JACQUELINE CHOOLJIAN, Magistrate Judge.
On February 25, 2015, Judith Ramirez ("petitioner"), a state prisoner who is proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, with an attached memorandum ("Petition Memo"). Petitioner challenges a judgment in Ventura County Superior Court. On April 1, 2015, respondent filed an Answer and a supporting memorandum ("Answer").
For the reasons stated below, the Petition is denied, and this action is dismissed with prejudice.
On August 22, 2012, a Ventura County Superior Court jury found petitioner guilty of the second degree murder of her daughter on May 29, 2010 (count 1), two counts of child endangerment (counts 2 & 3), driving with a suspended license on May 29, 2010 (count 4), driving under the influence of alcohol on January 27, 2007 (count 5), driving while having a 0.08 percent or higher blood alcohol level on January 27, 2007 (count 6), and driving with a suspended/revoked license on January 27, 2007 (count 7). (CT 419-32). As to count 1, the jury found true allegations that petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury on her four-year-old son and Abilene Diaz. (CT 419). As to counts 2 and 3, the jury also found true allegations that petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury on her son and daughter. (CT 421-24).
On October 30, 2012, the trial court sentenced petitioner to 23 years to life in state prison. (Lodged Doc. 6 at 2; CT 481-88).
On June 24, 2014, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in a reasoned decision. (Lodged Doc. 1). On August 27, 2014, the California Supreme Court denied review without comment. (Lodged Doc. 8).
Since petitioner raises a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Court has independently reviewed the state court record (
On May 29, 2010, petitioner's 17-year-old daughter, Victoria Ramirez, was killed while petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Earlier in the day, petitioner drove Victoria, her four-year-old son (Jose H.), and Victoria's friend (Abilene Diaz) to a party in Nyeland Acres. Petitioner consumed beer before going to the party, drank a beer on the way to the party, and drank a lot of beer at the party. Jaquelin Garcia saw petitioner seated at a table with two or three open cans of beer.
When petitioner left the party at 9:00 p.m., Garcia asked if petitioner was okay to drive or needed a ride. Petitioner said that her daughter (Victoria) or daughter's friend (Diaz) was driving. Liana Marron, the party host, asked "Are you okay?" "Do you want me to take you?" Petitioner said that Diaz was driving. As they walked to petitioner's Nissan Pathfinder, Victoria asked petitioner to let Diaz drive. Petitioner insisted on driving and was drunk, which concerned Diaz and Victoria. On a prior occasion, petitioner said that if she was stopped for drunk driving they would throw her in jail.
At 9:08 p.m., petitioner stopped at a Valero gas station on Vineyard Avenue and purchased a large can of beer. Petitioner drank the beer from a brown paper bag as she drove northbound on Vineyard Avenue to Santa Paula. Diaz noticed that petitioner was zigzagging and saw a truck coming at them head-on.
A motorist, Maria Sanchez, saw the Nissan swerve three or four times and go over the center line into oncoming traffic. Sanchez turned on her emergency lights to warn motorists and pulled over. As petitioner approached a curve in the road, petitioner lost control of the Nissan, hit a ditch culvert, and rolled over two times. Diaz, who was in the front passenger seat, suffered facial lacerations. Petitioner's daughter, Victoria, was in the rear passenger seat and died from blunt-force head injuries.
Petitioner's four-year-old son, Jose, was trapped in the rear passenger seat and suffered a broken arm. Jose yelled, "Help me. Help me" and "Sorry, Mom. Sorry, Mom." Petitioner was worried, and in an angry voice, told Jose to "Shut your trap" and "Don't say anything more." After a paramedic arrived, petitioner screamed, "Is my daughter fucking dead? Don't fucking lie to me. Tell me, is she fucking dead?"
California Highway Patrol Officer Richard Holguin responded to the 911 call and found a can of beer in a brown bag 10 to 15 feet from the Nissan. The can was "freshly opened" and had beer in it. Officer Holguin contacted petitioner at the hospital and noted that she had a strong odor of alcohol and red and glassy eyes. Petitioner had minor cuts to her face and left arm, and contusions across the shoulder and chest. Officer Holguin believed the injuries were consistent with petitioner being the driver and asked how the accident happened. Petitioner said "My brakes didn't work. I couldn't stop." When Officer Holguin asked where petitioner started driving from, petitioner replied "I never said I was driving." Officer Holguin responded, "You just told me that your brakes weren't working. That kind of implies to me that you were driving."
Petitioner repeatedly asked about her daughter but not about her son who was crying loudly in the hospital trauma room. Petitioner said that she drove through the curves on Vineyard, that the brakes did not work, and that she tried to drive into a field and crashed. When petitioner was told that her daughter was dead, petitioner yelled out, "No. It's my fault. I should have been the one who had died."
