MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND

CHARLES F. EICK, Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.

PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff filed a complaint on July 17, 2013, seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits. The parties filed a consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on August 12, 2013. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on January 3, 2014. Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on March 5, 2014. The Court has taken the motions under submission without oral argument. See L.R. 7-15; "Order," filed July 18, 2013.

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

Plaintiff asserts disability based on alleged physical and mental impairments (Administrative Record ("A.R.") 30-268). With regard to her alleged mental impairments, Plaintiff reported feeling "very overwhelmed," unable to handle stress, and "depressed and stressed out all the time" (A.R. 168, 172). A medical treatment record dated in May of 2011 also mentions "depression" (A.R. 243). At the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), Plaintiff referenced "stress" a number of times, and also claimed she had not gone to the doctor because she did not have insurance (A.R. 64-66). At the same hearing, the following colloquy occurred between Plaintiff's representative and the ALJ:

(A.R. 62-63).

The ALJ found Plaintiff has severe physical impairments but no severe mental impairment (A.R. 32). The ALJ's decision, which is dated July 5, 2011, states:

Following the ALJ's decision, Plaintiff submitted additional medical evidence. This evidence, which is attached to "Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or Remand," includes opinions from two physicians. Both of these physicians diagnosed depression and anxiety, and both physicians opined Plaintiff is not capable of performing even low stress jobs (Exhibits A and B to "Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or Remand"). Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, it appears that one of these opinions, that of Dr. Muzaffer, expressly relates to the time period beginning October 19, 2010 (Exhibit B, page 4). The other opinion, that of Dr. Mory, expressly relates to the time period beginning December 13, 2011 (Exhibit A, page 4).

The Appeals Council considered this additional evidence but denied review (A.R. 9-14). As the Appeals Council stated: "[t]his means that the Administrative Law Judge's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. . . ." (A.R. 9)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the Administration's decision to determine if: (1) the Administration's findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Administration used proper legal standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

Where, as here, the Appeals Council considered additional evidence but denied review, the additional evidence becomes part of the record for purposes of the Court's analysis. See Brewes v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[W]hen the Appeals Council considers new evidence in deciding whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that evidence becomes part of the administrative record, which the district court must consider when reviewing the Commissioner's final decision for substantial evidence."; expressly adopting Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993)); Taylor v. Commissioner, 659 F.3d 1228, 1231 (2011) (courts may consider evidence presented for the first time to the Appeals Council "to determine whether, in light of the record as a whole, the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was free of legal error"); Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 957 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993) ("the Appeals Council considered this information and it became part of the record we are required to review as a whole"); see generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b).

DISCUSSION

As Defendant appears to concede, the Court "may look to evidence submitted for the first time to the Appeals Council to determine whether the ALJ's decision is still supported by substantial evidence and free of reversible error" ("Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" p. 2, ll. 19-22 (citing Brewes v. Astrue, 682 F.3d at 1157)). In light of the evidence submitted for the first time to the Appeals Council, the ALJ's decision in the present case no longer is "supported by substantial evidence and free of reversible error."1 Remand is appropriate.2

An alleged impairment may be found "not severe" "when the medical evidence establishes only a small abnormality . . . which would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work.. . ." Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 85-28.3 This severity concept is merely "a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). If the non-severity of an alleged impairment "is not clearly established by medical evidence . . . adjudication must continue through the sequential evaluation process." SSR 85-28.

When the evidence submitted to the Appeals Council for the first time is included in the record, the evidence of record no longer "clearly establishes" the non-severity of Plaintiff's alleged mental impairments. In arguing the contrary, Defendant claims that the medical opinions submitted to the Appeals Council are irrelevant to the time period at issue. However, one of the opinions, that of Dr. Muzaffer, appears to be expressly directed to part of the time period at issue (10/19/10 - 7/15/11). Moreover, many if not most mental impairments are progressive in nature. See Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1121-22 (6th Cir. 1989), cited with approval in Morgan v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1991). Consequently, it would not be unreasonable to infer that a mental impairment found to be wholly disabling now may well have been "severe" during an immediately preceding time period.4

Also undercutting the validity of the Administrative decision in the present case is the Administration's special duty to develop the record. The Administration "has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant's interests are considered." Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000) ("Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits. . . ."). The Administration's duty to develop the record is "especially important" "in cases of mental impairments." DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991).

On the present record, this Court cannot deem the errors in the Administrative decision to have been harmless. The circumstances of this case indicate that there is a substantial likelihood the ALJ's consideration of the additional evidence submitted to the Appeals Council would materially alter the ALJ's disability analysis. Therefore, remand is appropriate. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011); see also INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (When a court reverses an administrative determination, "the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.") (citations and quotations omitted).

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons,5 Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.