JAY C. GANDHI, Magistrate Judge.
Maximo Hernandez, Jr. ("Plaintiff") challenges the Social Security Commissioner's decision denying his application for disability benefits. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in concluding that he does not meet Listing 112.05C. (See Joint Stip. at 7-12.) The Court addresses, and rejects, Plaintiff's contention below.
As a rule, a claimant has the burden to prove that he has an impairment that meets or equals a Listing. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005). "[T]o show that his impairment matches a Listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify." Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
To prove functional equivalence, a claimant must present medical findings related to his impairment that "are at least of equal medical significance to the required criteria" of the listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.924(e), 416.926(a). However, the ALJ is not required to state why a claimant fails to meet or equal every section of the Listings, as long as the ALJ adequately summarizes and evaluates the evidence. Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1990).
In this case, the ALJ committed no error in finding that Plaintiff does not meet or equal a Listing. Two reasons support this determination.
First, the ALJ properly relied on the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Avazeh Chehrazi, in finding that Plaintiff does not meet or equal Listing 112.05C. (See Administrative Record ("AR") at 23, 191-97); Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[T]o the extent that [the examining physician's] opinion rests on objective clinical tests, it must be viewed as substantial evidence . . . .").
In particular, Dr. Chehrazi opined that Plaintiff is not limited in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, and only mildly limited in handling complex instructions. (Id. at 23, 197.) Further, Dr. Chehrazi found that Plaintiff is socially appropriate, communicates clearly, and would be able to interact appropriately with supervisors, co-workers, and peers on a consistent basis. (Id.) Indeed, Dr. Chehrazi assigned Plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") score of 72, indicating only "transient" or "temporary" symptoms. (Id. at 23, 197); see Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (revised 4th ed. 2000) at 34 (GAF score of 72 reflects less than mild symptoms). Thus, despite Plaintiff's low IQ score, Plaintiff does not have "significant limitations," let alone a presumptively disabling impairment. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 1 § 112.05C. While Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ's interpretation of Dr. Chehrazi's opinion, the ALJ's interpretation was reasonable, and is thus entitled to deference. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 ("Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion that must be upheld.").
Second, the signatures of the two State agency reviewing physicians, Drs. L. Limos and R. Tashjian, on Plaintiff's Disability Determination Explanation and Transmittal forms, provide additional evidence that Plaintiff does not meet or equal a Listing. (See AR at 82, 84); Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180 at *3 (July 2, 1996) ("The signature of a State agency medical or psychological consultant on an SSA-831-U5 (Disability Determination and Transmittal Form) . . . ensures that consideration by a physician (or psychologist) designated by the Commissioner has been given to the question of medical equivalence at the initial and reconsideration levels of administrative review."). Here, both Drs. Limos and Tashjian specifically considered Plaintiff's symptoms and IQ score, and found that he does not meet or equal Listing 112.05C. (Id.)
Accordingly, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff is not disabled. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001).
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT judgment shall be entered