ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 10TH CLAIM FOR RELIEF OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

[DKT No. 15.]

DEAN D. PREGERSON, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant County of Riverside ("Defendant)'s Motion to Dismiss Portions of Second Amended Complaint. (DKT No. 15.) The Motion is fully briefed and suitable for adjudication without oral argument. Having reviewed the parties' submissions, the court now adopts the following order.

I. Background

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss focuses on one of twelve causes of action asserted by Plaintiff Valerie Williams ("Plaintiff") arising from the death of her son, Anthony James Lawson ("Lawson"). The relevant factual allegations are as follows:

Lawson began to walk in the opposite direction and was detained when Defendant Deputy Ryan Rahner ("Rahner") arrived on the scene. (¶ 30.) Lawson was known by Rahner from previous contacts in the neighborhood and, Plaintiff alleges, Rahner knew, or should have known, that Lawson had a mental illness. (¶ 31.) As a result of his mental distress, Lawson walked away from Bracey and tried to evade the deputies' attempts to hold him down or place him in handcuffs, while making "animal-like sounds." (¶ 33.) Though Lawson attempted to avoid the officers, he did not attempt to harm anyone. (Id.)

In response to a call for back-up, Defendant Deputy Steven Lycopolus ("Lycopolus") arrived on the scene and immediately used two full cartridges of an X26 taser on Lawson, discharging the weapon nine times in less than three minutes. (¶ 36.) Lycopolus also struck Lawson several times on his head. (¶ 27, 38.) Bracey, Rahner, and Lycopolus then pinned Lawson to the ground in an attempt to place handcuffs on him. (¶ 40.) The officers also used a hobble device to tie Lawson's legs together. (¶ 42.)

The Defendants summoned paramedics to the scene at approximately 1:05 a.m. when they realized Lawson was unresponsive and not breathing. (¶ 44.) Defendants did not attempt to render first aid to Lawson. (Id.) Lawson was declared dead at the hospital. (¶ 45.)

II. Legal Standard

A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must "accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Although a complaint need not include "detailed factual allegations," it must offer "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion "are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. In other words, a pleading that merely offers "labels and conclusions," a "formulaic recitation of the elements," or "naked assertions" will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. at 679. Plaintiffs must allege "plausible grounds to infer" that their claims rise "above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief" is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

III. Discussion

The instant Motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's Tenth Cause of Action. This claim seeks relief under California Civil Code § 52.1 ("the Bane Act").

Section 52.1 provides a right to relief when someone "interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of [California]." The elements of a claim for relief thus include (1) an act of interference with a legal right by (2) intimidation, threats or coercion. See Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329, 334 (1998). A suit may be brought for damages, injunctive relief, or other equitable relief, as well as reasonable attorney's fees. See § 52.1(a),(b),(h).

Plaintiff's Bane Act claim alleges that Defendants "interfered or attempted to interfere, by threatening or committing acts of violence, coercion or intimidation, with [Lawson's] exercise and enjoyment of, inter alia, the following rights":

(SAC ¶¶ 138-139.3.) The court considers the viability of Plaintiff's Section 52.1 claim as to each of the rights with which Plaintiff asserts Defendants interfered.

A. Interference with the Right to be Free from Excessive Force

First, the court considers whether Plaintiff has stated a viable Section 52.1 claim as to Defendants' alleged interference with Lawson's right to be free from excessive force. (See SAC ¶ 139.1 (second clause, marked [1][b] above.) As Defendant notes, the majority of relevant cases support the view that an allegation of excessive force is insufficient to state a claim under Section 52.1 absent an allegation that the defendant used such force to interfere with a separate, independent right of the plaintiff. The Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force is not such a separate, independent right. See, e.g., Justin v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 2008 WL 1990819 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2008) ("[A] claim under section 52.1 cannot be predicated on allegations that Defendants used force to interfere with [the plaintiff's] right to be free from bodily restraint or harm. Section 52.1 is only applicable when a defendant intends by his or her conduct to interfere with a separate, affirmative right enjoyed by a plaintiff; it does not apply to a plaintiff's allegation of use of excessive force absent a showing that the act was done to interfere with a separate state or federal constitutional right.") (internal citations omitted); Josfan v. Indochine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4689, 36-37 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012) (dismissing Section 52.1 claim on ground that the "[p]laintiff has not alleged that the officers' alleged use of excessive force interfered with a separate constitutional right"); Jones v. City of Oakland, 2013 WL 1333933 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013) ("A claim under Section 52.1 may only proceed if there is evidence of `threats, intimidation, or coercion' independent from the Constitutional violation (such as wrongful detention or excessive force) itself.").

Several courts have suggested that excessive force alone can satisfy the requirements of Section 52.1. See, e.g., Knapps v. City of Oakland, 647 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Warner v. Cnty. of San Diego, 2011 WL 662993 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011). However, these cases do not present a persuasive basis for deviating from the majority view. Knapps, on which Warner relies, bases its conclusion that the plaintiff, a victim of excessive force by police officers, stated a claim under Section 52.1 on the proposition that "the elements of a section 52.1 excessive force claim are essentially identical to those of a § 1983 excessive force claim." 647 F. Supp. 2d at 1168. However, this proposition is not supported by reasoning or reasoned authority.1

Having considered the relevant authority, this court adopts the majority view. Under this approach, Defendants' alleged interference with Lawson's right to be free from excessive force cannot be the basis for a viable Section 52.1 claim. Accordingly, the court will dismiss, with prejudice, Plaintiff's Section 52.1 claim insofar as it asserts such a theory in the second clause of SAC ¶ 139.1.

