MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND

JACQUELINE CHOOLJIAN, Magistrate Judge.

I. SUMMARY

On November 1, 2013, plaintiff Gary Steven Daniel ("plaintiff") filed a Complaint seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of plaintiff's application for benefits. The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, respectively ("Plaintiff's Motion") and ("Defendant's Motion"). The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15; November 4, 2013 Case Management Order ¶ 5.

Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order of Remand.

II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

On February 9, 2011, plaintiff filed applications for Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. (Administrative Record ("AR") 16, 168, 173). Plaintiff asserted that he became disabled on June 30, 2007, due to depression, anxiety, carpal tunnel syndrome (right hand), allergies, femoral hernia, and stress. (AR 191). The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") examined the medical record and heard testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert on May 9, 2013. (AR 36-73).

On May 31, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled through the date of the decision. (AR 16-24). Specifically, the ALJ found: (1) plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)/chronic bronchitis, and possible right-sided carpal tunnel syndrome (AR 18); (2) plaintiff's impairments, considered singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment (AR 19); (3) plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b)) with additional limitations1 (AR 20); (4) plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work as a shuttle bus driver (AR 22); (5) there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform, specifically car rental deliverer and mobile lounge driver (AR 22-23); and (6) plaintiff's allegations regarding his limitations were not fully credible (AR 21).

The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's application for review. (AR 8).

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Sequential Evaluation Process

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that the claimant is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the work the claimant previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).

In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is to follow a five-step sequential evaluation process:

Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110 (same).

The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (claimant carries initial burden of proving disability).

B. Standard of Review

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), a court may set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations and quotations omitted). It is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990)).

To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, a court must "`consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion.'" Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the ALJ's conclusion, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues, in pertinent part, that the ALJ erred at step five in determining that plaintiff had past relevant work skills that would permit plaintiff to adjust to a "significant range" of other work within plaintiff's residual functional capacity. (Plaintiff's Motion at 4-7). In light of the Ninth Circuit's determination (discussed below) that a "significant range" of other work means a "significant number of occupations," this Court agrees. Since the Court cannot find that the ALJ's error was harmless, a remand is warranted.

A. Pertinent Law

If, at step four of the sequential evaluation process, the claimant meets his burden of establishing an inability to perform past work, the Commissioner must show, at step five, that the claimant can perform some other work that exists in "significant numbers" in the national economy (whether in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country), taking into account the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100 (citation omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The Commissioner may satisfy this burden, depending upon the circumstances, by the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as "the Grids"). Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100-01). Where (i) a claimant suffers from both exertional and nonexertional limitations; (ii) the Grids do not mandate a finding of disability based solely on the claimant's exertional limitations; and (iii) the claimant's non-exertional limitations are at a sufficient level of severity such that the Grids are inapplicable to the particular case, the Commissioner must consult a vocational expert.2 Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007); see Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir.) (2006); Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989). The vocational expert's testimony may constitute substantial evidence of a claimant's ability to perform work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy when the ALJ poses a hypothetical question that accurately describes all of the limitations and restrictions of the claimant that are supported by the record. See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101.

ALJs routinely rely on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") "in determining the skill level of a claimant's past work, and in evaluating whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy." Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(d)(1), 416.966(d)(1) (DOT is source of reliable job information); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995) (DOT is presumptive authority on job classifications).

Rule 202.07 of the Grids is in issue in this case. Where, like here, a claimant is of advanced age (i.e., 55 years or older), is limited to light work, and is unable to perform past relevant semi-skilled or skilled work, Rule 202.00(c) (which is incorporated by reference into Rule 202.07) directs a finding of "disabled" unless the claimant has "skills that are [] readily transferable to a significant range of [other] semi-skilled or skilled work that is within the individual's [residual] functional capacity. ..."3 20 C.F.R. Part 404, subpt. P, app. 2. §§ 202.07, 202.00(c) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit construes the phrase "significant range of . . . work" in Rule 202.00(c) to require "a significant number of occupations." Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1117.

