characteristics of a relevant listed impairment, or, if a claimant's impairment is not listed, then to the listed impairment `most like' the claimant's impairment." Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526). Medical equivalence, moreover, "must be based on medical findings"; "[a] generalized assertion of functional problems is not enough to establish disability at step three." Id. at 1100 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526).

An ALJ "must evaluate the relevant evidence before concluding that a claimant's impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ, however, need not "state why a claimant failed to satisfy every different section of the listing of impairments." Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding ALJ did not err in failing to state what evidence supported conclusion that, or discuss why, claimant's impairments did not satisfy a Listing). Moreover, the ALJ "is not required to discuss the combined effects of a claimant's impairments or compare them to any listing in an equivalency determination, unless the claimant presents evidence in an effort to establish equivalence." Burch, 400 F.3d at 683 (citing Lewis, 236 F.3d at 514).

2. Analysis

The ALJ's step-three determination is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step three by failing to identify which Listing he was considering or explain why he concluded that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal a Listing. (J. Stip. at 12, 17.) Although it is true that the ALJ found only that Plaintiff "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1" and that "[n]o treating or examining physician has recorded findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed impairment, including Listing 1.00, nor does the evidence show medical findings that are the same or equivalent to those of any listed impairment," without specifically stating what evidence supported his conclusion (AR 21-22), elsewhere in the decision he dedicated three single-spaced pages to summarizing and analyzing the medical evidence and Plaintiff's testimony (AR 22-25). Because those findings were sufficient to support the ALJ's step-three conclusion that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal a Listing, he did not err. See Gonzalez, 914 F.2d at 1201 (rejecting claimant's argument that ALJ erred by failing to discuss why he did not satisfy Listing because four-page "evaluation of the evidence" was "an adequate statement of the foundations on which the ultimate factual conclusions are based" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Lewis, 236 F.3d at 513 (ALJ must discuss and evaluate evidence that supports step-three conclusion but need not do so under specific heading).

Moreover, the ALJ "is not required to discuss the combined effects of a claimant's impairments or compare them to any listing in an equivalency determination, unless the claimant presents evidence in an effort to establish equivalence." Burch, 400 F.3d at 683 (citing Lewis, 236 F.3d at 514). Here, Plaintiff and her counsel never asked the ALJ to consider any Listings in the 12 series, and Plaintiff has failed to point to any credited evidence of functional limitations that would have affected the ALJ's analysis, nor has she offered any plausible theory of how the combination of her impairments equaled a Listing. The ALJ therefore did not commit reversible error by failing to make additional findings at step three.

D. The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing Plaintiff's Credibility

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting her credibility. (J. Stip. at 36-38, 44-45.) Because the ALJ did provide clear and convincing reasons supporting his evaluation of Plaintiff's testimony and those reasons were supported by substantial evidence in the record, reversal is not warranted on this basis.

1. Applicable law

An ALJ's assessment of pain severity and claimant credibility is entitled to "great weight." See Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1986). "[T]he ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). In evaluating a claimant's subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ engages in a two-step analysis. See Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36. "First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment [that] could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged." Id. at 1036 (internal quotation marks omitted). If such objective medical evidence exists, the ALJ may not reject a claimant's testimony "simply because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably produce the degree of symptom alleged." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282 (emphasis in original). When the ALJ finds a claimant's subjective complaints not credible, the ALJ must make specific findings that support the conclusion. See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, those findings must provide "clear and convincing" reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. If the ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the reviewing court "may not engage in second-guessing." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.

2. Relevant facts

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she stopped working at Costco in January 2007 because of symptoms related to bilateral plantar fasciitis. (AR 33.) Plaintiff acknowledged that her job duties at Costco likely led to her condition but stated that she did not file a workers' compensation claim. (AR 33-34.) When the ALJ inquired why not, Plaintiff initially responded that she was hoping to return to Costco because it was a good employer but then said "there wasn't any reason" she didn't file a claim and that "[t]o be honest," she was on state disability at the time so she was seen by other doctors. (AR 33-35.) She stated that since her state disability had run out, she had been supported by her husband and earned some money caring for her six-year-old granddaughter, of whom she had sole custody. (AR 37-38.) Plaintiff explained that she stopped working because of the pain in her feet but developed pain in her neck in March 2008, after she had stopped working. (AR 38-39.) She explained that her neck was currently the "bigger obstacle" to her working. (AR 45.) She testified that in March 2008, she "woke up and [she] felt like [she] slept on her neck wrong so [she] didn't know there was a problem." (AR 39.) She further indicated that she had injured her neck in 2001, for which she filed a workers' compensation claim, but the doctor who examined her in March 2008 did not feel it was related to that injury. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, she would have been able to perform a "seated job" between January 2007 and March 2008 but could not presently work because her neck was in "constant acute pain." (AR 39-40.) Plaintiff also stated that she was initially treated conservatively for her neck pain but had neck surgery in October 2008 that provided "immediate improvement but then it, the, the symptoms started coming back." (AR 40.) She explained that she had two additional herniated discs, "the C3 and 4 and C5 and 6." (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff testified that her neck pain had gotten worse since the surgery and "goes down into the middle of [her] spine into her shoulder blades up into the skull of [her] head." (AR 41.) She acknowledged that her treating neurologist was aware of her two herniated discs, but only conservative treatment, consisting of "[p]hysical therapy, massages, [and] pain medication," had been recommended. (Id.) Plaintiff did note that her treating neurologist suggested more surgery might be a possibility but also said that she would be "exchanging one pain for another." (Id.) She indicated that her neurologist suggested she go to a specialist for a Botox injection to treat her neck pain but that her insurance would not cover it. (AR 46.)