B. Interference with the Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

Next, the court considers whether Plaintiff has stated a viable Section 52.1 claim with respect to Defendants' alleged interference with Lawson's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. (See SAC ¶ 139.1 (first clause, marked [1][a] above).)

As an initial matter, there is no doubt that a plaintiff may state a viable Section 52.1 claim by alleging that a defendant subjected him to an unlawful arrest and, in so doing, exercised excessive force. In other words, an arrest without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, can constitute the violation of a separate and independent right that Section 52.1 requires. See Bender v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 217 Cal.App.4th 968 (2013) ("[T]he Bane Act applies because there was a Fourth Amendment violation—an arrest without probable cause—accompanied by the beating and pepper spraying of an unresisting plaintiff, i.e., coercion that is in no way inherent in an arrest, either lawful or unlawful.")

However, in the instant case, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to plausibly assert that an unlawful arrest occurred. Plaintiff alleges that, while en route to Plaintiff's residence, Defendant Bracey heard a call notifying him of a burglary in the same area and mistakenly identified Lawson as the suspect in the burglary. (SAC ¶ 25.) Plaintiff additionally asserts at various points in the SAC that "it is inconclusive simply from Lawson's race and dress that Lawson was in fact the same person identified as a suspect in the burglary call." (SAC ¶¶ 57, 67, 78.) No other relevant facts are alleged. These allegations are too conclusory to plausibly assert that Lawson was arrested without probable cause. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Accordingly, the court will dismiss, without prejudice, Plaintiff's Section 52.1 claim insofar as it asserts interference with Lawson's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as stated in the first clause of SAC ¶ 139.1.

C. Interference with the Right to Free from Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

The court next considers whether Plaintiff has stated a viable Section 52.1 claim with respect to her assertion that Defendants interfered with Lawson's "right not to have his serious medical needs ignored by officials." (FAC ¶¶ 139.3.) Defendant moves to dismiss the claim as to this theory of relief on the basis that it implausibly involves retroactive causation. Defendant does not clearly explain its reasoning, but its argument appears to be that Defendants' use of force, which it contends caused the need for medical care, could not logically have interfered with Lawson's right to not have his subsequent medical needs ignored. (Mot. at 5, 9.)

Plaintiff does not respond to Defendant's argument in her Opposition. However, upon its own review of the pleadings, the court is not persuaded that the claim should be dismissed on the basis that Defendant advocates. The SAC repeatedly asserts that, prior to their use of major force on Lawson, Defendants failed to seek or provide medical care for Lawson, despite observing symptoms—namely that Lawson was dripping in sweat and appeared to be incoherent—which indicated that Lawson was in need of immediate medical attention and despite Deputy Rahner's prior familiarity with Lawson, from which he knew or should have known that Lawson had a mental illness. (See SAC ¶¶ 28-35.) These allegations undermine Defendant's retroactive causation argument.

However, the court finds this component of Plaintiff's Section 52.1 claim deficient for a different reason: The right invoked by Plaintiff—the 14th amendment right to be free from deliberate indifference on the part of the government to one's medical needs while in custody—cannot logically be interfered with by threats, intimidation, or coercion. "The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by `threats, intimidation or coercion,' tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law, or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law." Austin V. v. Escondido Unified School Dist., 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 883 (2007). However, in the case of the right of persons in custody to not have their serious medical needs deliberately ignored, the right involved is not one which may be exercised by a plaintiff by performing or not performing particular conduct(or by acquiescing in the conduct of others) and which may thus be the subject of external interference. Rather, the right implies an affirmative duty on the government to undertake certain conduct—namely, to provide one in custody with necessary medical care. See Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). A right of this sort may only be violated through the government's inaction, i.e. by failing to provide the care required; the right may not, as a matter of logic, be interfered with by means of threats, intimidation, or coercion. In sum, a Section 52.1 claim is incompatible with a deliberate indifference theory. For this reason, the court will dismiss Plaintiff's Section 52.1 claim, with prejudice, insofar as it asserts such a theory in SAC ¶ 139.3.

D. Interference with the Purported Right to Seek Medical Treatment

Finally, the court considers whether Plaintiff has stated a viable Section 52.1 claim with respect to her assertion that Defendants interfered with Lawson's "right to seek medical treatment for his serious medical needs." (SAC ¶ 139.2.) Plaintiff has not cited any authority establishing such a generalized right and the court is not aware of any such authority. See, e.g., Ogrod v. United States, 2007 WL 2319766 (E.D. Pa Aug. 10, 2007) ("The plaintiff claims that the constitutional right at issue is the right to seek medical care that he contends is protected by the Eighth Amendment. The defendants argue that there is no constitutional right to seek medical care but only to receive medical care when in prison. The Court agrees with the defendants.") To the extent that Plaintiff is invoking the right of persons in custody to not have their serious medical needs deliberately ignored by authorities, this theory of relief is unsuccessful for the reasons just discussed. Because the court is not persuaded that Plaintiff has asserted a cognizable theory of relief, the court will dismiss the claim with prejudice insofar as it is premised on interference with the Lawson's purported right to seek medical treatment, as stated in SAC ¶ 139.2.2

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the court will GRANT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Tenth Cause of Action for violations of California Civil Code § 52.1. The Tenth Cause of Action is dismissed with prejudice insofar as the claim asserts that Defendants interfered with Lawson's rights to be free from excessive force, to seek medical treatment for his serious medical needs, and to have his serious medical needs not ignored by officials. The Tenth Cause of Action is dismissed without prejudice insofar as it asserts that Defendants interfered with Lawson's right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.

IT IS SO ORDERED.