ALKA SAGAR, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Pamela J. Robbins ("Plaintiff"), a former proof machine operator at a bank, asserts disability since February 1, 2007, based on alleged physical and mental impairments. (A.R. 129-135.) The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") examined the record and heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") on March 28, 2012. (A.R. 26-30.) The ALJ denied Plaintiff benefits in a written decision. (A.R. 11-22.) The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ's decision. (A.R. 1-3.)
On October 9, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), alleging that the Social Security Administration erred in denying her disability benefits. (Docket Entry No. 3.) On February 7, 2014, Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint, and the Certified Administrative Record ("A.R."). (Docket Entry Nos. 13, 14.) The parties have consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge. (Docket Entry Nos. 9, 10.) On April 30, 2013, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation ("Joint Stip.") setting forth their respective positions on Plaintiff's claim. (Docket Entry No. 15.)
"Social Security disability benefits claimants have the burden of proving disability."
At step one, the ALJ must determine whether or not the claimant is actually engaged in any "substantial gainful activity," as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572. If claimant is not so engaged, the evaluation continues to step two.
At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimed physical or mental impairments are severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). When determining severity, "the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's impairments on her ability to function, without regard to whether each alone was sufficiently severe."
At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant's severe impairments are disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The claimant is considered disabled if her purported conditions meet or are medically equivalent to a listing found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
If the ALJ concludes that claimant is not disabled at step three, the ALJ moves to step four and considers whether the claimant can return to her past relevant work.
If the claimant proves in step four that she cannot return to her past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). At step five "the burden of proof shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant can do other kinds of work."
In applying for disability insurance benefits, Plaintiff alleged the following disabling severe impairments: anxiety, degenerative disk disease, depression, scoliosis, arthritis, and high blood pressure. (A.R. 130.) Additionally, at the hearing before the ALJ on March 28, 2012, Plaintiff testified that she has pain in her left knee and in her back. (A.R. 37-38.) Plaintiff claimed that as a result of her depression, she would lay down throughout the day and not socialize with friends. (A.R. 41.)
The ALJ applied the five-step evaluation process to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled. (A.R. 13-21.) At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not engaged in any "substantially gainful activity." (A.R. 13.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: degenerative disk disease of the lumbar spine with radiculopathy, depressive disorder, and mood disorder. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's severe impairments did not meet or equal a medical listing found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (A.R. 13-14.)
Next, before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform unskilled, light work with the following limitations:
(A.R. 15.) The ALJ based the finding of Plaintiff's RFC on the opinions of: Dr. Hoang, an orthopedic consultant; Dr. El-Khoury, a pain management doctor; Dr. Bagner, III, a psychiatric consultant; and Dr. Xie, a neurologist. (A.R. 15-19.)
At step four, the ALJ concluded, based on the testimony of the vocational expert ("VE"), that Plaintiff could no longer work as a proof machine operator and had no transferable skills from that job. (A.R. 20.)
At step five, the ALJ summarized the VE's testimony, stating that the VE had found that Plaintiff could perform the following jobs identified in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"): (1) inspector/hand packager (DOT No. 559.687-074); (2) marker II (DOT No. 920.687-126); or (3) assembler of small products II (DOT No. 379.687-030). (A.R. 21.) The ALJ then relied on the VE's testimony, along with Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, to conclude that "the claimant is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy." (
This court reviews the Administration's decision to determine if: (1) the Administration's findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) The Administration used proper legal standards. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279. "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance."
Plaintiff contends that there is an inconsistency between the ALJ's RFC assessment, which limits Plaintiff to work that is "solitary and not in coordination with others," (A.R. 15), and the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff can perform the jobs identified by the VE. (Joint Stip. 2-8.) Plaintiff explains the inconsistency by citing to the DOT, which indicates that each of the jobs identified by the VE requires some degree of interaction with people (e.g., taking instructions from, or helping, other people). (Joint Stip. 4-7.)
After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds that the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from material
The ALJ found that Plaintiff's function report, dated May 18, 2011, indicated she had no problem getting along with family, friends, neighbors, or others, and she has never been fired or laid off from a job because of problems getting along with other people. (A.R. 19, 180, 181.) Moreover, the ALJ noted that when Dr. Bagner performed a psychiatric consultative evaluation of Plaintiff on February 5, 2011, he stated that "Plaintiff would have no limitations interacting with supervisors, peers and the public." (A.R. 16.)
During the hearing on March 28, 2012, Plaintiff testified that as a result of pain in her back and depression, she lays down a lot during the day and avoids socializing. (A.R. 38-39, 41, 42.) She also testified that she had "extreme anxiety" and "fe[lt] very nervous a lot." (A.R. 32.) Accordingly, the ALJ presented a hypothetical to the VE that included all of Plaintiff's physical and mental limitations, including limitations involving social interactions (i.e., contact with the general public and coordination with other individuals). (A.R. 47-49.) The ALJ explained to the VE the limitation with regard to Plaintiff's social interactions as follows:
(A.R. 49 (emphasis added).) The VE then testified that a hypothetical person with Plaintiff's limitations could perform various unskilled, light exertional jobs, including that of an inspector/hand packager, marker II, and assembler of small products II. (A.R. 50-51.)
After considering Plaintiff's testimony at the hearing that she is very anxious and nervous, the ALJ gave Plaintiff "the benefit of doubt" and determined that her RFC should contain the following limitation: "no contact with the general public and can only perform work in solitary and not in coordination with others." (A.R. 15.) The ALJ then found, based on the VE's response to his hypothetical at the hearing, that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the Plaintiff can perform. (A.R. 21.)
Plaintiff incorrectly characterizes her RFC, stating that the limitation requires her to work in "complete isolation" and "avoid all contact with coworkers." (Joint Stip. 4.) However, as the ALJ explained in the hearing, the RFC limitation does not preclude Plaintiff from being around other people. Rather, it merely requires that the job not involve communication between Plaintiff and another party in order to finish their work.
Plaintiff contends that an ALJ cannot rely on expert testimony that contradicts the DOT unless the record contains persuasive evidence to support the decision. (Joint Stip. 3 (citing
Moreover, the ALJ properly relied on the VE's testimony because the hypothetical presented to the VE considered all of the claimant's limitations that were supported by the record.
There is no inconsistency between the ALJ's RFC assessment and finding that Plaintiff can perform the jobs identified by the VE. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.