JAY C. GANDHI, Magistrate Judge.
Alejandro Hernandez Bernal ("Plaintiff") challenges the Social Security Commissioner ("Defendant")'s decision denying his application for disability benefits. In particular, Plaintiff contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in determining Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). (See Joint Stip. at 5-10, 14-16.) The Court addresses, and rejects, Plaintiff's contention below.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly determined his RFC. (See id.) Specifically, the ALJ erred by rejecting the medical opinions of Plaintiff's treating and examining physicians, as well as the "other source" opinions provided by Plaintiff's chiropractors. (Id.) The Court takes each argument in turn.
First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Brent Pratley. (See id. at 7-10.)
"Although a treating physician's opinion is generally afforded the greatest weight in disability cases, it is not binding on an ALJ with respect to the existence of an impairment or the ultimate determination of disability." Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he opinion of the treating physician is not necessarily conclusive as to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability."). Nevertheless, "the ALJ must present `specific and legitimate reasons' for discounting the treating physician's opinion, supported by substantial evidence." Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Here, the ALJ properly gave limited weight to Dr. Pratley's treating opinion for two reasons.
First, the ALJ properly gave limited weight to Dr. Pratley's opinion because he prescribed conservative treatment. (Administrative Record ("AR") at 30); see Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ properly rejected opinion of treating physician who prescribed conservative treatment). Specifically, the ALJ noted that "Dr. Pratley opined that [Plaintiff] would benefit from a conservative course of treatment, including physiotherapy, home exercises, and pain medication." (AR at 30, 408.) Dr. Pratley further advised Plaintiff to visit a
Next, the ALJ properly rejected the more extreme limitations imposed by Dr. Pratley in light of his relatively benign findings. (AR at 30-31); see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 1988) (ALJ properly rejected treating physician's opinion which was unsupported by treatment notes, personal observations, or test reports). For instance, findings from physical examinations included that Plaintiff ambulated well, and the range of motion of his lumbar spine was only slightly diminished. (AR at 30, 402-11.) While there was some evidence of tenderness in the paraspinal muscles bilaterally, "there was no guarding or spasm noted." (Id.) Furthermore, a nerve conduction study was normal, "indicating no evidence of radiculopathy or neuropathy." (Id. at 30, 454-59.)
As such, the ALJ properly weighted Dr. Pratley's opinion.
Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of his examining physician, Dr. Anthony T. Fenison. (See Joint Stip. at 6-7.)
An ALJ may reject the controverted opinion of an examining physician only for "specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence." Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31).
Here, however, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Fenison's opinion. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, Dr. Fenison never opined that Plaintiff was restricted to lifting 13.5 pounds. (See Joint Stip. at 6; AR at 301.) Rather, after noting that Plaintiff's chiropractor, Dr. Gasparian, found such a restriction, Dr. Fenison explicitly rejected the finding as "somewhat excessive." (Id. at 301, 495.) Indeed, Dr. Fenison only precluded Plaintiff from "repetitive activities involving his lumbar spine" and "heavy lifting activities." (Id. at 28, 301) (emphasis added). As such, the ALJ actually adopted Dr. Fenison's opinion in finding that Plaintiff "cannot perform repetitive stopping, crouching, or twisting[,]" but can "carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently[.]" (Id.)
The ALJ thus properly evaluated Dr. Fenison's examining opinion.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of his chiropractors, Drs. Anna Gasparian and Andrew Mer. (See Joint Stip. at 8-10.)
Because chiropractors are not "acceptable medical sources," 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991) ("a chiropractor[] . . . is not considered an acceptable medical source[]"), their opinions are entitled to less weight than those offered by physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d). An ALJ may discount "other source" opinions if he gives germane reasons for doing so. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); see Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993); accord Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, the ALJ committed no error in rejecting certain lifting limitations imposed by Plaintiff's chiropractors
For the above reasons, the ALJ properly evaluated the opinions of Plaintiff's physicians and chiropractors, and in turn, properly determined Plaintiff's RFC.
Based on the foregoing,