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U.S. v. Jackson, SA CR 12-269(B)-AG. (2014)

Court: District Court, C.D. California Number: infdco20141231818 Visitors: 15
Filed: Dec. 29, 2014
Latest Update: Dec. 29, 2014
Summary: ORDER SEVERING TRIAL AND CONTINUING TRIAL DATE TO MARCH 8, 2016 AND RE EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIOD PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ACT Trial ANDREW J. GUILFORD, District Judge. The Court has read and considered the Stipulation Severing Trial, Continuing Trial Date, and Re Excludable Time Period pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act filed by the government and defendant F. Scott Jackson in this matter on December 22, 2014. The Court hereby finds that the Stipulation, which this Court incorporates by reference i
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ORDER SEVERING TRIAL AND CONTINUING TRIAL DATE TO MARCH 8, 2016 AND RE EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIOD PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ACT Trial

ANDREW J. GUILFORD, District Judge.

The Court has read and considered the Stipulation Severing Trial, Continuing Trial Date, and Re Excludable Time Period pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act filed by the government and defendant F. Scott Jackson in this matter on December 22, 2014. The Court hereby finds that the Stipulation, which this Court incorporates by reference into this Order, demonstrates facts that support a severance and continuance of the trial date in this matter for defendant F. Scott Jackson and provides good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.

THEREFORE, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The charges against, and trial of, defendant F. Scott Jackson are hereby severed from the trial of the remaining defendants in this case

2. The trial date for defendant F. Scott Jackson is continued from February 3, 2015, to March 8, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. A Status Conference is set for February 29, 2016 at 2:00 p.m.

3. For purposes of computing the date under the Speedy Trial Act by which defendant Jackson's trial must commence, the time period of February 3, 2015, to March 8, 2016, inclusive, shall be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(2) because the delay results from a period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the government pursuant to a written agreement with defendant, with approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.

4. Nothing in this Order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence.

All motions filed by defendant Jackson are ordered off calendar and vacated as moot.

Source:  Leagle

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