When an ALJ determines at step five that a claimant has acquired skills at a past relevant skilled or semi-skilled job that would permit plaintiff to adjust to a significant range of other skilled or semiskilled work in the national economy, the ALJ must include in the written decision certain findings of fact, supported by substantial evidence, specifically (1) the specific transferrable "work skills" the plaintiff acquired from the past relevant work; and (2) "[the] specific occupations to which the acquired work skills are transferable. ..." Bray v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 554 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting SSR 82-41). The ALJ must make such specific findings even where the ALJ relies on the testimony of a vocational expert. Id. at 1225 (citations omitted).

B. Additional Pertinent Facts

At the May 9, 2013 administrative hearing, the vocational expert ("VE") testified that plaintiff's past relevant work included the job of shuttle bus driver (DOT § 913.663-018) — a semi-skilled occupation at the medium exertional level with a specific vocational preparation ("SVP")4 Level of 3. (AR 62, 253). The VE opined that while working as a shuttle bus driver, plaintiff had acquired transferrable skills of "driving" and "keeping minimal records." (AR 64-65).

At the hearing, the ALJ posed a hypothetical question to the VE which included all limitations noted in the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment for plaintiff. (Compare AR 20 with AR 66-67, 68). In response, the VE testified that plaintiff — or a hypothetical person with the same age, education, vocational background, and residual functional capacity as plaintiff — could perform the representative jobs of car rental deliverer (light, semi-skilled, SVP Level 3) (DOT § 919.663-010) and mobile lounge driver (light, semi-skilled, SVP Level 3) (DOT § 913.663-014), which required the unique skills acquired in plaintiff's past relevant work but no additional skills. (AR 64-68, 253).

Based upon the VE's testimony, the ALJ included the following pertinent findings in the administrative decision: (1) plaintiff (who was born on February 1, 1952) was an individual of "advanced age" (i.e., 55 years old) on the alleged disability onset date (i.e., June 30, 2007), and plaintiff subsequently changed age categories to "closely approaching retirement" (i.e., age 60 or old);5 (2) in his past relevant work as a shuttle bus driver, plaintiff acquired work skills of "driving" and "record-keeping"; (3) plaintiff could perform the representative occupations of car rental deliverer (DOT § 919.663-010) and mobile lounge driver (DOT § 913.663-014); and (4) under the framework of Rule 202.07 of the Grids, plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 22-23).

C. Analysis

The ALJ's finding that plaintiff could do only two representative occupations (i.e., car rental deliverer and mobile lounge driver) was insufficient to satisfy the Commissioner's burden at step five to show that there is a "significant range of [other] semi-skilled or skilled work" that plaintiff could do. In short, two occupations6 simply do not constitute a "significant" number for purposes of Rule 202.00(c), as construed by the Ninth Circuit. Cf. Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1117 ("One occupation does not constitute a significant range of work [for purposes of Rule 202.00(c)]."); see generally Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant ("significant" refers to "a noticeably or measurably large amount"); cf. Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.3d 771, 775 (9th Cir. 1987) (amended) (whether there are a significant number of jobs a claimant is able to perform with his limitations is question of fact to be determined by a judicial officer).

The Court cannot find the ALJ's error harmless. At the hearing the VE essentially testified that there were no skilled or semi-skilled occupations other than car rental deliverer and mobile lounge driver to which plaintiff (or a hypothetical individual with the same other characteristics as plaintiff) could adjust using the skills plaintiff acquired from his past relevant work. (AR 64-69). Thus, on the current record and under governing Ninth Circuit law, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's implicit finding that, for purposes of Rules 202.07 and 202.00(c), there was a "significant range of [other] semi-skilled or skilled work" that plaintiff could do. In addition, defendant points to no other persuasive evidence in the record which could support the ALJ's non-disability determination at step five. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (ALJ error generally harmless where it is "inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination") (citations and quotation marks omitted).

V. CONCLUSION7

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is reversed in part, and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.8

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.