DEAN D. PREGERSON, District Judge.
Presently before the court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the court grants the motion and adopts the following order.
In 2008, Plaintiff Heather Hughes ("Hughes") purchased the rights to a screenplay (the "Script") titled "Sarah's Gift." (Declaration of Sarah Lupen, Ex. H ¶ 2.) Hughes rewrote and renamed the script, which she the registered with the United States Copyright Office and Writer's Guild of America West. (Lupen Decl., Ex. H ¶¶ 3-4.)
In 2011, Defendant Jonah Hirsch ("Hirsch") recommended the Script to Helping Hands Productions, LLC ("Helping Hands").
In July 2011, Hughes entered into a purchase option agreement with Helping Hands. (Lupen Decl., Ex. J.) Helping Hands paid Hughes $7,500 for a one-year option ending July 26, 2012. (Lupen Decl., Ex. H ¶ 11.) Under the terms of the option agreement, Helping Hands had the right to extend its purchase option for another year by tendering another $7,500 to Hughes at any time prior to July 26, 2012. (Lupen Decl., Ex. J.) Helping Hands did not purchase the script. (Lupen Decl., Ex. H ¶¶ 12, 15.)
A dispute arose as to the ownership of the Script, leading Plaintiffs to file the instant action in this court. Plaintiffs and Helping Hands arbitrated their dispute, which resulted in an arbitration award concluding that Helping Hands had no claim to the Script. (Lupen Decl., Ex. C.) Plaintiffs and Helping hands then entered into a stipulated judgment in this case. (Dkt. 46, 48).
Hirsch and Fixed Point declined to submit to binding arbitration. Plaintiffs now seek summary judgment declaring that Hughes is the sole owner of the Script.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
It is not the court's task "to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact."
There do not appear to be any disputes of material fact.
Hirsch's argument is somewhat unclear to the court. Plaintiffs claim only that they own all rights, title, and interest to the Script, to which Hirsch appears to stake no claim. (FAC ¶ 54; Opp. at 2.) This alone would seem to warrant summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.
To the extent Hirsch contends that Plaintiffs are not the
Furthermore, even if Hirsch did own a copyright to creative expressions incorporated into the Script, that would not necessarily entitle him to an authorship or ownership interest in the Script. "[A]uthorship is not the same thing as making a valuable and copyrightable contribution."
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' First, Second, and Third causes of action are DISMISSED, with prejudice, at Plaintiffs' request. Each party shall bear its own costs.