Petitioner admitted drinking earlier in the day but could not recall how much. Officer Holguin noted that petitioner's speech was thick and slurred and administered simple field sobriety tests. Petitioner failed the tests and was asked to take an alcohol breath test. Petitioner said, "Go ahead. I was drunk anyways." Petitioner blew into a preliminary alcohol screening device which registered a .124 percent blood-alcohol concentration (BAC). When Officer Holguin asked petitioner for a second breath sample, petitioner pursed her lips and pretended to blow.
Petitioner was arrested, waived her rights under
At trial, Diaz testified that petitioner purchased a beer at a liquor store before the party and drank it as she drove them to the party. Diaz noticed that the Nissan was swerving and that petitioner had difficulty controlling the vehicle.
The day before the occurrence the number one, northbound lane on Vineyard Road was resurfaced. Marc Mumford, the project supervisor, testified that the construction zone was posted 25 miles per hour and that Caltrans wanted the signs to stay up over the weekend. Before the occurrence, Mumford's crew placed yellow and white reflective tabs on the road to mark the center line and northbound traffic lanes. Three foot tall, orange reflective cylinders were placed along the edge of the roadway every 30 feet.
Petitioner defended on the theory that the Nissan brakes did not work, that the steering locked up, and that the road was too dangerous to drive on. These claims were refuted by expert testimony that the Nissan had no mechanical problems, that Vineyard Avenue was safely marked for nighttime driving, and that the road resurfacing did not cause the accident. Wesley Vandiver, an accident reconstruction expert, opined that the Nissan was traveling 60 miles per hour when petitioner drove it off the road.
Counts 5 through 7 are based on a 2007 DUI. Shortly after midnight on January 27, 2007, petitioner ran a stop sign with no headlights on and turned left in front of a patrol car driven by Oxnard Police Officer Joseph Clarke. Officer Clarke braked to avoid hitting petitioner and followed for two or three blocks as petitioner made quick jerky movements. Petitioner was driving with a suspended license and said that she had two or three drinks at a nearby bar. Petitioner's speech was slurred and her eyes were red and tired. Officer Clarke asked if petitioner was feeling the effects of alcohol. Petitioner said "I feel good" and that she was on her way to pick up her son. Petitioner admitted that she was "too drunk" to perform a field sobriety test and took a blood test which registered a .18 percent BAC. After petitioner was arrested for DUI, her driver's license was suspended.
In 2004 petitioner was convicted of DUI and ordered to attend an alcohol school program. Before petitioner was expelled from the program, petitioner attended a class on the risks and dangers of driving while intoxicated, a class on the statistics of alcohol related car accidents resulting in injury or death, and a class about DUI victims and their families. It was stipulated that petitioner's driver's license was suspended as a result of the 2004 DUI conviction and that petitioner drove with a suspended license from December 4, 2004 through May 29, 2010 when the traffic fatality occurred.
This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus on "behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal court may not grant an application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"; or (2) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
In applying the foregoing standards, federal courts look to the last reasoned state court decision.
Petitioner contends that the evidence presented at trial did not support her second degree murder conviction because there was insufficient evidence to prove implied malice. The California Court of Appeal — the last state court to issue a reasoned decision addressing this claim — rejected the claim on its merits on direct review. (Lodged Doc. 6 at 5-9). Based on an independent review of the record (
On habeas review, a court's inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence is subject to two layers of judicial deference.
Second, on habeas review, "a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was `objectively unreasonable.'"
Under California law, second degree murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought" but without additional elements that would support a conviction of first degree murder.
This is not a close case. It was more than objectively reasonable for the Court of Appeal to conclude that the evidence presented at petitioner's trial was sufficient to support a finding of implied malice because such evidence established, among other things, that petitioner's blood alcohol content well exceeded the legal limit, she had a pre-drinking intent to drive, she knew the hazards of driving while intoxicated, and she engaged in highly dangerous driving. (Lodged Doc. 6 at 6-8). As the Court of Appeal explained:
(Lodged Doc. 6 at 6-8) (citations omitted). This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal's findings and analysis. Petitioner's suggestion that the evidence does not support an inference that she was subjectively aware that she was engaging in conduct that was dangerous to human life and deliberately acted with conscious disregard for life was properly rejected by the Court of Appeal:
(Lodged Doc. 6 at 8-9) (citations omitted). This Court again agrees.
Although petitioner appears to claim that she is entitled to relief because the evidence supports an inference that she was not acting with implied malice and did not actually appreciate the hazards involved, she misapprehends the standards governing the assessment of this claim. Even if the jury could have reasonably drawn an inference that petitioner did not act with implied malice, this Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.
In sum, the Court of Appeal's rejection of petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of implied malice was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: (1) the Petition is denied and this action is dismissed with prejudice; and (2) the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.