Plaintiff testified that what she did on a daily basis was dictated by her pain, for which she took a pain medication, an antiinflammatory, and a muscle relaxer and used a pain patch. (AR 42-43.) She indicated that the pain medication sometimes caused the pain to "subside," but that at other times she must do additional care, like "laying on a heating pad or ice packs" several times a day as needed. (AR 43.) She had trouble falling and staying asleep and woke three to four times a night, which caused her to need naps during the day. (AR 44.) She estimated that since March 2008, she spent at least 50% of the day lying down. (AR 48.) Plaintiff explained that she did not do any activities away from home except go to medical appointments, but she was able to drive and did drive her granddaughter to school. (AR 47.) She later admitted that she also occasionally grocery shopped and attended church. (AR 48, 51.) Finally, Plaintiff also stated that she cooked, got her granddaughter ready in the morning and drove her to school, and read the Bible for about three hours a day. (AR 49-51.)

3. Analysis

(AR 23.)

Reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ's alleged failure to make proper credibility findings or properly consider Plaintiff's subjective symptoms. The ALJ partially credited Plaintiff's allegations in assessing an RFC more restrictive than that opined by Dr. Sophon. (AR 22, 25.) To the extent the ALJ did reject Plaintiff's allegations, he provided clear and convincing reasons for doing so. As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff's treatment records "show substantial improvement from March 1, 2008 to the present." (AR 23.) Her plantar fasciitis improved after January 2008, no evidence showed she needed treatment after that time for foot pain, and her feet were normal during her January 2010 consultative exam. (AR 179-209, 367-71.) In addition, her neck pain improved after her October 2008 surgery; the most recent record from Dr. Rodriguez, her treating neurologist, in April 2010 recommended only conservative treatment and no future surgeries. (AR 376-77.) Based on this evidence, the ALJ was entitled to discount Plaintiff's subjective testimony to the extent it conflicted with the medical record. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 ("Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant's subjective testimony."); Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040 (in determining credibility, ALJ may consider "whether the alleged symptoms are consistent with the medical evidence"); Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 ("Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis."); Kennelly v. Astrue, 313 F. App'x 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (same); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ may infer that claimant's "response to conservative treatment undermines [claimant's] reports regarding the disabling nature of his pain").

The ALJ also properly rejected Plaintiff's subjective allegations on the basis that she did not file a workers' compensation claim after leaving work in January 2007 because of plantar fasciitis, a work-related injury. (AR 23.) While Plaintiff initially testified that she did not file a claim because she hoped to return to work, she then stated that there was no reason she did not file a claim and conceded that from January 2007 to March 2008, she would have been able to perform a "seated job." (AR 33-34, 45, 47, 53-54.) The ALJ reasonably considered Plaintiff's failure to file a claim as undermining her allegations that she was unable to work. See Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (in evaluating plaintiff's testimony, the ALJ may use "`ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation'" (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284)).

Moreover, as the ALJ noted, Plaintiff admitted that she was able to do a wide variety of daily activities, including driving, taking care of her six-year-old granddaughter, occasional grocery shopping, cooking, attending church, and reading the Bible about three hours a day. (AR 23, 42-51.) That Plaintiff's allegations of disabling pain were inconsistent with her daily activities was a valid reason for the ALJ to discount her testimony. See Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ properly discounted claimant's testimony because "she leads an active lifestyle, including cleaning, cooking, walking her dogs, and driving to appointments"); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 ("Even where [claimant's] activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant's testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.").

Because the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for his credibility finding and those reasons were supported by substantial evidence, the Court "may not engage in second-guessing" the ALJ. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 (citation omitted). Plaintiff is not entitled to reversal on this claim.

E. The ALJ Did Not Err in Failing to Consider Whether Plaintiff Was Disabled Under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines

Plaintiff contends the ALJ's RFC assessment that Plaintiff could perform a limited range of light work was "essentially" a finding that she could perform sedentary work and thus the ALJ should have determined that Plaintiff was disabled under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines ("the Grids"). See Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that Grids are used to assist in step-five determination of whether significant number of jobs exist in national economy that claimant can perform); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569. Plaintiff's contention lacks merit. Because the ALJ properly found, at step four, that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work, he was not required to go onto the next step and consider whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Grids. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) (explaining that the ALJ's inquiry is complete if he determines at step four that plaintiff is not disabled); 404.1560(b)(3) ("If we find that you have the residual functional capacity to do your past relevant work, we will determine that you can still do your past work and are not disabled. We will not consider your vocational factors of age, education, and work experience or whether your past relevant work exists in significant numbers in the national economy."). Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ should have applied the Grids because Plaintiff's past work "is best described as a `composite job.'" (J. Stip. at 36.) But the VE testified that Plaintiff's job at Costco was "really two different jobs" and said that Plaintiff could perform one of them. (AR 56-57.) This is in fact exactly like the case cited by Plaintiff, Castillo v. Astrue, No. CV 10-2584 JC, 2010 WL 4916608, at *4 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2010), in which the Court found an argument almost identical to Plaintiff's "unavailing." Moreover, because the ALJ properly rejected the opinions of Drs. Landrey and Tran, the ALJ's step-four finding was proper regardless of whether Plaintiff's past job could be characterized as a composite job. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to reversal on this basis.

VII. CONCLUSION

Consistent with the foregoing, and pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),9 IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.